The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine: Stages of the Maidan Movement and Why They Constitute a Revolution
The mass demonstration in Kyiv on Sunday, 1 December 2013 was attended by 350,000 people—young and old, of different faiths and ideologies, Ukrainians from the west, south, and east—all subverting the legitimacy of the Yanukovych-Azarov regime through their collective action on Maidan. This mass demonstration, supplemented by a myriad of anti-government protests on that day, marked the popularization of EuroMaidan. On 2 December the cities Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk announced a general strike in solidarity with the anti-government protests. What united the people was a perception of widespread government corruption, abuse of power, and violation of human rights.
However, what made the people take to the streets was the conviction that their collective action could in fact lead to change, and moreover, that this change was necessary. The Yanukovych-Azarov regime paid lip service to the demands of EuroMaidan and the political opposition but ultimately had no interest in compromising with either. Hence, despite the “oddly festive” mood in the tent-city of Maidan Nezalezhnosti, the second stage of the revolutionary process was one of great uncertainty, with the pendulum of momentum swaying between the regime and its opponents.
On 3 December Prime Minister Azarov’s government survived a vote of no-confidence in parliament, but the momentum remained in the hands of Maidan. The “March of a Million” on 8 December in Kyiv attracted 500,000 people. A group of activists then toppled the statue of Lenin in downtown Kyiv, later replacing the monument with a golden toilet to symbolize the corruption of the political elite in Ukraine. On 10 December the police raided the offices of the largest political opposition party, Batkivshchyna.
The following day the Berkut riot police unsuccessfully attempted to clear the peaceful protesters from Maidan Nezalezhnosti; 11 December was remembered as the “night of resistance” and strengthened the resolve of the protesters. However, it was not entirely clear how popular EuroMaidan’s support was across Ukraine. The Kyiv Post wrote on 15 December that “in all the ups and downs of EuroMaidan, it’s hard to tell which side has the momentum at the moment—President Yanukovych or those demanding his resignation.”
President Yanukovych had issued a statement on 1 December saying that he was “deeply outraged” at the brutality used by the riot police against peaceful protestors on 30 November, and appealed to the Ukrainian people that “we are united in our common choice of a European future.” But these words were not supported by any visible actions. On 17 December Yanukovych signed the “Ukrainian-Russian Action Plan,” in which Russia promised to buy $15 billion in Ukrainian debt and cut natural gas import prices by one third, which further aggravated EuroMaidan protesters. On 20 December the Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor Pshonka presented parliament a one-sided story about the violence on 30 November that had sparked the popularization of EuroMaidan.
A Ukrainian political consultant, Tars Berezovets, argued that by accusing the protesters of provoking police brutally instead of punishing those guilty of exceeding their powers, the authorities effectively showed their intention of keeping the riot police—i.e. force and intimidation—as the main guarantee of their power. Rather prophetically, Berezovets said that “every force will get its counter argument sooner or later and the denial to listen to the nation will most likely cause more violent conflicts.”
At the Sunday rally on 22 December the political opposition parties announced that they would join hands to form the “Maidan People’s Union,” which Batkivshchyna’s leader Yatseniuk said was modelled on Poland’s “Solidarity” movement in the 1980s. On New Year’s Eve 200,000 people gathered on Independence Square and sang the Ukrainian national anthem, ushering in 2014. On 1 January 15,000 people participated in a torchlight march through Kyiv celebrating the 105th birthday of Stepan Bandera. The presence of the far right on EuroMaidan, notably the Svoboda Party, Privy Sektor (Right Sector), and Spilna Sprava (Common Cause), was a fact, but neither the anti-government resolve nor collective action was monopolized by these far-right groups.
To clarify, EuroMaidan was not supported by every Ukrainian—many vehemently opposed the movement—but all available evidence suggests that the majority of Ukrainian people did support EuroMaidan, either directly or tacitly. Comprehensive networks emerged to deliver donations, food, and other supplies to Maidan. Police reinforcements were obstructed from reaching Kyiv, e.g. people blocking roads, railroads, and painting windshields. What is more, there existed no sizeable pro-government rallies, not even in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine which represented the electoral base of the Party of Regions.
Despite the scale and duration of EuroMaidan, by mid January the peaceful demonstrations had not led to any changes in government. The Yanukovych-Azarov regime showed no interest in compromising with EuroMaidan or the political opposition. Instead, behind closed doors, the government pursued an orchestrated campaign to smear critics, sideline opposition leaders, and use law enforcement to harass activists and rely on courts for favourable rulings. The regime waged a war of information to delegitimize EuroMaidan. The 5,000 to 10,000 protestors who settled on Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv remained firm in their commitment to oust the government, “for their honesty and future,” as one protester put it.
But the numbers that attended the mass Sunday rallies started telling a different story; they became progressively smaller, and on 12 January just 10,000 people rallied. The people were losing faith that their collective action could bring about change. The pendulum of momentum swung in favour of President Yanukovych, who saw the opportunity ripe for the regime to consolidate its power. On 16 January the parliament passed into law a series of “draconian” measures that restricted freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, effectively turning all those who opposed the regime from “romantics into radicals.”
During the second stage of the revolutionary process, Maidan developed into a community of romantics who created an alternative body politic in the centre of Kyiv that opposed not just the Yanukovych-Azarov regime, but the entire system of power in Ukraine. “I’m afraid I just couldn’t go away from Maidan. The real life is here,” said one protester. Lynn Hunt describes this experience as a “mythic present: the instant of creation of the new community, the sacred moment of the new consensus.” Notably, the word “Maidan” adopted new meanings in the context, and for the purpose, of radical political change. Considering the case of the French Revolution in 1789, Hunt argued:
Revolutionary language did not simply reflect the realities of revolutionary changes and conflicts, but rather was itself transformed into an instrument of political and social change. In this sense, political language was not merely an expression of an ideological position that was determined by underlying social or political interests. The language itself helped shape the perception of interests and hence the development of ideologies.
