To better understand the campaign dynamics, this subsection briefly describes the most important events leading to early elections on 10 February 2009 and 22 January 2013.
In early 2006, Ehud Olmert had become prime minister, after Kadima’s - recently deceased - 2005 founder Ariel Sharon resigned for health reasons. Due to criticism of the government’s reaction to the 2006 Lebanon War, personal accusations of corruption, and the call for resignation by Ehud Barak, leader of Kadima’s coalition partner Labour, Olmert agreed to resign in September 2008. However, Tzipi Livni, who won the Kadima leadership, was unable to form a government within two months, forcing her to ask President Shimon Peres to schedule early elections for February. Olmert remained acting prime minister until the new government was formed at the end of March 2009.
In a joint move, branches of the Islamic movement called for election boycotts, citing the lack of influence of Arab MKs, and the risk of giving the state legitimacy, after an attempt by Yisrael Beitenu and ultra-nationalist National Union to disqualify both major Arab political parties. Ta’al and Balad were initially banned in January 2009 by the Central Elections Committee for “incitement, support for terrorism, and refusing Israel’s right to exist,” but later reinstated after appealing to the High Court of Justice. The campaigning was dominated by the three-week ‘Gaza War’, or ‘Operation Cast Lead’, lasting from 27 December 2008 until 18 January 2009 with 1,200 to 1,500 mostly Palestinian casualties, when IDF stormed Gaza in response to rocket fire into Israel. It ended with an Israeli unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal.
In July 2011, hundreds of thousands of Israelis set up encampments across the country in a movement similar to ‘Occupy’. Beginning as a Facebook movement against high food prices in June, the first protest camps appeared in Tel Aviv on 14 July, and within days had spread to over 60 encampments in almost every town and city, Jewish and Palestinian. It culminated, after six weeks, in its biggest demonstration with over 400,000 participants on 3 September. The main aims were to create an “a-political” and “broad based, diffused” movement putting “society before economy,” and criticizing low salaries and significant increases in living costs, including food, gas and housing. It consisted of the young and middle-aged middle-class, and had no concrete, let alone a joint agenda. Because of this, the government was able to dissipate the encampments by appointing the ‘Trajtenberg Commission’, which made recommendations unlikely to be implemented in practice. However, for the first time, the dominant security discourse was pushed into the background by socioeconomic concerns and debates on beneficial treatment for ultraorthodox and settlers.
This significantly impacted the 2012-2013 elections, which had become necessary due to budgetary disputes. To prevent early elections, Kadima, which had won the most Knesset seats in 2009, joined the government in May 2012 but left only two months later, when their requests for a redrafting of the Tal Law, allowing ultraorthodox Jews to defer military service, failed. The major event capturing the campaign period was again a military operation in Gaza. On 14 November 2012, Israel’s military began an 8-day campaign, called ‘Operation Pillar of Defense’, after “some 100 rockets hit southern Israel.” This was finally settled by a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, brokered by Egypt’s new President Mursi.
The abovementioned military campaigns in Gaza had immediate impact on the elections by determining public discourse, but also by shortening the campaign period, as all major parties refrained from political advertising during the fighting period.
In 2008-2009, Likud framed security concerns within Israel in the broader regional security context (e.g. Lebanon 2006 and Iran’s nuclear program) to rally support for stronger reactions, and to discredit Kadima policies. Hezbollah, which had attacked and killed five IDF members, thus starting the 2006 Lebanon War, was quickly linked to the threat from its state-supporter Iran, which was linked to Hamas in Gaza, thereby drawing a full circle, with Iran at its core. Kadima’s Livni, in order to reverse the image of being “too weak to protect Israel,” sought to discredit Netanyahu’s assessments of threats by citing less severe U.S. evaluations of the Iranian nuclear program, and shaping an image of “Obama [as] the man of tomorrow … [and] Bibi [Netanyahu as] the prehistoric man of yesterday.” In 2008-2009, Netanyahu and other traditional leaders of ‘hard talk’ arguably succeeded in setting the agenda, with all parties picking up on the topic (cf. figure 2).
