The Arab League's Role in the Syrian Civil War

By T M
2014, Vol. 6 No. 07 | pg. 4/4 |

4. Conclusion and Recommendations for the League of Arab States

While widely accused of lacking common political will and notorious understaffing, the LAS’ development over the past decade is considerable. As section 3.1 illustrates, its mediation efforts and interventions have mitigated internal divides and given the Arab world a stronger voice towards international actors, including the UNSC.

The Syrian , rife with sectarianism and proxy warfare, has fallen victim to the LAS’ current internal power-struggle. With Western unimaginativeness and distraction by the Ukraine- crisis, an end to the requires regional solutions. The LAS lacks participation of important regional actors, but has proven its ability to offer creative approaches during the conflict’s first year. To allow the formation of a truly Syrian opposition, the “manipulation of people’s inborn religious feelings”165 must end. Establishing pan-Arab common ground would enable the LAS to act as a mouthpiece towards regional and international actors. The LAS must evolve, as developments in Tunisia spread hope to young citizens across the entire region, who will not accept recourse to former authoritarian ways.

To consolidate Arab League improvements:

  1. Build on Secretary-General Moussa’s reform agenda to improve early-warning and conflict management mechanisms and address conflicts in their early stages
  2. Identify overlap between LAS organs with the goal of updating the League Pact to reflect current practices
  3. Outline today’s LAS vision and self-conception within the international context
  4. Address the underfunding and understaffing of the Secretariat at Summit Conferences, and aim to establish permanent funds to improve conflict management capabilities
  5. Work towards a joint definition of ‘terrorism’, isolating elements that are indiscriminately targeting civilians and spreading fundamentalist thinking, instead of using the term for political ends

For interactions with member states:

  1. Provide good offices and mediate between Saudi Arabia and Qatar to overcome current disputes and ensure an independent development of the Syrian opposition
  2. Promote better cooperation in response to the refugee crisis, thereby preventing conflict and easing psychological effects in neighbouring countries, notably Lebanon and Jordan
  3. Stress the risk of sectarianism; Leverage the experience of Oman in creating multi-sectarian societies and promote pan-Arabism as the common identity
  4. To this end, promote closer cultural and economic cooperation, necessary to compete with economic powers, such as , the USA or the EU
  5. Issue strong statements demanding actions rather than continued condemnations of ‘terrorism’: Promote initiatives to curtail the recruitment of Arabs to fight in Syria166, demand stricter border controls and prevent private funding for fundamentalist groups
  6. Issue public statements holding governments responsible for the implementation of agreed-upon sanctions
  7. Use the good relations of some members to engage with third countries, such as Turkey. Engage Iran to ensure a gradual disengagement of Hezbollah, notably through Kuwait, Qatar or Oman

For interactions with the opposition:

  1. Evaluate possibilities of direct negotiations with Assad based on secret talks
  2. Act as monitoring group of the Coalition’s High Council to ensure an equal participation of all ethnic groups and avoid further sectarianism, but allow for independent development of the opposition; report developments to the international partners
  3. Publically raise questions on the role of minorities, including Alawites, in a future Syria

For interactions with President Assad:

  1. Evaluate possibilities of direct negotiations with the opposition based on secret talks
    1. Engage in direct talks with the Assad regime based on a pan-Arab mediation mission
    2. Issue strong statements to demand actions rather than oral condemnations of ‘terrorism’, especially regarding the tacit permission of al-Nusra’s continued occupation of Rakka167

For interactions with international organisations:

  1. Agree on guidelines with the UN for cooperation and division of labour
  2. Support the UN as the only widely-accepted body, and continue to promote progress based on the Geneva Communiqué and the Joint Special Envoy
  3. Continue to meet civil society and NGO representatives working in Syria, including women who play a key role in the revolution168, to understand needs on the ground169
  4. Maintain an “independent” Arab voice, and highlight key concerns to counter media-hypes and propaganda
  5. Focus on an end to human suffering and impunity based on local ceasefires, humanitarian corridors and outlawing attacks on civilians, medical institutions and Syria’s cultural heritage
  6. Offer any help required in the destruction of the remainder of chemical weapons by the 30 June deadline
  7. Hold international donors responsible for promised humanitarian relief funds170
  8. Begin the planning for a post-war Syria, comparable to the post-WWII Marshall Plan171, and secure donors

 


References

Al-Arabiya News. Brahimi set to resign as U.N.-Arab League envoy to Syria. 7 May 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/05/07/Brahimi-set-to-resign-as-U-N-Arab-League-envoy-to-Syria.html (accessed May 9, 2014).

Al-Arian, Ali. “Syrian refugees cling to stability in Iraq.” Al-Jazeera. 24 April 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/syrian-refugees-cling-safety-iraq-201448102353645313.html (accessed May 10, 2014).

Al-Buluwi, Abdulmajeed. “Saudis fear Syria blowback after discovering ISIS cell.” Al-Monitor. 8 May 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/isis-saudi-arabia-qaeda-terrorism-syria.html (accessed May 10, 2014).

Al-Jazeera. A Question of Arab unity:Why Unity? - Documentary. 28 January 2008. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AUZhfv-68Fs (accessed April 30, 2014).

—. Arab Unity: Nasser's . 20 June 2008. http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517252821627.html (accessed April 27, 2014).

—. Iran criticises Arab League over Syria . 27 March 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/03/201332781749856496.html (accessed March 23, 2014).

—. Iran seeks Arab help for regional stability. 3 December 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/iran-seeks-arab-help-regional-stability-2013122184535505699.html (accessed May 2, 2014).

—. Jail for Saudis who join foreign conflicts. 4 February 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/jail-terms-saudis-who-join-foreign-fights-20142411202563202.html (accessed February 10, 2014).

—. Syria: The Reckoning (documentary). 23 April 2013. http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/syria-reckoning/ (accessed April 23, 2014).

Al-Khatib, Moaz. “Interview with Moaz al-Khatib: The priority is to save Syria.” AlJazeera. 11 May 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2013/05/2013510141112681380.html (accessed May 4, 2014).