In other words, revolutionary political discourse was rhetorical; it was a means of persuasion, a way of reconstituting the social and political world.
The word “Maidan” is just the Arabic world for “square,” a public space. But a “Maidan” now means in Ukrainian what the Ancient Greek word agora means in English: not just a marketplace where people happen to meet, but a place where they deliberately meet, precisely in order to deliberate, speak, and create a political society. During the revolutionary process in Ukraine the word “Maidan” came to mean the act of public politics itself, so that for example people who used their cars to organize public actions and protect other protestors were called the “automaidan.” In this light, “EuroMaidan” is an intriguing invention—linguistically rooted in both east and west, elusive to translate, and an insightful glimpse into the Ukraine’s troubled politics and history.
Who coined the term is not clear, and it became so popular so quickly that it seems almost to have sprung from the collective unconscious. Translating “EuroMaidan” as "EuropeSquare" would be technically accurate but emotionally impoverished because both elements mean much more. Ukraine is part of Europe geographically, but for the demonstrators and their supporters the concept of "Europe" had the resonance of a vision, vivid and frustratingly out of reach. Hence, as with Europe, Maidan became as much an idea as a place.
It was not just the words “Maidan” and “EuroMaidan” that were transformed into instruments of political and social change; the very language employed on Maidan helped shape the perception of interests and the development of ideologies during Ukraine’s revolutionary process. In December, posters on Maidan included phrases such as: “No Putin No Cry”; “Europe, dear, we are coming back home”; “Don’t steal Christmas tree toys, you are not Yanukovych”; “Yanukovych, we are fucking angry!”—together intimating the frustration of the people, domestic as well as geopolitical concerns, and the peaceful nature of Maidan.
One particularly imposing poster read: “Try to understand, this is just too much!” The poster was written in Russian by a group of protesters who had come to Kyiv from Kharkiv, in the east of Ukraine, reflecting that Maidan attracted people not just from western Ukraine, as some have claimed. Maidan became a public space on which Ukrainians could express their discontent with the Yanukovych-Azarov regime, and exercise political freedom. For as Hannah Arendt writes in On Revolution, “to be free is not merely to be unobstructed; it is to take positive action with others.” In the next stage of the revolutionary process, the spirit of Maidan intensified, and the people had to fight to defend their freedom to act in concert.
The “dictatorship laws” passed by parliament on 16 January 2014, and signed into law by President Yanukovych on the following day, sought to put an end to EuroMaidan. The laws de facto criminalized all of the opposition’s methods, and eliminated any sense of freedom of speech and assembly that remained in Ukraine, except for on Maidan. But instead of silencing dissent, the laws radicalized the revolutionary process. A mass demonstration was held on Maidan Nezalezhnosti on Sunday 19 January in defiance of the “draconian” laws.
This was the ninth consecutive Sunday rally, and unlike previous rallies, the people’s frustration was directed not just against the government, but also against the leaders of the political opposition. The crowds accused the opposition leaders of doing “more talking than leading,” and booed them off stage; even the most militant of Ukraine’s opposition leaders, Svoboda Party’s Tiahnybok, was taunted as “weak.” That evening clashes erupted between protesters and riot police, and when UDAR leader Klitschko tried to calm the situation he was publicly sprayed with a fire extinguisher by a young protester. What this signified was simple: the politicians were not in charge of this revolution, the people were.
The spirit of Maidan had dramatically changedsince the protests began on21 November 2013. The consensus was no longer that EuroMaidan was a peaceful protest, but a “people’s uprising.” Violent clashes between some 10,000 protestors and the Berkut and Interior Ministry special forces raged from 20 January to 22 January and led to a stand-off on Hrushevskoho Street. The revolutionary headquarters, the City Hall and Trade Union buildings, remained in the protesters’ hands.
The Kyiv Post described the “surreal and warlike” atmosphere of those days, “the smell of fire, smoke and tear gas, the scent of danger and the ominous drumming” of clubs and shields and shovels pounding aways at the road for stones to use as missiles. Ukraine’s Day of Unity on 22 January, celebrating the unification of east and west Ukraine in 1919, witnessed the first three deaths of Ukraine’s Winter Revolution—denoting its radicalization on a day that could hardly have carried more symbolism. The presence of victims solidified the unity amongst protesters, as well as amongst the larger part of the Ukrainian population that directly or tacitly supported EuroMaidan.
On 26 January parliament’s three opposition parties rejected a proposal by the Yanukovych-Azarov regime to end the “longest and fiercest political crisis in Ukraine’s history” because it did not include the cancellation of the “dictatorship laws.” Yatseniuk, leader of the Batkivshchyna Party, tweeted to President Yanukovych: “No deal. We’re finishing what we started. The people decide our leaders, not you.” Sovereignty shifted. Recognizing that he was losing control of the situation, Yanukovych on 28 January revoked the anti-protest laws and dismissed Prime Minister Azarov, who then fled to Austria. Yanukovych’s “compromises” were not appreciated in Moscow, and Russia imposed trade sanctions on
Ukraine and halted its $15 billion aid package, of which $3 billion had thus far been disbursed. On 29 January the opposition parties in parliament pushed for an amnesty bill, which Yanukovych reluctantly signed on 31 January, but only after adding to the bill a deadline on protesters to leave occupied government buildings within fifteen days. “Shame!” the opposition parties shouted, and said they must “call for a people’s assembly and discuss what to do next.” President Yanukovych used the time window to visit President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia.