In 2012-2013, on the other hand, Netanyahu’s threatening rhetoric was unable to gain similar traction. While Netanyahu maintained the strong security discourse towards Iran, even making statements about attacking without U.S. support, other political actors, most importantly Yesh Atid’s Lapid, focused on social and economic topics as part of a broader solution. Even former Mossad chief Dagan and Israeli Defense Minister Barak had noted in 2011 that Iran was unlikely to become a nuclear power before 2015 and that by spreading public fear and threatening attacks on Iran, Netanyahu was cornering an Iranian leadership otherwise unlikely to attack.
Notably, Netanyahu had previously been criticized by the U.S. for his inconsistency between economic and political policies. With Obama’s re-election in November 2012, there was a strong push for progress in the Middle East Peace Process, which had not surfaced in Israeli 2009 campaigning, and which included a halt to illegal settlements and an upgrading of Palestinian rights in the West Bank.
Figure 2: Dominant Themes in 2009 and 2013 Election Campaigning
Having introduced Israel’s main political parties and the major themes, we now turn to evaluating, whether the ‘Spiral of Silence’ theory provides explanations for voting behavior and strongly differing priorities during both elections. This section studies citizens’ willingness to publicly express their opinion when in accordance or conflict with the dominant public opinion. Public opinion is judged on the basis of the major newspapers’ opinion polls.
Israel’s 2009 elections led to the formation of a right-wing conservative governing coalition of Likud, Yisrael Beitenu, Shas, United Torah Judaism, and Jewish Home together with center-left Labour, which left the coalition mid-term. Elections were held just weeks after the IDFs three-week military campaign in Gaza at the end of a six month truce. While there was considerable international opposition to the intensity of the response, the Israeli media and public opinion “united behind [the] military’s ‘proper response’ to Hamas’ rocket attacks and ‘revenge against Hamas’” and discredited those parties more optimistic about the peace process.
This suggests that citizens’ opposing opinions may have increasingly been ‘silenced’ by the dominant public opinion, in what was widely presented as a “drift to the right by Israeli voters” as an “inevitable product of the context in which the campaign unfolded.” Political commentators agree: Alpher sees “pessimism over the prospects for a viable … peace process, more than any other factor” as the reason for voters’ move from the political left to the right and center.
Yiftachel observed “security trumping all other issues,” and a “particularly unilateral campaign” neglecting social and economic issues; from widespread corruption, which had forced Prime Minister Olmert out of office, to problems of access to water, and the starting economic crisis. He records a dramatic rise of the ‘colonialist block’ by 30% in the 2009 towards the 2006 elections, a sharp decline of the ‘ethnocratic block’ by 22%, and another sharp decline of the ‘democratic block’. This represents a promising starting point for future field studies, evaluating how public expression of opinion is influenced during Israeli elections. In 2008, any criticism of the military campaign was judged as anti-Israeli, and all support for the peace process as naïve, thereby empowering hawkish discourse and ‘silencing’ contrary public statements.
The 2013 elections, which saw the Netanyahu-led Likud-Yisrael Beitenu lose eleven seats, forced Netanyahu to form an unlikely governing coalition with Yesh Atid, The Jewish Home and Ha’Tnuah. Ultraorthodox Shas and United Torah Judaism had to join the opposition for only the second time in 35 years. Even though the 2013 campaign also witnessed an Israeli military intervention in Gaza, very different themes were deemed important by the Israeli electorate.
‘Operation Pillar of Defense’, lasting from 14-22 November 2012, saw tough statements by leading politicians Netanyahu, Lieberman and President Peres, but failed to generate strong public support. Despite frequent demonization of Iran’s threat, only 12% of interviewees ranked Iran and only 16% the peace process as “the most important issue facing the new government.” Instead, 43% rated economic issues as number one. One reason why Netanyahu failed to influence public opinion vis-à-vis Iran, despite e.g. repeated speeches at the UNGA, might be contrary statements by respected figures of the Israeli and U.S. secret services discrediting exaggerated threats. Even Likud’s media campaigns, including stage-managed interviews, failed to change public opinion.
Another explanation, along the lines of Noelle-Neumann, might be the change of dominant public opinion during the course of the economic crisis. Massive protests for social justice just eighteen months prior to the elections encouraged citizens to speak openly about topics previously dominated by the security discourse. According to polls, 90% of the public supported the protest movement, granting them “a sense of empowerment.”