—. Translated video of Moaz al-Khatib Speech at the Arab Summit: March 26, 2013. 26 March 2013. http://abujamajem.wordpress.com/2013/03/27/moaz-al-khatib-speech-at-the-arab-summit-march-26-2013/ (accessed May 4, 2014).

Al-Saud, Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz. “Op-ed: Saudi Arabia Will Go It Alone.” The New York Times. 17 December 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/opinion/saudi-arabia-will-go-it-alone.html?_r=1&#h[LSARtr,1,WbtTia,1,TciMso,3] (accessed April 27, 2014).

Alsham, Jeash. Youtube footage of Syrian combats. 20 August 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z8eXXa-nbZk&list=PLEw62cBRgJfnyNVnXScz2ItD2t-jVdbPo (accessed March 20, 2014).

Ambassador Li Baodong. Statement by H. E. Ambassador Li Baodong, Permanent Representative of China to the , at the Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. 10 May 2011. http://www.china-un.org/eng/gdxw/t823976.htm (accessed May 1, 2014).

Analyst at the European Parliament, interview by Tobias Metzger. (17 April 2014).

Annan, Kofi. “Syria: UN Envoy Warns Against Arming Rebels.” Sky News. 8 March 2012. http://news.sky.com/story/1943/syria-un-envoy-warns-against-arming-rebels (accessed March 8, 2014).

Arab League Pact. Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945. 22 March 1945. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp (accessed March 27, 2014).

Arab NGO employee working on Syria since 201, interview by Tobias Metzger. (1 May 2014).

Ban, Ki-moon. UN off-the-cuff: Secretary-General's remarks to a group of journalists earlier today. 9 March 2012. http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=2258 (accessed May 3, 2014).

Barnett, Michael, and Etel Solingen. “Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The Sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab Leage.” In Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective, edited by A.I. Johnson and A. Acharya. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

BBC Documentary. A History of Syria, with Dan Snow. 18 June 2013. http://www.disclose.tv/action/viewvideo/141933/A_History_of_Syria_2013_Documentary/ (accessed March 10, 2014).

BBC. Profile: Ahmad Jarba, Syrian opposition leader. 8 July 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23229258 (accessed March 12, 2014).

—. Syria conflict: Government troops retake Homs Old City. 8 May 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27323736 (accessed May 8, 2014).

—. Syria profile - Facts. 23 May 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703910 (accessed May 7, 2014).

—. Syria profile - Timeline of Events. 19 March 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995 (accessed May 3, 2014).

Black, Ian. “End of an era as Prince Bandar departs Saudi intelligence post.” The Guardian. 16 April 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/16/prince-bandar-saudi-intelligence-syria (accessed April 18, 2014).

—. “Kofi Annan resigns as Syria envoy.” The Guardian. 2 August 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/02/kofi-annan-resigns-syria-envoy (accessed March 2, 2014).

Bloomberg. UN Humanitarian Chief Laments the Deadlock in Syria Aid. 30 April 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-30/un-humanitarian-chief-laments-the-deadlock-in-syria-aid.html (accessed May 1, 2014).

Carnegie Europe. The Syrian War in Three Capitals. 17 October 2013. http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/10/17/syrian-war-in-three-capitals/gqjr# (accessed May 1, 2014).

Chatham House. Syria, Turkey and Iran: Regional Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict. December 2012. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/171212summary.pdf (accessed March 15, 2014).

Dakhlallah, Farah. “The League of Arab States and Regional Security: Towards an Arab Security Community?” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 2012: 393-412.

—. “The Arab League in Lebanon: 2005-2008.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2012: 53-74.

Deutsche Welle. Obama and Rouhani talk, first direct US-Iran contact since 1979. 27 September 2013. http://www.dw.de/obama-and-rouhani-talk-first-direct-us-iran-contact-since-1979/a-17120273 (accessed March 27, 2014).

—. Tensions rise as Saudis fear US 'going soft'. 15 October 2013. http://www.dw.de/tensions-rise-as-saudis-fear-us-going-soft/a-17150591 (accessed March 15, 2014).

El-Kouedi, Mona. “NATO and the Arab League: The Importance of Being Earnest.” NATO Research Paper - NATO Defense College, No. 93. June 2013. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=166495 (accessed May 10, 2014).

ErdoÄŸan, Recep Tayyip. “Talk to Aljazeera with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan: Turkey's role in the Middle East.” AlJazeera. 12 February 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/02/erdogan-­â€�turkey-­â€�role-­â€�middle-­â€�east-­â€� (accessed May 3, 2014).

Financial Tracking Service. Total Funding to the Syrian Crisis 2014. 2014. http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis (accessed May 10, 2014).

. The World's Worst Observer. 27 December 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/27/the_worlds_worst_human_rights_observer (accessed May 3, 2014).

Former LAS employee, interview by Tobias Metzger. (1 May 2014).

Gaddafi, Muammar. Gaddafi Speech at Arab League Meeting, March 2008 - We all distrust each other. 29 March 2008. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fMLmA4lnxXo (accessed May 1, 2014).

Haaretz Newspaper. Transcript of Netanyahu's UN General Assembly speech. 1 October 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.550012 (accessed May 1, 2014).

Hassouna, Hussein A. The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: a study of conflicts. New York: Oceana Publications, 1975.

Huffington Post. Arab League Asks UN For Libya No-Fly Zone. 12 March 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/12/arab-league-asks-un-for-libya-no-fly-zone_n_834975.html (accessed May 10, 2014).

International Crisis Group. “Anything But Politics: The State of Syria's Political Opposition.” Middle East Report No 146. 17 October 2013. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/146-anything-but-politics-the-state-of-syria-s-political-opposition.aspx (accessed April 30, 2014).

—. “Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa.” Africa Report No 181. 7 November 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/181%20Implementing%20Peace%20and%20Security%20Architecture%20-%20I%20-%20Central%20Africa%20ENGLISH.pdf (accessed March 12, 2014).