The Maidan protestors and President Yanukovych entrenched their positions and were defiant not to retreat; the countdown to the final confrontation began. On 7 February a bomb hidden in a medical package exploded in the Trade Union’s building, crippling two protesters—16 and 20 years old. The Interior Ministry released a statement claiming that the explosion occurred because the protesters were making bombs, and warned that Maidan Nezalezhnosti was dangerous due to the presence of “criminal groups” operating under “right-wing ideology.”
The far-right had played a significant role in EuroMaidan since its popularization on 1 December, and these radical elements became more dominant as the government became less compromising. A leader of a Maidan self-defence unit said: “It’s true that Maidan is radicalizing, but the reason is that the authorities aren’t carrying out our demands.” UDAR leader Klitschko observed that the “people associate the government only with force,” making violence a logical response. Oleksandr Danylyuk’s, leader of Spilna Sprava, which seized the Agriculture, Energy, and Justice Ministry buildings on 27 January, said frankly: “We were very peaceful [before]. Now is the time for actions.”
The far-right groups were by no means alone in their call for action. At the twelfth consecutive Sunday rally on 9 February, which was attended by 50,000 people, the political opposition leaders called on the Ukrainian people to join the self-defence teams to protect EuroMaidan. The call was answered by thousands who were “ready to give [their] lives for freedom.” As a priest recalled: “We could not go back. Any retreat would mean corruption and lies and consent to live in dictatorship like in the USSR.” It would also mean persecution. Klitschko explained that because “the judiciary is not independent, nobody in Ukraine [could] have their future guaranteed, especially when they [stood] up to the system.” Yatseniuk spoke on behalf of the opposition camp, and for the majority of the Ukrainian people, when he proclaimed: “Our victory is through Maidan only. The real power is here at Maidan.” As the 17 February deadline for protesters to evacuate government buildings approached, the conditions for a peaceful resolution to the standoff between the regime and Maidan were elusive.
On 17 February, however, the three ministries that had been occupied by protesters on 27 January were handed back to the government, and it seemed as though both sides were moving towards a compromise. But rather than offering meaningful negotiations with EuroMaidan, President Yanukovych issued a further ultimatum demanding protesters leave Maidan Nezalezhnosti by 6 p.m. on 18 February. A Party of Regions minister commented: “It has to be done now if we don’t want to lose our country forever.” The opposition parties frantically tried to find a political resolution, but parliament was in deadlock. That same day Russia’s finance minister announced that Russia would resume its aid package to Ukraine, which had been interrupted since the dismissal of Azarov on 28 January. The visits to Kyiv by foreign emissaries from Europe and the United States did nothing to evade the impending bloodshed. When the crisis talks failed in the evening of 18 February, Yatseniuk declared: “We’re standing on the brink of the most dramatic page of the history of Ukraine.”
From 19 to 21 February central Kyiv became witness to the most serious clashes to grip the European continent in over a decade, and among the most serious since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. On 19 February the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)—successor of the Soviet-era KGB—announced it was beginning an “anti-terrorist operation,” effectively giving the police a cart blanche to use live ammunition against protesters. President Yanukovych replaced the head of the army’s general staff and announced that the armed forces would be deployed if a state of emergency was declared.
The mood of the 15,000 protesters manning the barricades on Maidan was nonetheless “aggressively upbeat,” and as the first wave of riot police failed to recapture the revolutionary headquarters, the protesters went on the offensive and marched towards Ukraine’s parliament. Twenty-six people were killed that day. In the evening a truce was declared between the government and the political opposition, but less than twelve hours later the fighting resumed in central Kyiv—both sides blamed the other for restarting hostilities. At least forty-six more people were killed on 20 February, many of them by sharp-shooters on rooftops.
On 21 February President Yanukovych finally assented to the demands of the political opposition, notably: early presidential elections before December 2014, a coalition government, Yulia Tymoshenko set free, and Yanukovych restoring the 2004 constitution, which would transfer considerable power from the president to parliament. Yanukovych also approved a full amnesty and the closing of all criminal cases against protesters since 21 November 2013. But after what had happened since the onset of the revolutionary process, and especially during the last two days, this political compromise was not enough for the men and women manning the barricades. When the political opposition announced the deal on Maidan that evening, they were booed off stage. “The people’s revolution continues!” the protesters shouted. President Yanukovych and his political allies received an ultimatum from militant protesters on Maidan, which essentially read: “resign now or else.” The protesters would not compromise with those in power with blood on their hands: “we are not afraid of anything now, we are ready to die.”
The true sources of power can be found in the vigorous action in concert among equals ready to sacrifice themselves for their beliefs. This is what Hannah Arendt argues in her essay On Violence, which she wrote following the Prague Spring in 1968. In light of those dramatic events, she observed:
The head on clash between Russian tanks and the entirely nonviolent resistance of the Czechoslovak people is a textbook case of a confrontation between violence and power…. To substitute violence for power can bring victory, but the price is very high; for it is not only paid by the vanquished, it is also paid by the victor in terms of his own power.
In the last instance, President Yanukovych substituted violence for power, and in effect lost what scarce power he had left. Arendt argues that violence and power are diametrically opposed; “where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent.” The sudden dramatic breakdown of the regime’s power that ushers in revolutions reveals in a flash how civil obedience—to laws, to rulers, to institutions—is but the outward manifestation of support and consent. Hence, Arendt makes a distinction between the power of government and the power of people—the former corresponding to the popular opinion of the people, the latter to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert. Over the course of the revolutionary process in Ukraine, more power shifted to the people every time the government used force against peaceful protesters, who in turn exerted their power by acting in concert. The more power Yanukovych’s regime lost, the more violent it had to become. The shift in power from the regime to the people became absolute when the streets of Kyiv turned red on 19 and 20 February 2014.