Social justice comprised economic opportunities and employment, but also equal rights and duties for all citizens of Israel, e.g. with regard to the ultraorthodox Jews’ exempt from military service, which was declared unconstitutional by Israel’s High Court.
A Haaretz daily newspaper poll, confirmed the high personal concern for socioeconomic issues (47% considered it the chief concern), and encouraged more people to speak publicly about these issues. Nevertheless, the protests did not spark support for the Palestinian strive for social justice, public opinion still silenced ‘leftist’ voices, and security discourse was still incorporated in public statements for social justice.
While this analysis suggests some confirmation for the ‘Spiral of Silence’ theory, one needs to be careful when using polls as primary evidence. Polls may also be seen as shaping certain perceptions: Shallah e.g. argues that citizens’ fear was manipulated by asking suggestive questions, such as “Do you fear the Iranian nuclear program?.” Furthermore, post-election analyses trying to explain the unexpected results, blamed unreliable polling, and, specifically, the exclusion of cell phones. Polls therefore missed important dynamics, such as Naftali Bennett’s ‘Jewish Home’ successful campaign of specifically targeting young voters using smartphone applications.Continued on Next Page »
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Endnotes
1.) Cf. (Yesh Atid n.d.): Yair Lapid had only founded the “There is a future” party in January 2012.
2.) Cf. (Glynn and McLeod 1984) and(Noelle-Neumann 1977)
3.) Cf. (Noelle-Neumann 1977)
4.) Cf. (Glynn and McLeod 1984)
5.) Cf. (Entman 2004, 4) as quoted in (Golan 2013, 361): Framing is “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.”
6.) Cf. (Krosnick and Kinder 1990, 509-510): Priming is the process of influencing individuals to make them associate certain images or words with given categories “alter[ing] the political importance that the public attaches to the flow of events.”
7.) Cf. (Kosicki 2006, 124-125): Agenda-setting is the process of shaping the list of topics which are considered most important by a public. This can be done by politicians, the media, social movement actors or credible actors such as academics.
8.) Cf. (University of Twente 2013): Noelle-Neumann was herself working for Nazi Germany’s newspaper „Das Reich“ in the late 1930s leading to claims by analysts that she was developing the theory to justify her own actions.
9.) (Glynn and McLeod 1984, 731)
10.) Cf. (Taylor 1982)
11.) (Glynn and McLeod 1984, 732)
12.) (Noelle-Neumann 1974, 43)
13.) Cf. (Katz and Allport 1931): Daniel Katz and Floyd H. Allport in 1931 called this phenomenon ‘pluralistic ignorance’, where a majority rejects a norm without expressing its views, because of the assumption that most accept it.
14.) Cf. (Mutz 1989, 20)
15.) (Glynn and McLeod 1984, 732)
16.) Cf. (Noelle-Neumann 1977, 157)
17.) Cf. (Noelle-Neumann 1974)
18.) Cf. (Noelle-Neumann 1977, 144)
19.) (McLean and McMillan 2013)
20.) (Noelle-Neumann 1977, 143-144)
21.) (Noelle-Neumann 1977, 143)
22.) Cf. (Jewish Virtual Library 2013)
23.) Cf. (Marcus 2009, 59)
24.) Cf. (Sheizaf 2012): E.g. Palestinians living in East Jerusalem are granted ‘residency’, but not ‘citizen’ status, and are therefore only allowed to vote in municipal elections.
25.) Cf. (Jewish Virtual Library 2013): The remaining seven seats went to the Gil party which is not further discussed because non-present in 2009 and 2013.
26.) (Yiftachel 2009, 76)
27.) Cf. (AlJazeera 2013): Lieberman is a Russian immigrant and West Bank settler living eighteen km within occupied territory.
28.) (Yiftachel 2009, 75)
29.) Cf. (Yiftachel 2009, 77): Ariel Sharon established Kadima in November 2005 after disputes over his support for the American ‘road map’ towards a Palestinian state.
30.) (Yiftachel 2009, 81)
31.) Own figure based on (Jewish Virtual Library 2013) and (Yiftachel 2009)
32.) The so called ‘hawks’, favour ‘predatory solutions’, and ‘doves’, favour disengagement and peaceful means.