—. “Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (II): Southern Africa.” Africa Report No 191. 15 October 2012. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/southern-africa/191-implementing-peace-and-security-architecture-II-southern-africa.pdf (accessed March 12, 2014).

—. “Now or Never: A Negotiated Transition for Syria.” Middle East Briefing No 32. 5 March 2012. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/B032-now-or-never-a-negotiated-transition-for-syria.aspx (accessed March 30, 2014).

—. “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya.” Middle East/North Africa Report No. 107. 6 June 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/107-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-v-making-sense-of-libya.aspx (accessed May 10, 2014).

—. Syria Statement. 1 September 2013. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/mena/syria-statement.aspx (accessed April 27, 2014).

—. “The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire.” Europe Report No 230. 30 April 2014. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/230-the-rising-costs-of-turkey-s-syrian-quagmire.pdf (accessed April 30, 2014).

Jarba, Ahmad. European Parliament - Extraordin​ary Spinelli debate with Ahmed Jarba, president of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (17 March 2014).

Karouny, Mariam. “Large part of ancient souk in Syria's Aleppo in ashes: activists.” Reuters. 30 September 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/30/us-syria-crisis-idUSBRE88J0X720120930 (accessed May 10, 2014).

Keesing's Record of World Events. LAS Summit Conferences. No. 28122 1976. http://www.eui.eu/Research/Library/ElectronicResources/E-Resources/2012/01-14-KeesingsRecordofWorldEvents.aspx (accessed March 11, 2014).

Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Kholaif, Dahlia. “Oman: No Gulf-wide union for us.” Al-Jazeera. 15 December 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/oman-no-gulf-wide-union-us-2013121571431541941.html (accessed March 20, 2014).

Lavrov, Sergei. “Syria's leadership making mistakes, says Russia.” BBC. 20 March 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17450284 (accessed March 7, 2014).

Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. “The Arab League Comes Alive.” Middle East Quarterly, 2012: 71-78.

Malek, Anwar. “Arab League official attacks Syria mission as 'farce'.” The Guardian - Martin Chulov. 11 January 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/11/arab-league-official-syria-mission-farce (accessed March 12, 2014).

Mason, Simon, and Sandra Rychard. “Conflict Analysis Tools - Tip Sheet.” ISN - ETH Zurich. Edited by Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC. December 2005. http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/15416/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/55576247-d809-4bea-b22c-e8134336a642/en/CSPM+Tipp+Conflict+6.3.pdf (accessed November 30, 2013).

Mehlis, Detlev. “Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to UNSCR1595.” Report by the UN chief investigator into the Hariri assassination. 20 October 2005. www.un.org/news/dh/docs/mehlisreport (accessed May 1, 2014).

Muasher, Marwan. “A League of Their Own: The Arab League may not be perfect, but it's come a long way.” Foreign Policy. 11 January 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/11/a_league_of_their_own (accessed April 26, 2014).

Nasser, Gamal Abdel. “Interview with Gamal Abdel Nasser, President United Arab Republic by Clifton Daniel, New York Times.” News in perspective on National Educational . April 1969. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cU_4PYR50ek (accessed May 4, 2014).

Nuland, Victoria. “U.S. Welcomes Arab League Call for Assad to Step Down.” Embassy of the United States in London, UK. 23 January 2012. http://london.usembassy.gov/midest129.html (accessed March 27, 2014).

Osborn, Andrew. “Qatar's Al Jazeera files $150 million damages claim with Egypt.” Reuters. 28 April 2014. http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=f06c34a9-6d87-4b0b-9299-2c550608e474 (accessed April 30, 2014).

Oweis, Khaled Yacoub. “Saudi-Qatar rivalry divides Syrian opposition.” Reuters. 15 January 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/15/us-syria-crisis-qatar-idUSBREA0E1G720140115 (accessed May 10, 2014).

Perthes, Volker. “Die Stunde der Nachbarn.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). 25 April 2014. http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/produkt-detail/article/die_stunde_der_nachbarn.html (accessed May 1, 2014).

Pinfari, Marco. “Nothing but Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts.” LSE Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, Working Paper no. 45 March 2009: 1-31.

Pogany, Istvan. “The Arab League and Regional Peacekeeping.” Netherlands Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, May 1987: 54-74.

Putin, Vladimir. “Putin: Who gave NATO right to kill Gaddafi?” RT news. 26 April 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iw5Ij_RFJ1Q (accessed April 26, 2014).

Reuters. Ban Ki-moon withdraws Iran’s invite to Syria talks. 20 January 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/20/us-syria-crisis-iran-idUSBREA0J1F720140120 (accessed March 12, 2014).

—. Kuwait summit merely papers over Arab rifts. 26 March 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/26/us-arabs-summit-declaration-idUSBREA2P1I120140326 (accessed March 26, 2014).

RFE/RL. In Syria, Russia Seeks To Preserve Middle East Foothold. 22 March 2012. http://www.rferl.org/content/in_syria_russia_seeks_to_preserve_middle_east_foothold/24523022.html (accessed May 11, 2014).

Ryan, Curtis. “The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria.” Middle East Research and Information Project. Vol. 42, Spring 2012. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/new-arab-cold-war-struggle-syria (accessed April 13, 2014).

Sayigh, Yezid. “A Melancholy Perspective on Syria.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 8 April 2014. http://carnegie-­â€�mec.org/2014/04/08/melancholy-­â€�perspective-­â€�on-­â€�syria/h7fc# (accessed May 14, 2014).

—. “The Assad Regime: Winning on Points.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 10 April 2014. http://carnegie-­â€�mec.org/2014/04/10/assad-­â€�regime-­â€�winning-­â€�on-­â€�points/h7vj (accessed April 15, 2014).

—. “The Syrian Opposition’s Bleak Outlook.” Carnegie. 17 April 2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/04/17/syrian-opposition-s-bleak-outlook/h8e6?reloadFlag=1 (accessed May 10, 2014).