Violence during a revolutionary process reflects more than anything else the nature of the former regime, i.e. the extent to which violence was characteristic of the old regime and the impact of it on society at large. This line of argumentation evokes de Tocqueville’s thoughts in The Old Regime and the French Revolution, notably that the experience of the ancien regime, and the impact of this experience on the actions of the people during the French Revolution, was persistent and decisive in determining the course of the revolution. Violence, then, can be considered as merely the regurgitation of a former violent world, and is thus the least novel of revolutionary actions. Therefore, violence cannot be considered as a determinant of revolution unless considered directly in the context of power. Having said this, violence does serve one further purpose, and that is with regards to death. Arendt suggests:
Of all equalizers, death seems to be the most potent…. Death…is perhaps the most anti-political experience there is…. But faced collectively and in action, death changes its countenance; now it seems more likely to intensify our vitality than its proximity…. Our death is accompanied by the potential immortality of the group we belong to…. It is as though life itself…is “surging upward,” is actualized in the practice of violence.
Violence does not promote causes, neither history nor revolution, neither progress nor reaction; but it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention. And sometimes, violence is the only way of ensuring a hearing for moderation—“to ask the impossible in order to obtain the possible is not always counterproductive.” The victims of Maidan, the “heaven’s battalion,” usurped President Yanukovych and his associates of their power. Once those in power were ousted, the possibility existed that a process of reconciliation could begin in Ukraine. The onset of a counter-revolution, however, interrupted this possibility.Continued on Next Page »
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1.) The author is conscious of the fact that this is a contentious position to hold, for it rests on an understanding of “political legitimacy”—essentially democratic, i.e. the government is popular amongst its electorate—that is not definite and, therefore, not universally understood in such terms.
2.) Ilan Rachum, “The Meaning of “Revolution” in the English Revolution, 1648-1660,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 56 (1995): p. 214.
3.) Ibid, p. 211.
4.) Keith M. Baker, Inventing the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 206.
5.) Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 18.
6.) Ibid, p. 34.
7.) The displacement of the narrative from the political to the social, from the vicissitudes of thrones and governments to the progress of civil society, lay at the heart of Enlightenment thinking. Baker, Inventing the French Revolution, p. 212.
8.) Robin Okey, The Demise of Communist East Europe: 1989 in Context (London: Hodder Arnold, 2004), p. viii.
9.) While I disagree with Krejci’s attempt to develop a general revolutionary theory, his work does provide a number of valuable insights.
10.) Krejci suggests that revolution against sovereign authorities in the home country can be called “vertical revolution,” and revolution against sovereign authorities seated in another country “horizontal revolution.” Krejci suggests that only revolution in which action is initiated from below can be considered as a revolution in the proper sense of the word. Action from above and from the side can be styled as revolutions only in a broader meaning. Revolutions that are both vertical and horizontal, or started both from below and from above, may be described as “hybrid revolutions.” Jaroslav Krejci, Great Revolutions Compared: The Outline of a Theory (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 7-11.
11.) Ibid, p. 6.
12.) I constructed the narrative of the EuroMaidan Revolution, from 21 November 2013 to 1 March 2014, using a broad selection of media sources. The fact that these events are so current, and that the author does not speak Ukrainian or Russian, necessitated this primary focus on media sources. The greatest part of information was taken from the Kyiv Post, Russia Today, and EuroNews, all of which provided relatively objective coverage of the events in Ukraine. Kyiv Post has a slight European bias in its coverage, which is effectively complemented in the author’s research by using RT, which has a Russian bias. Among what is broadly defined as “Western” media, EuroNews provides a balanced coverage of the Ukraine crisis. Yet, considering the “haze of propaganda” to which the Maidan revolution has been subjected, i.e. a war of narratives, it becomes inherently complicated to construct a narrative that is neutral and informative, while still coherent and compelling. Nevertheless, I sought to do so to the best of his abilities, notably in fact-checking information by diversifying sources. A further difficulty in constructing this narrative—in fact, any narrative, is selection, i.e. what to include and what no to. The focus of this paper is on “revolution,” hence, the focus of the narrative is on the revolutionary elements of the events in Ukraine between November 2013 and March 2014. Having said this, the conceptual analysis of the events in Ukraine has been purposefully separated from the narrative so as not to distort the narrative—its coherence, and more importantly, its neutrality. Timothy Snyder, “Ukraine: The Haze of Propaganda,” NY Books, March 1, 2014, accessed March 11, 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/mar/01/ukraine-haze-propaganda/.
13.) Katya Gorchinskaya, “No Deal,” Kyiv Post, Nov. 21, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/no-deal-2-332280.html; Anastasia Forina and Oksana Grytsenko, “Nine Years After Start of Orange Revolution, Kyivans Take to Streets in Protest of Scuttled EU Deal,” Kyiv Post, Nov. 22, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/nine-years-after-start-of-orange-revolution-kyivans-take-to-streets-in-protest-of-scuttled-eu-deal-332282.html; Katya Gorchinskaya, “Echoes of Orange Revolution: Volunteers Kick into Action for EuroMaidan Protests,” Kyiv Post, Nov. 24, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/volunteers-who-run-euromaidan-332400.html.
14.) The rapid appearance and organization of EuroMaidan is primarily an achievement of social networks and online media. The Facebook posts of Mustafa Nayem on 21 November, in which he called on others to go to Independence Square, got more than 1,000 shares in several hours. The official “EuroMaidan” Facebook page became the fastest growing page in Ukraine: between its launch on 21 November and 29 November, it attracted 102,000 subscribers. This suggests that during the first stage of the revolutionary process, the protests attracted primarily Ukraine’s younger and middle-class population. Kateryna Kapliuk, “Role of social media in EuroMaidan movement essential,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 1, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/role-of-social-media-in-euromaidan-movement-essential-332749.html.