33.) Cf. (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia 2012)
34.) Cf. (Yiftachel 2009, 78-79): Yiftachel places Likud and Yisrael Beitenu in the colonialist category; Labour and Kadima in the ethnocratic category; and Meretz and the Arab (Balad and Ra’am Ta’al) and Arab-Jewish (Hadash) parties in the democratic block.
35.) Cf. (Jewish Virtual Library, Biography of Ehud Olmert 2013): Both Sharon and Olmert had previously been leading politicians in Likud.
36.) Cf. (Marcus 2009, 57): Likud represented her as too weak to face the security challenges, and Shas demanded large financial support for families, and entirely rejected a potential division of Jerusalem.
37.) Cf. (Marcus 2009, 56-57)
38.) Cf. (Yiftachel 2009, 81)
39.) (Marcus 2009, 61)
40.) Cf. (Goldstone 2011)
41.) Cf. (Alimi 2012, 402)
42.) Cf. (Gordon 2012, 352): Palestinian communities in Umm el Fahem, Jaffa and Tira among others joined the protests
43.) Cf. (Gordon 2012, 349)
44.) (Alimi 2012, 404)
45.) Cf. (Alimi 2012, 402)
46.) Cf. (Alimi 2012, 403,405)
47.) Cf. (Gordon 2012, 353)
48.) Cf. (Alimi 2012, 404)
49.) Cf. (BBC News 2012)
50.) (The Jerusalem Post 2012)
51.) Cf. (The Guardian 2013)
52.) Cf. (Marcus 2009, 57)
53.) Cf. (Marcus 2009, 57)
54.) Cf. (McGovern 2013): The 2007 U.S. NIE concluded with “high confidence” that Iran had stopped working on nuclear weapon development in the fall of 2003 and not restarted it. Cf. (Secretary of Defense Gates 2009) and (CBS News 2009): Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defence Gates both warned in July 2009, that a preventive strike on Iran would be "ill advised", "very destabilizing" and "likely very bad".
55.) Quote from Kadima strategist in (Marcus 2009, 63)
56.) Cf. (Jutcovich 2013); Netanyahu as quoted in (International Crisis Group 2013, 15):”I won’t wait until it’s too late to decide on Israeli attack on Iran” and “… there is no sense of urgency. All the problems that we have [in the region], however important, will be dwarfed by this messianic, apocalyptic, extreme regime that would have atomic bombs.”
57.) Cf. (Hersh 2011, 33): Statement upon retirement of 2002-2010 Mossad chief Meir Dagan
58.) Interview with Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak by Haaretz daily newspaper as quoted in (Hersh 2011, 33): “I don’t think in terms of panic. I don’t think [the Iranian leadership] will do anything so long as they are in complete control of their senses, but to say that somebody really knows and understands what will happen with such a leadership sitting in a bunker in Tehran ... I don’t know what it would do.”
59.) Cf. (Marcus 2009, 62)
60.) Cf. (Yiftachel 2013, 59)
61.) Own figure based on section 3.3 analysis and sources
62.) Cf. (Noelle-Neumann 1977, 148): “In election campaigns, this spiraling process of opinion expression … can lead … to an increase in the number of supporters of a political party and ‘thus the decisive margin for the election victory’.”
63.) Cf. (Glynn and McLeod 1984, 738): The theory states, that individuals seeing their position gain support are more likely to discuss, and individuals seeing their position loose support less likely to discuss.
64.) Cf. (Rahat and Hazan 2013, 375)
65.) Cf. (Marcus 2009, 61)
66.) (Yiftachel 2009, 75)
67.) Cf. (Marcus 2009, 62)
68.) (Marcus 2009, 55,56)
69.) (Alpher 2009)
70.) (Yiftachel 2009, 75)
71.) Cf. (Yiftachel 2009, 78-79). See section 0 for definitions of the blocks.
72.) Cf. (Jewish Virtual Library, Israeli Opinion Regarding Peace with the Palestinians 2013): “Israeli has no partner for peace.”
73.) Cf. (Perez 2013, 5)
74.) Cf. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012): "No government would tolerate a situation where nearly a fifth of its people live under a constant barrage of rockets and missile fire, and Israel will not tolerate this situation."