SIRPI. SIPRI Factsheet: Trends in international arms transfers, 2011. March 2012. http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1203.pdf (accessed March 20, 2014).

Steinberg, Guido. “The New “Lions of Syria.”” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). April 2014. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C19_sbg.pdf (accessed May 10, 2014).

SWP. “Darfur: The responses from the Arab World.” German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). March 2010. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/03._Arab_League_Weber1_ks.pdf (accessed May 3, 2014).

SyriaMap. Homs, Syria - Capital of the Revolution. 15 November 2011. http://syriamap.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/homs_111115_update.jpg (accessed May 10, 2014).

Takeyh, Ray. “Testimony on Iran before the House Committee on Armed Services: Assessing Geopolitical Dynamics and U.S. Policy Options.” Council on Foreign Relations. 8 June 2008. http://www.cfr.org/iran/iran-assessing-geopolitical-dynamics-us-policy-options/p10882 (accessed May 10, 2014).

Tavares, Rodrigo. “Understanding regional peace and security: a framework for analysis.” Contemporary Politics, Vol. 14, No. 2, June 2008: 107-127.

The Daily Star Lebanon. Syria opposition 'not yet ready for Arab League seat'. 9 March 2014. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Mar-09/249749-syria-opposition-not-yet-ready-for-arab-league-seat.ashx#axzz2w1V9TFRd (accessed May 10, 2014).

The Daily Star. Lebanon, UN mull establishing Syrian refugee camps. 10 May 2014. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/May-10/255990-lebanon-un-mull-establishing-syrian-refugee-camps.ashx#axzz31LkvFWov (accessed May 10, 2014).

The Guardian. Syria death toll over 150,000, says human rights body. 1 April 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/syria-civil-war-death-toll-150000 (accessed April 10, 2014).

—. Syria suspended from Arab League. 12 November 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/12/syria-suspended-arab-league (accessed March 12, 2014).

The New York Times. Assad Accepts Cease-Fire; Opponents Are Skeptical. 27 March 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/world/middleeast/syrian-opposition-leaders-meet-as-bloodshed-continues.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed April 20, 2014).

The Times of Israel. Main bloc quits Syrian National Coalition over Geneva. 21 January 2014. http://www.timesofisrael.com/main-bloc-quits-syrian-national-coalition-over-geneva/ (accessed March 23, 2014).

The Washington Post. 22 January 2012.

Time Magazine. Syria’s Air-Defense Arsenal: The Russian Missiles Keeping Assad in . 3 June 2013. http://world.time.com/2013/06/03/syrias-air-defense-arsenal-the-russian-missiles-keeping-assad-in-power/ (accessed March 28, 2014).

UN Department of Public Information. Kofi Annan Appointed Joint Special Envoy of United Nations, League of Arab States on Syrian Crisis. 23 February 2012. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sgsm14124.doc.htm (accessed April 12, 2014).

—. Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions. 17 March 2011. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm (accessed May 9, 2014).

—. Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2139 (2013) to Ease Aid Delivery to Syrians, Provide Relief from ‘Chilling Darkness’. 22 February 2014. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11292.doc.htm (accessed April 12, 2014).

UN. “Map of Syrian Arabic Republic.” UN Cartographic Dept. April 2012. http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/syria.pdf (accessed April 12, 2014).

UN OCHA. Syria Crisis - Humanitarian Assistance Needed. 2014. http://syria.unocha.org/ (accessed May 11, 2014).

UN Security Council. Report of the UN Secretary General on the Relationship between the UN and Regional Organizations, in particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. 7 April 2008. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20S%202008%20186.pdf (accessed May 9, 2014).

UNDP. UNDP Annual Report 2008: Capacity Development: Empowering People and Institutions. 10 May 2008. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/corporate/undp_in_action_2008.html (accessed May 11, 2014).

United Nations. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. 26 June 1945. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf (accessed May 10, 2014).

UNSCR1973. “UN security council resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya – full text.” The Guardian. 17 March 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/17/un-security-council-resolution (accessed March 20, 2014).

Vesalius College. International Affairs Capstone Conference: The Syrian crisis - where are we and where are we heading? 29 April 2014. http://www.vesalius.edu/news-events/events/?mc_id=112 (accessed May 3, 2014).

VICE. Syria - The Free Syrian Army. 22 December 2012. http://www.vice.com/ground-zero/syria-the-free-syrian-army (accessed February 20, 2014).

Voice of America. Swelling Tide of Syrian Refugees Causes Strains in Jordan. 7 May 2014. http://www.voanews.com/content/swelling-tide-of-syrian-refugees-causes-strains-in-jordan/1909775.html (accessed May 10, 2014).

Zartman, William I. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, September, Vol. 1, No. 1 2001: 8-18.


List of Acronyms

EEAS – European External Action Service

GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council

ICG – International Crisis Group

IDP – Internally Displaced Person

ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

LAS – Arab League, formerly League of Arab States

MB – Muslim Brotherhood

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organisation

RRP – Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan

SHARP – Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan

SNC – Syrian National Council; now part of the Syrian National Coalition

Syrian National Coalition – ‘National Coalition of Syrian revolutionary and oppositional forces’

UAE – United Arab Emirates

UAR – United Arab Republic

UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction


Endnotes

1.) For recent Crisis Group reporting on Syria, see: (International Crisis Group, The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire 2014), (International Crisis Group, Anything But Politics: The State of Syria's Political Opposition 2013), (International Crisis Group, Now or Never: A Negotiated Transition for Syria 2012) and for a widely recognized statement on the American calls for retaliatory strikes in response to the use of chemical weapons, see (International Crisis Group, Syria Statement 2013).

2.) Cf. (The Guardian, Syria death toll over 150,000, says human rights body 2014)

3.) (UN OCHA 2014)

4.) Lebanon host up to 1 million refugees, Turkey between 750,000 and 1 million, Jordan up to 600,000 and Iraq up to 250,000, cf. (The Daily Star 2014), cf.(Voice of America 2014), cf. (Al-Arian 2014), Cf. (International Crisis Group, The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire 2014)

5.) Cf. (The Guardian, Syria suspended from Arab League 2011)

6.) UNDP 2008 figures, as quoted in (Pinfari 2009, 6)

7.) The country’s official name is the ‘Syrian Arab Republic’.