15.) Katya Gorchinskaya, “Echoes of Orange Revolution: Volunteers Kick into Action for EuroMaidan Protests,” Kyiv Post, Nov. 24, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/volunteers-who-run-euromaidan-332400.html. The Orange Revolution, despite its name, was in fact not a revolution. It was a series of mass demonstrations between late-November 2004 and January 2005 that called for a re-run of presidential elections that had, in the first run, been marred by corruption, voter intimidation, and electoral fraud. The Supreme Court approved a new round of elections in which the pro-EU candidate Viktor Yushchenko (who was allied with Yulia Tymoshenko) defeated Viktor Yanukovych. In general, the “Orange Maidan” movement was defined by popular civil action but its scope remained limited to immediate political demands. Paul D’Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 82.
16.) Daryna Shevchenko, “Vox Populi: How should the nation react to police violence against protesters?” Kyiv Post, Nov. 30, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/vox-populi-with-daryna-shevchenko-how-should-the-nation-react-to-the-violent-night-events-at-maidan-nezalezhnosti-332711.html.
17.) Sociologists at the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, who questioned 1,037 Ukrainian protesters, concluded that the decision by the Ukrainian authorities to disperse the peaceful demo with force was a big mistake. “When we asked people why they joined the rally, 70 percent said they came because they were angry with the dispersal of the peaceful pro-EU demo on November 30. 54 percent of people said it was the Ukrainian president’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, and the third reason for coming to Independence Square is a will to change life in Ukraine,” said sociologist Yulia Ilchuk. “Ukrainian opposition uses polls to bolster cause,” EuroNews, December 12, 2013, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.euronews.com/2013/12/13/ukrainian-opposition-uses-polls-to-bolster-cause/.
18.) “Police violently break up Independence Square protests at 4 a.m. today; many injuries reported,” Kyiv Post, Nov. 30, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/reports-police-forcefully-break-up-protest-site-on-maidan-nezalezhnosti-this-morning-332674.html.
19.) Katya Gorchinskaya and Oksana Grytsenko, “Government admits helplessness, asks for a new deal with Europe,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 2, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/government-admits-helplessness-asks-for-a-new-deal-with-europe-332858.html.
20.) Krejci, Great Revolutions Compared, pp. 31-36.
21.) Ukraine had had a brief spell of independence between 1917 to 1921, before being defeated by the Red Army and becoming a member of the Soviet Union. Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (London: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 22.
22.) The revolutionary process of Maidan can be argued to have begun on 1 December 1991, when the 90 percent of Ukrainians voted for independence from the Soviet Union in a national referendum. In this view, the Winter Revolution in Ukraine (2013-2014) was a confirmation of Ukraine’s independence from its powerful eastern neighbour Russia, i.e. a confirmation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. This notion of sovereignty, however, cannot be primarily considered as a rejection of Russia—which is not the case—but as an internal process of nation-building, i.e. drawing national consensus and defining national identity.
23.) The 1990s were a period of economic turmoil in Ukraine: by the end of the decade, the economy had shrunk to one third of its pre-1991 level. Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 43.
24.) “Ukraine: State of Chaos,” Aljazeera, 2012, (update January 15, 2014), accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2012/11/2012112261029228352.html.
25.) “Profile: Ukraine's ousted President Viktor Yanukovych,” BBC News, February 28, 2014, accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182830.
26.) EU or IMF conditions on loans would not have favoured President Yanukovych’s increasingly authoritarian leadership. What is more, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin had ambitions to create a Eurasian Union, and Ukraine could not be both a member of both Putin’s union and the European Union. Peter Leonard, “IMF offers Ukraine up to $18 billion in loans,” Yahoo News, March 27, 2014, accessed April 2, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/imf-offers-ukraine-18-billion-loans-082715644.html.
27.) Krejci, Great Revolutions Compared, p. 35.
28.) “Ukrainian opposition uses polls to bolster cause,” EuroNews, December 12, 2013, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.euronews.com/2013/12/13/ukrainian-opposition-uses-polls-to-bolster-cause/.
29.) Krejci, Great Revolutions Compared, p. 35.
30.) Ibid, p. 33.
31.) Katya Gorchinskaya and Oksana Grytsenko, “Government admits helplessness, asks for a new deal with Europe,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 2, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/government-admits-helplessness-asks-for-a-new-deal-with-europe-332858.html.
32.) Arendt, On Revolution, p. 42.
33.) The four largest TV channels in Ukraine, Inter, ICTV, 1+1, and Ukraiina TV, are owned by the country’s oligarchs. The channels thus effectively act as weathervanes for which way the political winds are blowing. If the channels are reporting censored news on EuroMaidan, this means that their owners are are betting their stakes on President Yanukovych. If they are reporting relatively objective news, this suggests that the oligarchs see the possibility of power shifting and are watching and waiting to see what happens. All the major channels, except for ICTV, reported objectively on the mass demonstration on 1 December, Inter even encouraged viewers to attend the rally. However, by mid December the news again became visibly censored, suggesting that the oligarchs perceived the momentum to be with the Yanukovych-Azarov regime, not with EuroMaidan. Mary Mycio, “News analysis: A television news breakthrough,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 7, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/news-analysis-a-television-news-breakthrough-333200.html.
34.) A survey of protesters conducted on the 7 and 8 December found that 92% of those who came to Kiev from across Ukraine came on their own initiative, and 8% came as part of a political party or civil society organization. In terms of cause, 70% said they came to protest the police brutality of 30 November, and 54% to protest in support of the EU Association Agreement signing. Among their demands, 82% wanted detained protesters freed, 80% wanted the government to resign, and 75% want president Yanukovych to resign and for snap elections. “EuroMaidan rallies in Ukraine - Dec.9,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 10, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine-live-updates-332341.html.
35.) Olga Rudenko, “Another Sunday, another big rally,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 15, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/another-sunday-another-big-rally-333740.html.