75.) Cf. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012): FM Lieberman at meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (20 Nov 2012): "We appreciate the international community’s position, which unequivocally supports Israel’s right to protect itself and its citizens. Talk and public calls on Israel to abstain from a ground operation strengthen the Hamas and extend the current confrontation. If Israel will be forced to initiate a ground operation, it will not be a limited operation, nor will it be 'Operation Pillar of Defense 2', but rather 'Defensive Shield 2.'"
76.) Cf. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012): “President Shimon Peres spoke to US President Barack Obama (14 Nov 2012) about the situation in southern Israel and Gaza and said, ‘The head of the military force of Hamas was killed half an hour ago. He was a most extreme man and was in charge of all the attacks and assassinations from Gaza against Israel. We shall handle it with great care. Our intention is not to raise the flames, but already for days, day and night, they are shooting rockets at Israel. Women cannot fall asleep. I was today there with the children.’”
77.) Cf. (Louw 2010, 222-223)
78.) (The Times of Israel 2013) as quoted in (Griffith 2013)
79.) Cf. (The Washington Post 2013): “In one clip, he stands before a map of the Middle East, surveying an array of threats and promising that if reelected he would shield Israel with rocket defense systems, surround it with a border fence and prevent a nuclear Iran."
80.) Cf. (Netanyahu 2009) or cf. (Netanyahu 2013): Portraying himself e.g. in 2009 as bearing the burden of preventing another disaster like the holocaust. Cf.(Allin and Simon 2010, 52). Cf. also Ariel Levite, former Israeli national security adviser as quoted in (Allin and Simon 2010, 52): "For Begin [referring to 1981 attack at Osirak, Iraq] it was between him and God. There is strong evidence that that's how Bibi [Benjamin Netanyahu] defines his historical mission.”
81.) Cf. (Haaretz Newspaper, Republicans blast Kerry’s 'anti-Israeli' Senate briefing against new Iran sanctions 2013); U.S. State Department described Israeli evaluations of nuclear programme of Iran as “inaccurate, exaggerated and not based in reality”; Cf. (Haaretz Newspaper, Netanyahu: A bad deal with Iran could lead to war 2013): “Yukiya Amano, Director General of the IAEA, saw ‘no radical change” in Iran’s nuclear programme over past three months.’”
82.) Cf. (Louw 2010, 223) and cf. (Tagesschau 2013) reporting on “Netanyahu’s media campaign”
83.) Cf. (The Guardian 2013)
84.) (Gordon 2012, 349)
85.) Cf. (Haaretz Newspaper 2012)
86.) Cf. (The Washington Post 2013): 47% saw socioeconomic issues as chief concern, with only 10% viewing Iran, and only 18% negotiations with the Palestinians as the most important issue in their voting. The conscription of ultraorthodox Jews gained in public debate with 12% of interviewees citing this as the most important issue.
87.) Cf. (Gordon 2012, 350)
88.) Cf. (Gordon 2012, 352)
89.) Cf. (Gordon 2012, 353): Public statement during tent protests one day after the 18 August 2011 killings of 8 by Palestinian militants, and the reprisal killings of 15 Palestinians in Gaza: “Quietly, but resolutely. Because the nation demonstrating is the same nation absorbing the blows of fire from our enemies, and its staunch demand for a deep change in economic priorities and for overall social justice does not come at the expense of the struggle against terror—on the contrary. A nation whose sons are bound by mutual guarantee, and fight together for the future and the fortitude of the State of Israel, is a strong nation who can face all its enemies.”
90.) Cf. (Eiran and Malin 2013, 78), which documents different fears in Israel, including the “fear of annihilation, fear of a more difficult security environment, socioeconomic fears [, and the] fear of a challenge to Israel’s founding ideological principles.” These fears are perceived as cumulative fears.
91.) Cf. (Shallah 2009, 7): 85% of interviewees replied they feared Iran; 41% therefore supported attacking Iran, and 23% said they intended to leave Israel entirely out fear of Iran.
92.) Cf. (Jutcovich 2013): Other factors may have been the surprisingly high turnout of over 70%, and the high number (25-27%) of undecided voters pre-election.
93.) Cf. (The Washington Post 2013)
94.) (UN Cartographic 2004)