8.) UN 2012 figures as quoted (BBC, Syria profile - Facts 2013)

9.) (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 71)

10.) (Pinfari 2009, 1)

11.) Cf. (Nasser 1969): Unlike his successor Sadat, Nasser saw no bilateral solutions to Israel as this would necessarily mean that Israeli occupation of other Arab territories continues. For Nasser it was always either peace or expansion of Israeli settlements. See also: (Al-Jazeera, Arab Unity: Nasser's Revolution 2008)

12.) Cf. (Nasser 1969)

13.) Consult (Arab League Pact 1945) for the original text

14.) Cf. (Pinfari 2009, 1)

15.) As a permanent body currently based in a building off of Tahrir Square in Cairo

16.) The Council Summits are ordinarily convened once or twice a year, granting each member one vote based on (Arab League Pact 1945, 11)

17.) Cf. (Arab League Pact 1945, Art. 2)

18.) Cf. (Arab League Pact 1945, 5)

19.) Cf. (Pinfari 2009, 3): The Political Committee was added to the Arab League structure in November 1946.

20.) For more information, see (Hassouna 1975, 389)

21.) Cf. (Pogany 1987, 55) and cf. (Pinfari 2009, 4)

22.) Interview with (Analyst at the European Parliament 2014) on European relations with the Arab League; and Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014) who confirmed saying that “in terms of personnel, we have no one” and “funding is on a case by case basis.”

23.) Cf. (Pinfari 2009, 3-4)

24.) (Pinfari 2009, 14). See also Appendix C for a list of MENA conflicts and LAS reactions.

25.) Cf. (Al-Jazeera, Arab Unity: Nasser's Revolution 2008)

26.) (BBC Documentary 2013): The majority of around 75% are Sunni Muslim, with Christians, Alawite, Druze and Kurds representing minority populations.

27.) Cf. (Al-Jazeera, A Question of Arab unity:Why Unity? - Documentary 2008)

28.) The “Great Syrian Revolution” to free the country from started in 1925.

29.) Cf. (Al-Jazeera, Syria: The Reckoning (documentary) 2013) and cf. (Al-Jazeera, Arab Unity: Nasser's Revolution 2008)

30.) Cf. (Al-Jazeera, Syria: The Reckoning (documentary) 2013): This was based on a power-sharing agreement between Alawite and Sunni.

31.) Cf. (VICE 2012): According to citizens “the walls had ears“.

32.) Cf. (Al-Jazeera, Syria: The Reckoning (documentary) 2013)

33.) Cf. (Al-Jazeera, Arab Unity: Nasser's Revolution 2008)

34.) Cf. (Al-Jazeera, Arab Unity: Nasser's Revolution 2008)

35.) On 16 June 1979, the ‘Combatant Vanguard of the Muslim Brotherhood” killed 30 soldiers in Aleppo, cf. (Al-Jazeera, Arab Unity: Nasser's Revolution 2008)

36.) Cf. (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 74-75)

37.) Cf. (Kerr 1971) and cf. (Nasser 1969): UAR President Nasser describes the immense influence of the on the Arab world especially during the Suez crisis in 1956. Soviet technicians and arms but also food and minerals were instrumental after the 1967 defeat by Israel.

38.) (Gaddafi 2008)

39.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014)

40.) Cf. (Pinfari 2009, 3): During this time, the only non-Egyptian Secretary-General was elected, and the headquarters moved to Tunisia.

41.) Cf. (Mehlis 2005)

42.) Cf. (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 75)

43.) Cf. (Al-Saud 2013)

44.) This is apparent in Algeria’s and Sudan’s UNGA voting behaviour: formerly strong Assad allies, they have increasingly abstained from voting against sanctions on Assad once his political influence and, therefore, possible political support faded. Cf. Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014)

45.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014)

46.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014): The Egyptian army is systematically against the MB for fear of Islamist extremism. This reflects mostly U.S.-trained military elites. The MB was outlawed by Egypt in December 2013 and by Saudi Arabia in March 2014.

47.) Cf. (Osborn 2014)

48.) The six Gulf Cooperation Council members are Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Together they hold around 1/3 of global oil reserves. Cf. (Pinfari 2009, 9)

49.) Cf. (Deutsche Welle, Obama and Rouhani talk, first direct US-Iran contact since 1979 2013)

50.) For the full transcript, see (Haaretz Newspaper 2013)

51.) Cf. (Takeyh 2008)

52.) (Carnegie Europe 2013)

53.) Abbas Golriz, Mission of Iran to the EU, at (Vesalius College 2014)

54.) Abbas Golriz, Mission of Iran to the EU, at (Vesalius College 2014)

55.) (Al-Jazeera, Iran seeks Arab help for regional stability 2013)

56.) (Jarba 2014): “ knows no . We have one common enemy: terrorism.”

57.) Cf. material collected by British national Eliot Higgins - blogger “Brown Moses,” (Alsham 2013)

58.) Cf, (Kholaif 2013)

59.) Cf. (International Crisis Group, The Rising Costs of Turkey's Syrian Quagmire 2014)

60.) Mustafa Turan, Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EU at (Vesalius College 2014). ErdoÄŸan distanced himself stating that this was “not the Assad from three years ago,” (ErdoÄŸan 2014)

61.) Cf. (Chatham House 2012)

62.) (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 78)

63.) Full text of UNSCR1973 available at, (UNSCR1973 2011)

64.) (Ambassador Li Baodong 2011)

65.) Cf. (Putin 2011): If the “Coalition said destroying Gaddafi was not their goal, then why bomb his palaces” and “some officials claimed that eliminating him was actually their goal - did they have the right? Did he have a fair trial?”