36.) EuroMaidan kept its resolve, captured here by one plain-spoken protester on 15 December: “[The authorities] don’t listen to us at all. So we must stay here until they start listening.” Ibid.
37.) Daryna Shevchenko and Olena Goncharova, “Chief prosecutor Pshonka gives his version of Nov. 30-Dec. 1 EuroMaidan violence,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 20, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/chief-prosecutor-pshonka-gives-his-version-of-nov-30-dec-1-euromaidan-violence-334043.html.
38.) On 25 December the journalist and activist Tetiana Chornovol, who was investigating the luxurious homes of top Ukrainian officials, was brutally attacked on her way home by a group of men. Ibid.
39.) Bandera is a controversial historical figure who collaborated with the Nazi’s during the Second World War and is considered by many Ukrainians, especially in the east, with contempt.
40.) Democratic Initiatives Foundation, December 8, 2013, accessed, April 12, 2014, http://www.dif.org.ua/en/events/gvkrlgkaeths.htm.
41.) Pro-government rallies that did occur were no larger than 20,000, and there is ample evidence that many pro-government protesters were paid for their services. Daryna Shevchenko and Olena Goncharova, “Chief prosecutor Pshonka gives his version of Nov. 30-Dec. 1 EuroMaidan violence,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 20, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/chief-prosecutor-pshonka-gives-his-version-of-nov-30-dec-1-euromaidan-violence-334043.html.
42.) President Yanukovych had only suspended three lower level officials in response to the 30 November police assaults; meanwhile, dozens of activists remained in prison. Ibid.
43.) On 9 January government hired thugs, “titushki,” violently broke up a EuroMaidan forum in Kharkiv, the second largest city in Ukraine. Oksana Grytsenko, “Smashed windows, tear gas accompany EuroMaidan forum in Kharkiv,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 11, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/smashed-windows-tear-gas-accompany-euromaidan-forum-in-kharkiv-334870.html.
44.) On 5 January EuroMaidan activists called for a boycott of Inter TV, Ukraine’s most viewed channel, due to increasingly biased coverage. The statement reads: “During the recent weeks, the [Inter] channel’s editorial policy has undergone catastrophic changes. Without any objective reasons, the issue of Maidan has disappeared from the news. If covered, it does so in such a distorted way that it has nothing to do with the reality.” On 24 December a longtime associate of oligarch Dmytro Firtash took over management at Inter TV. In response, three executives resigned. Vlad Lavrov, “EuroMaidan activists call for boycott of Inter TV channel,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 5, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/euromaidan-activists-call-for-boycott-of-inter-tv-channel-334683.html.
45.) Katya Gorchinskaya, “Lyovochkin resigns over draconian anti-democratic laws; others expected to quit soon,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 17, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/lyovochkin-resigns-over-draconian-anti-democratic-laws-others-expected-to-quit-soon-335152.html.
46.) “Revolution of Dignity,” ICTV, March 8, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ictvs-documentary-revolution-of-dignity-now-has-english-language-subtitles-338913.html.
47.) Olena Goncharova, “A month later, EuroMaidan beat goes on,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 21, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/a-month-later-euromaidan-beat-goes-on-334112.html.
48.) Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. 27.
49.) Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class, p. 24.
50.) Timothy Snyder, “Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine,” NY Books, February 19, 2014, accessed March 11, 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/mar/20/fascism-russia-and-ukraine/?insrc=rel.
51.) It is symbolic that it was a tradition at EuroMaidan since the movement began on 21 November 2013 to sing the Ukrainian national anthem almost every hour. Does this suggest that Ukraine’s independence is through Europe? Olena Goncharova, “A month later, EuroMaidan beat goes on,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 21, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/a-month-later-euromaidan-beat-goes-on-334112.html.
52.) An impressive burst of creativity took place online. Memes and photo-shopped pictures making fun of Ukrainian politicians and police officers were shared by everyone sympathetic to Maidan. Andrey Zelinsky, an art director from Kyiv, was the author of many of these memes. The first one he made depicted a shadowy Kyiv and two riot policemen beating a protester, reading “Welcome Ukraine.” Zelinskyi explained: “I drew that the day I woke up and realized that I live in a police state.” Daryna Shevchenko, “Smart and funny EuroMaidan posters,” Kyiv Post, Dec. 25, 2013, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/lifestyle/smart-and-funny-euromaidan-posters-334231.html.
53.) “Revolution of Dignity,” ICTV, March 8, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ictvs-documentary-revolution-of-dignity-now-has-english-language-subtitles-338913.html.
54.) Arendt, On Revolution, p. xv.
55.) The laws introduced 10-year jail terms for blockading government buildings; hefty fines and prison terms for protesters who wear face masks and helmets; fines and prison terms for unauthorized installation of and provision of facilities or equipment for tents, stages or amplifiers in public places; and driving bans for people who form convoys of more than five cars. Also approved was legislation to easier strip members of parliament of immunity; the identification of members of non-government organizations funded by foreign governments or foundations as "foreign agents"; 2-year jail terms for defamation spread through social media; 1-year jail terms of corrective labour for slandering government officials; mandatory registration for internet-based media and prepaid mobile phone services purchasers. "Ukraine's parliament passes tough anti-protest laws,” Financial Times, January 16, 2014, accessed March 22, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e9367e64-7ebc-11e3-a2a7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz30JzfM3V4.
56.) The law caused the resignation of several top government staff members, including Serhiy Lyovochkin, President Yanukovych’s long-time chief of staff, Denys Ivanesko, head of public information, Darka Chepak, press secretary, and Andriy Yermolaev, a political advisor to the president. Katya Gorchinskaya, “Lyovochkin resigns over draconian anti-democratic laws; others expected to quit soon,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 17, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/lyovochkin-resigns-over-draconian-anti-democratic-laws-others-expected-to-quit-soon-335152.html.
57.) The Traditional chants of “Bandits, get out!” and “Glory to the Ukraine!” had become tiresome. “EuroMaidan ralles in Ukraine (Jan. 20 updates),” Kyiv Post, Jan. 21, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/euromaidan-ralles-in-ukraine-jan-20-updates-335302.html.
59.) “Kiev Burning,” Vice Media, February 20, 2014, accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.vice.com/vice-news/ukraine-burning.
60.) On 21 January Yuriy Verbytsky, a protester abducted the day before along with activist Ihor Lutsenko, was been found dead. At a press conference on 24 January, Lutsenko said: “I am not leaving until we win, no matter what happens.” Daryna Shevchenko, “Activist tortured by police in video returns to EuroMaidan, talks to journalists,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 24, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/man-tortured-by-police-in-video-returns-to-euromaidan-talks-to-journalists-335545.html.
In the eastern regions of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhya, peaceful protesters were assaulted on 27 January by “titushki,” government hired thugs. Sergey Gorobets, who attended the protest, was perplexed: “I just don’t understand how hooligans can attack people and be under police protection while doing it. After that, how can a dialogue happen?” Olga Rudenko, “Police join forces with thugs to violently suppress protests in eastern Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 27, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/police-joins-forces-with-thugs-to-violently-suppress-protests-in-eastern-ukraine-335688.html.
61.) Tiahnybok, leader of Svoboda Party, said: “This is the third round of negotiations, and we have felt a real change in mood….people are taking power into their hands.” Katya Gorchinskaya and Oksana Grytsenko, “Opposition rejects Yanukovych offer, but willing to talk more,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 26, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/yanukovych-offers-prime-ministers-job-to-yatseniuk-makes-other-concessions-335591.html.
62.) Yanukovych offered the Prime Minister position to Yatseniuk, who refused. “Yanukovych accepts Azarov's resignation; other disputes remain,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 28, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/azarov-resigns-as-parliament-session-gets-under-way-335719.html.
63.) President Yanukovych no longer felt the supporting shoulder of Russia. A number of Russian government-controlled TV channels portrayed Yanukovych as a weak leader, and suggested that federalization and even disintegration of Ukraine was inevitable. This scared Yanukovych and put him off the idea of further compromise. Katya Gorchinskaya, “Russia restarts trade sanctions against Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 29, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/russia-restarts-trade-sanctions-against-ukraine-335835.html.
64.) The former president Leonid Kravchuk warned parliament that this law would only inflame tension further in Ukraine, which is “on the brink of civil war.” “Kiev Burning,” Vice Media, February 20, 2014, accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.vice.com/vice-news/ukraine-burning.
65.) “Yanukovych accepts Azarov's resignation; other disputes remain,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 28, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/azarov-resigns-as-parliament-session-gets-under-way-335719.html.
66.) Olga Rudenko and Solomiya Zinevych,” EuroMaidan increases security after bomb cripples two protesters,” Kyiv Post, Feb. 7, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv/euromaidan-increases-security-after-bomb-cripples-two-protesters-336490.html.
67.) The Security Service announced that law enforcement was on heightened alert because of threats of terrorism. Ibid.
68.) “Revolution of Dignity,” ICTV, March 8, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ictvs-documentary-revolution-of-dignity-now-has-english-language-subtitles-338913.html.
 Danylyuk also said: “Our actions are not civil resistance to Ukrainian leadership only. We see [the current political crisis in Ukraine] as a Russian invasion and occupation of our country.” Olga Rudenko, “Police join forces with thugs to violently suppress protests in eastern Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 27, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/police-joins-forces-with-thugs-to-violently-suppress-protests-in-eastern-ukraine-335688.html.
70.) “Everyone here has a strong sense of responsibility for Maidan’s future,” a leader of one self-defence unit said. Tetyana Chornovol, the journalist who was attacked on 25 December, said: “They thought it will end on 30 November, but it didn’t. They gave the order to shoot, torture and arrest, but it didn’t work again. They don’t understand that we are here until the end for our children, for our parents, and just because we are smart.” And Ihor Lutsenko, the activist who was kidnapped and tortured, said: “I understand that they understand nothing about us. They still think we are paid here or we at least get some material benefits. All their torture is without any result: Neither me nor Tetyana Chornovol nor Dmytro Bulatov have stopped. We just walk slower.” “EuroMaidan’s victims include five killed, many injured and missing,” Kyiv Post, Jan. 31, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/euromaidans-victims-include-five-killed-many-injured-and-missing-335932.html.
71.) “Revolution of Dignity,” ICTV, March 8, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ictvs-documentary-revolution-of-dignity-now-has-english-language-subtitles-338913.html.
72.) Christopher J. Miller and Katya Gorchinskaya, “Guide To EuroMaidan,” Kyiv Post, Feb. 13, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/guide-to-euromaidan-336810.html.
73.) Kyiv Post Feb.9. Discontent with President Yanukovych spreads within ranks of Ukraine’s foreign ministry: 115 current and former employees expressed their support for the “peaceful anti-government demonstrations.” Christopher J. Miller, “Klitschko: Yanukovych should be held accountable,” Kyiv Post, Feb. 13, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/klitschko-yanukovych-should-be-held-accountable-336803.html.
74.) Katya Gorchinskaya, “Government threatens force after 6 p.m. on Feb. 18 after deadly clashes resume in Kyiv,” Kyiv Post, Feb. 18, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv/government-threatens-force-after-6-pm-on-feb-18-after-clashes-that-kill-four-persons-injur-more-than-100-people-337033.html
75.) “EuroMaidan rallies in Ukraine (Feb. 19 live updates),” Kyiv Post, Feb. 20, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine-feb-19-live-updates-337098.html.