66.) Cf. (Bloomberg 2014)

67.) Cf. (Carnegie Europe 2013)

68.) Cf. (SIRPI 2012): SIPRI reported that from 2007-2011, Russia supplied 78% of Syria’s weapon imports. Cf. (Time Magazine 2013): This includes air-defence systems granting Assad significant military advantages.

69.) Cf. (RFE/RL 2012): Aleksei Malashenko, Carnegie Endowment expert and Aleksandr Konovalov, president of the Moscow-based Institute of Strategic Analysis call Syria the last remnant of Soviet politics.

70.) Cf. (Lavrov 2012): Foreign Minister Lavrov voiced criticism against the Syrian leadership as early as March 2012 because it has “responded incorrectly to the very first manifestations of the peaceful protests” and “despite the numerous promises it has made in response to our calls - is making a lot of mistakes.”

71.) Cf. (UN Department of Public Information, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2139 (2013) to Ease Aid Delivery to Syrians, Provide Relief from ‘Chilling Darkness’ 2014)

72.) Cf. (RFE/RL 2012): Foreign Minister Lavrov called it "the most important thing is that there are no ultimatums"

73.) Cf. (Pinfari 2009, 3): In May 1941 during WWII, British Foreign Secretary Eden to rally support against Nazi Germany supported the Arab countries’ quest for “a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy“.

74.) (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 78)

75.) (Pinfari 2009, 14), examples listed are the 1958 Lebanese Civil War and the 1961-63 Iraq/Kuwait dispute.

76.) UN Charter, Article 53(1) as quoted in (Pogany 1987, 57)

77.) Prof. Alexander Mattelaer, Vesalius College, Abbas Golriz, Mission of Iran to the EU, Mustafa Turan, Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EU and Jean-Marc Pisani, EEAS Head of ‘Crisis response planning and operation’ at (Vesalius College 2014)

78.) For a list of conflicts from 1948-2008 and LAS responses, see Appendix C.

79.) Article 4 deals with disputes and Article 5 gives the LAS Council authority to “mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member States, or a member State and a third State, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation” and to arbitrate dispute as long as it “does not concern a State's independence, or territorial integrity,” cf. (UNDP 2008)

80.) Cf. (Arab League Pact 1945, 5)

81.) Cf. (Pogany 1987, 54): 1) Arab League Force in Kuwait (Sept. 1961-Feb. 1963), 2) Symbolic Arab Security Force (Jun. 1976-Oct. 1976), and 3) Arab Deterrent Force (Oct. 1976-March 1983) both during the Lebanese Civil War lasting from 1975-1990.

82.) Iraq was absent during the vote on 20 July 1961.

83.) Cf. (Pogany 1987, 59-60): UAR and Saudi Arabia each contributed 1,200 troops, with the remainder of forces provided by Sudan, Jordan and Tunisia.

84.) The mandate was to provide “effective assistance for the preservation of Kuwait’s independence.” For a translation of the operative part of the League Council Resolution No. 1777 (20 July 1961), see (Hassouna 1975, 101)

85.) Cf. (Pogany 1987, 61-62): This meeting was held in Cairo on 8 June.

86.) Troops were to be contributed by Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Sudan, Syria and the PLO. Cf. (Pogany 1987, 62)

87.) League Council Resolution No. 3456 (9 June 1976) as quoted in (Pogany 1987, 62)

88.) League Council Resolution No. 3456 (9 June 1976) as quoted in (Pogany 1987, 62)

89.) This mission consisted of Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, the LAS Secretary-General, and heads of the Libyan and Algerian delegations.

90.) See the Communique issued by the office of the Presidency of the Lebanon, 16 June 1976. The text is reproduced in J. Nielsen, ed., International Documents on 1976 (1978), p. 433. as quoted in (Pogany 1987, 62-64)

91.) The troops were quickly deployed between 21 June and mid-July. They were allocated by Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Syria and served under an Egyptian commander. Cf. (Pogany 1987, 63-64)

92.) These were Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization., cf. (Pogany 1987, 64)

93.) For the text of the resolution adopted by the Riyadh Summit Conference, see(Keesing's Record of World Events 1976).

94.) Cf. (Pogany 1987, 67)

95.) Cf. (Pogany 1987, 66-70)

96.) The ‘Arab Initiative for the Resolution of the Lebanese Crisis’ called for the election of consensus president Michel Suleiman, the formation of a unity government and the normalisation of Lebanon-Syria relations under the mediation of the LAS Secretary-General.

97.) Cf. (Dakhlallah, The Arab League in Lebanon: 2005-2008 2012, 53-73). The final agreement included the general requests of the initial LAS peace plan.

98.) Cf. (Huffington Post 2011): Secretary-General Moussa said “what we want is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of more civilians.”

99.) Interested readers may refer to a variety of analyses of the Libyan intervention: Cf. (International Crisis Group, Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya 2011) and cf. (UN Department of Public Information, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions 2011).

100.) Questions addressed to speakers at Brussels‘ conferences, including (Vesalius College 2014)

101.) EEAS Head of ‘Crisis response planning and operation’ Jean-Marc Pisani, at (Vesalius College 2014)

102.) Cf. (BBC, Syria profile - Timeline of Events 2014)

103.) Syria had been on U.S. sanction list long before since President Bush listed Syria among the “axis of evil” and for supporting terrorist groups, seeking WMD and, in violation of UN resolutions, providing Hezbollah with Scud missiles,” cf. (BBC, Syria profile - Timeline of Events 2014) and cf. (Dakhlallah, The Arab League in Lebanon: 2005-2008 2012, 58)

104.) Cf. (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 76)

105.) (Pinfari 2009, 3)

106.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014)

107.) The Committee was led by Qatar’s prime minister and included Secretary-General al-Arabi and the Algerian, Egyptian, Omani and Sudanese foreign ministers.

108.) Cf. (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 76-77)

109.) Cf. (Foreign Policy 2011). There had been previous LAS fact-finding and vote monitoring missions in Sudan in 2004 and 2011, see (SWP 2010) for an evaluation of LAS involvement in Darfur.

110.) Cf. (Muasher 2012)

111.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014)

112.) Several policemen and soldiers defected to form the Free Syrian Army when ordered to shoot at protesters. For an extensive evaluation of opposition in Syria, see: (International Crisis Group, Anything But Politics: The State of Syria's Political Opposition 2013), and (Steinberg 2014).

113.) Cf. (Ryan 2012)

114.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014) describing the formation and development of the observation mission

115.) (Malek 2012)

116.) Cf. (UN Department of Public Information, Kofi Annan Appointed Joint Special Envoy of United Nations, League of Arab States on Syrian Crisis 2012): Ban Ki-moon praised “very close [trilateral] cooperation” between the UN, the LAS and the Special Envoy appointed on 16 February 2012. Cf. (Ban 2012)

117.) Cf. (Nuland 2012): The LAS proposal on 22 January 2012 and its ‘continued leadership’ received strong international praise, e.g. by U.S. State Department spokesperson Nuland, who called it “quite remarkable.”

118.) Cf. (The Washington Post 2012). And cf. (Former LAS employee 2014): Morocco traditionally continues to hold very strong ties with .

119.) Cf. (The New York Times 2012)

120.) (Annan 2012). Annan reminded all parties that "[w]e don't have to go very far in the region to find an example of what I am talking about".

121.) Cf. (Al-Jazeera, Iran criticises Arab League over Syria 2013)

122.) Cf. (Oweis 2014)

123.) For the full speech, see: (Al-Khatib, Translated video of Moaz al-Khatib Speech at the Arab Summit: March 26, 2013 2013)

124.) Al-Khatib headed the Syrian National Coalition for five months (Nov 2012 – April 2013) before resigning.

125.) Reply by Abbas Golriz to question from the author, (Vesalius College 2014): “A mediator has to take into account all realities. It cannot be someone who is involved via proxies.”

126.) Cf. (Al-Jazeera, Iran criticises Arab League over Syria 2013): Iran proposed itself a six-point plan in December 2012.

127.) Observations at Ahmad Jarba speech in Brussels, (Jarba 2014)

128.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014)

129.) (Black, Kofi Annan resigns as Syria envoy 2012)

130.) Cf. (Al-Arabiya News 2014)

131.) (Reuters, Kuwait summit merely papers over Arab rifts 2014): Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari accused the three of hypocrisy for punishing Qatar while attempting just the same in Syria.

132.) Cf. (Al-Khatib, Interview with Moaz al-Khatib: The priority is to save Syria 2013): External meddling “almost broke the Coalition.”

133.) Cf. (Oweis 2014): "There are military groups in the opposition that are more influenced by Qatar than Saudi Arabia. But within the Coalition Saudi Arabia is stronger," said Abdelrahman al-Haj, a senior official in the Syrian National Council. And cf. (Al-Khatib, Interview with Moaz al-Khatib: The priority is to save Syria 2013): “The expansion was used to increase influence by external actors.” See also: (BBC, Profile: Ahmad Jarba, Syrian opposition leader 2013)

134.) Cf. (BBC, Syria profile - Timeline of Events 2014)

135.) Cf. (Al-Khatib, Interview with Moaz al-Khatib: The priority is to save Syria 2013)

136.) Cf. (The Times of Israel 2014) and cf. (Sayigh, The Syrian Opposition’s Bleak Outlook 2014)

137.) Cf. (The Daily Star Lebanon 2014)

138.) Cf. Mustafa Turan, Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EU at (Vesalius College 2014): Turkey insists on ending this impunity, preferably by an international criminal court. Cf. (Jarba 2014) speaking about “systematic denial of food and water.”

139.) For the full text, see (UN Department of Public Information, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2139 (2013) to Ease Aid Delivery to Syrians, Provide Relief from ‘Chilling Darkness’ 2014)

140.) (BBC, Syria conflict: Government troops retake Homs Old City 2014): Only al-Wair remains controlled by the opposition. See Appendix B for a map of Homs.

141.) Resolution 2139 “expresses its intent to take further steps in the case of non-compliance” without introducing ‘automaticity’. Cf. (UN Department of Public Information, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2139 (2013) to Ease Aid Delivery to Syrians, Provide Relief from ‘Chilling Darkness’ 2014)

142.) The recurrent use of chemical weapons in April 2014 barely caused any international condemnation. Cf. (Perthes 2014). In reference to Israel’s nuclear programme, former Syrian National Coalition head Al-Khatib cautioned that the destruction of Syrian WMD should be part of a regional initiative. “The opposition will not sell their country,” cf. (Al-Khatib, Translated video of Moaz al-Khatib Speech at the Arab Summit: March 26, 2013 2013)

143.) Interview with (Arab NGO employee working on Syria since 201 2014). For an analysis by Carnegie Endowment predicting military superiority by the Syrian regime especially after the planned Homs evacuation, see (Sayigh, A Melancholy Perspective on Syria 2014) and (Sayigh, The Assad Regime: Winning on Points 2014)

144.) (Al-Khatib, Translated video of Moaz al-Khatib Speech at the Arab Summit: March 26, 2013 2013)

145.) Cf. (Al-Khatib, Interview with Moaz al-Khatib: The priority is to save Syria 2013) “All enemies in the world meet.”

146.) Mustafa Turan, Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EU and EEAS Head of ‘Crisis response planning and operation’ Jean-Marc Pisani at (Vesalius College 2014); Also (Jarba 2014)

147.) Statements by Mustafa Turan, Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EU and Abbas Golriz, Mission of Iran to the EU at (Vesalius College 2014)

148.) (Vesalius College 2014) and cf. (Al-Khatib, Interview with Moaz al-Khatib: The priority is to save Syria 2013)

149.) The ‘Islamic State ofIraq and al-Sham’ is also operating in neighbouring Iraq, and on 6 May an ISIS-linked cell was discovered in Saudi Arabia. Cf. (Al-Buluwi 2014)

150.) The Souk of Aleppo, an UNESCO world heritage site, was destroyed by bombardments in late-2012, Cf. (Karouny 2012)

151.) (Al-Khatib, Translated video of Moaz al-Khatib Speech at the Arab Summit: March 26, 2013 2013) saying that the Syrian people “rejects others’ supervision of its decision-making.” Cf. (Oweis 2014): Senior SNC official al-Haj who discusses Qatari and Saudi influence over military groups and the SNC itself.