76.) Defections: Lt. Colonel Shuliak, commander of Ivano-Frankivsk police unit, said that he would not follow criminal orders. Ibid.
77.) Later that day the police attacked Maidan Nezalezhnosti again and after heavy fighting, the Trade Union’s building caught fire and burnt down. Protesters in two provinces of western Ukraine took over the police headquarters. Ibid.
78.) On 20 February Ukraina TV, owned by Akhmetov who is the richest oligarch in Ukraine and long-time ally of Yanukovych, begins to offer more objective coverage, which suggests that the oligarchs were no longer firmly behind President Yanukovych. The Party of Regions also started fragmenting: twelve members of parliament announced their support for the “Ukrainian people.” Christopher J. Miller, “Embattled Yanukovych, opposition sign deal to end political crisis,” Kyiv Post, Feb. 21, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/embattled-yanukovych-opposition-sign-deal-to-end-political-crisis-337307.html.
79.) “Protesters threaten violence if Yanukovych doesn't resign now,” Kyiv Post, Feb. 21, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/protesters-threaten-violence-if-yanukovych-doesnt-resign-now-337343.html.
80.) Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harvest Book, 1970), pp. 52-53.
81.) Ibid, p. 56.
82.) Ibid, p. 44.
83.) Alexis De Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Anchor Books, 1983).
84.) Arendt, On Violence, p. 68.
85.) Ibid, p. 79.
86.) The activist was Volodymyr Parasiuk and member of Pravy Sektor. “Protesters threaten violence if Yanukovych doesn't resign now,” Kyiv Post, Feb. 21, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/protesters-threaten-violence-if-yanukovych-doesnt-resign-now-337343.html.
87.) Thirteen of the dead were policemen. Jessica Elgot, “Ukraine’s 'Neo-Nazis' Pay Respects At Funeral Of Jewish Maidan Activist,” Huffington Post UK, March 3, 2014, accessed 26 April, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/03/18/ukraines-neonazis-jewish_n_4986582.html.
88.) “Tymoshenko: ‘Heroes will never die’,” Feb. 22, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/tymoshenko-heroes-will-never-die-337390.html.
89.) Tymoshenko, Turchynov, and Yatseniuk are all members of the Batkivshchyna Party.
90.) “Ukraine as it happened: Yanukovych ousted, Tymoshenko freed,” EuroNews, February 22, 2014, accessed March 3, 2014, http://www.euronews.com/2014/02/22/live-updates-protesters-take-over-kyiv-parliament-releases-tymoschenko/.
91.) The onset of counter-revolutionary forces, notably actors calling for federalization of, and even separation from, Ukraine, will be discussed in the next section.
92.) “Tymoshenko: ‘Heroes will never die’,” Kyiv Post, Feb. 22, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/tymoshenko-heroes-will-never-die-337390.html.
93.) Arendt, On Revolution, p. 24.
94.) Ibid, p. xv.
95.) In the rhetoric of today, it has nearly become self-evident to speak of political freedom not as a political phenomenon, but on the contrary, as the more or less free range of non-political activities which a given body politic will permit and guarantee to those who constitute it. Ibid, pp. 19-20.
96.) Ibid, p. 34.
97.) Or when (if) institutions are created at all levels where Ukrainian citizens can meaningfully act in concert.
98.) Ibid, p. 134.
99.) Krejci p. 39. Krejci cites L.P. Edwards who says, “A revolution dies out in a curiously insignificant and inconsequential way.” Edwards sees the end of revolution in a “process of accommodation” culminating in “an arrangement…whereby the different factions in the revolutionary society have their reciprocal relations defined, and their spheres of action worked out…The man principles which the revolution has established cease to be matters of controversy.” Krejci, Great Revolutions Compared, p. 6.
100.) Conal Urquhart, “Ukraine MPs appoint interim president as Yanukovych allies dismissed – 23 February as it happened,” The Guardian, February 23, 2014, accessed April 2, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/ukraine-crisis-yanukovych-tymoshenko-live-updates.
101.) Katya Gorchinskaya, “Deadlock in parliament as president plays for time,” Kyiv PostFeb. 4, 2014, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/deadlock-in-parliament-as-president-plays-for-time-336262.html.
102.) “Ukraine’s 2012 Language Law to Stay Until New Bill Ready – Turchynov,” RIA Novosti, March 3, 2014, accessed March 4, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20140303/188063675/Ukraines-2012-Language-Law-to-Stay-Until-New-Bill-Ready--Turchynov.html.
103.) “Presence of foreign mercenaries in Ukraine shows weakness of Kiev govt,” Russia Today, April 9, 2014, accessed, April 12, 2014, http://rt.com/op-edge/foreign-mercenaries-in-ukraine-373/.
104.) Democratic Initiatives Foundation, April 8, 2014, accessed April 12, 2014, http://www.dif.org.ua/en/events/gvkrlgkaeths.htm.
Maria Popova, “What Doesn’t Kill Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, March 12, 2014, accessed March 13, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/12/
105.) Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class, p. 28.
106.) Arendt, On Revolution, p. xix.
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Kuhn von Burgsdorff, E. (2015). "The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine: Stages of the Maidan Movement and Why They Constitute a Revolution." Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse, 7(02). Retrieved from http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=986
Kuhn von Burgsdorff, Elias. "The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine: Stages of the Maidan Movement and Why They Constitute a Revolution." Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse 7.02 (2015). <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=986>
Kuhn von Burgsdorff, Elias. 2015. The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine: Stages of the Maidan Movement and Why They Constitute a Revolution. Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse 7 (02), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=986
KUHN VON BURGSDORFF, E. 2015. The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine: Stages of the Maidan Movement and Why They Constitute a Revolution. Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse [Online], 7. Available: http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=986
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