152.) (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 71)

153.) Cf. (Deutsche Welle, Tensions rise as Saudis fear US 'going soft' 2013): Some interpret the Saudi removal of radical intelligence chief al-Bandar (cf. (Black, End of an era as Prince Bandar departs Saudi intelligence post 2014)) as shifting policies and return to alignment with the U.S. after a low-point when Saudi Arabia turned down a UNSC seat and issued statements of ‘going it alone’ over upsets caused by U.S. reluctance to strike Syria and political opening to Iran. cf. (Al-Saud 2013)

154.) For a discussion of ripeness, the interested reader may consult(Zartman 2001).

155.) Cf. (Perthes 2014)

156.) Anger over the invitation to partake in Geneva-II which was later withdrawn still resonates strongly in Iran, cf. Abbas Golriz, Mission of Iran to the EU at (Vesalius College 2014) and cf. (Reuters, Ban Ki-moon withdraws Iran’s invite to Syria talks 2014): The official justification was that Iran had not endorsed the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2013.

157.) (Al-Khatib, Translated video of Moaz al-Khatib Speech at the Arab Summit: March 26, 2013 2013)

158.) Statement by Professor Alexander Mattelaer, Vesalius College at (Vesalius College 2014)

159.) Mustafa Turan, Permanent Representation of Turkey to the EU at (Vesalius College 2014)

160.) Abbas Golriz, Mission of Iran to the EU called unilateral claims against Iran hypocrite, referring to intervention from various unnamed neighbouring countries at (Vesalius College 2014).

161.) Interview with (Arab NGO employee working on Syria since 201 2014)

162.) Cf. (Mason and Rychard 2005, 6-7)

163.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014)

164.) Interview with (Analyst at the European Parliament 2014)

165.) (Al-Khatib, Interview with Moaz al-Khatib: The priority is to save Syria 2013)

166.) Cf. Saudi King Abdullah’s decree threatening incarceration for anyone fighting outside the kingdom, (Al-Jazeera, Jail for Saudis who join foreign conflicts 2014)

167.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014)

168.) Statement by (Jarba 2014)

169.) Interview with (Former LAS employee 2014): Meetings took place at working level and between Secretary-General and heads of NGO.

170.) Cf. (Financial Tracking Service 2014): To date only 24% of funding pledged by SHARP and RRP has been received.

171.) Coalition President Jarba strongly stated that Syria strongly resembles the desolate state of post-WWII Europe, Cf. (Jarba 2014)

172.) (UN 2012)

173.) (SyriaMap 2011)

174.) Own figure based on (Pinfari 2009, 21)

Suggested Reading from Inquiries Journal

Headlines are littered with the rhetoric of the powerful. The most present modern crises can ostensibly be reduced to deconstructed, decontextualized and digestible echoes of our world leaders. The Syrian case is not disqualified... MORE»
Advertisement
For all the border-transcending, common cause implications of the popular moniker "the Arab Spring," the sociopolitical upheaval it is meant to allude to seems, upon superficial review of its developing impacts, to have largely missed the Persian Gulf. The protests at Bahrain's Pearl Roundabout garnered minor international media... MORE»
The relationship between realism and nationalism is not clearly articulated in international relations literature. On one hand, realism and nationalism are viewed as contradictory forces, standing against one another as reason to emotion, reality to identity. On the other, nationalism and power politics are inherently intertwined... MORE»
For a country approximately the size of New Jersey, Israel certainly garners its share of widespread international attention. It is scrutinized, dissected, and more often than not, demonized under the microscope of the global... MORE»
Submit to Inquiries Journal, Get a Decision in 10-Days

Inquiries Journal provides undergraduate and graduate students around the world a platform for the wide dissemination of academic work over a range of core disciplines.

Representing the work of students from hundreds of institutions around the globe, Inquiries Journal's large database of academic articles is completely free. Learn more | Blog | Submit

Follow SP

Latest in Political Science

2019, Vol. 11 No. 03
Radical thinking among the far-right is a growing security problem for modern western society. Over the past several decades anti-government ideologies have been gaining legitimacy due to controversial interactions between Millennialist fringe religious... Read Article »
2019, Vol. 11 No. 02
In recent years, climate change has been increasingly framed as a security issue, with some theorists going so far as to call it the most important security issue of the 21st century. This paper will examine the relationship between climate change... Read Article »
2019, Vol. 11 No. 02
The Haitian Revolution of 1791 – 1804 was a successful slave rebellion in the French colony of Saint-Domingue that began in the wake of the French Revolution and went on to influence subsequent liberation movements for decades to come. The... Read Article »
2019, Vol. 11 No. 02
American politics today operates in an arena where truth and objective reality are bent to the designs of particular interests, powerful people and commercial profiteers. All facts are questioned; the truth has purposes. Populist and nationalist... Read Article »
2019, Vol. 11 No. 01
Globalization is generally studied as a process that extensively impacts nations and peoples across every aspect of society. Empirical and theoretical research largely focuses on this effect, seeking to discover the impact of an increasingly globalized... Read Article »
2018, Vol. 10 No. 10
The following paper seeks to elucidate the complex processes involved in the Mexican State’s loss of authority and the subsequent acquisition of this authority by armed criminal groups operating in that country. In theoretical terms, this... Read Article »
2018, Vol. 10 No. 07
The Polish populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) overturned the mainstream consensus in Polish politics by returning to power in 2015 with a populist platform, decrying a selfish elite and advancing policies that critics saw as illiberal and authoritarian... Read Article »

What are you looking for?

FROM OUR BLOG

Finding Balance in Graduate School
How to Use Regression Analysis Effectively
The Career Value of the Humanities & Liberal Arts