Having identified the conflict parties as part of the present-day situation, it is important to understand history and to consider ICAR’s continuum of five relationship stages: from cooperation, competition, tension and conflict to crisis. This subsection interprets defining events and power dynamics of the past to create an understanding of today’s perceptions and identities. Due to the limited space of this paper, the analysis cannot go as far as mapping each past conflict or crisis as suggested by Bright. An important aim is to understand the primary parties’ past grievances and the psychological effects to identify the interests underlying current positions. It is suggested that in order to design a sound intervention, it is helpful to consider points in time where today’s conflicting parties were able to peacefully co-exist.
Afghanistan, as part of the ancient Silk Route, has a rich history, with influences from Macedonian Greek conquest under Alexander the Great (329 BC), Arab armies bringing Islam by 654 AD, Persian rule from 874 to 999 AD, Mongol conquest by Genghis Khan in the 13th century, and periods of Afghan tribes conquering Indo-Afghan empires to the east from the 16th century. This explains Afghanistan’s current ethnic make-up and the regional differences in language and culture.
The military coup against President Daud in 1978 set off the country’s disintegration and started fighting, which continued through the Soviet invasion, the Civil War and the NATO intervention. Throughout, national, regional and international actors have engaged in peace talks and attempted to broker deals largely driven by external motivations. The most important historical events are listed hereafter:
Figure 1: Major Events in Afghan History
A history of fighting and systematic killing of one’s opposition (including civilians) after taking power, has led to major mistrust and conspiracy theories. Furthermore, external aid was often linked to military support and corrupt favouritism, rather than to enable economic development.
Figure 1 shows the dominant power during given time periods. The mujahidin, strongly backed financially by outside actors such as the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, emerged during the years of the Soviet invasion, and significant actors within today’s Taliban, including its leader Mullah Omar, fought fiercely against the communist regime of President Najibullah. Pakistan played an important role therein, giving shelter to mujahidin leaders in Peshawar, of which Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masud, who was targeted and killed by an Al-Qaeda suicide attack on 10 September 2001, and Uzbek General Dostum emerged victorious in 1992.
Changing alliances and the emergence of powerful regional warlords divided the country and further increased mistrust. Jalalabad-based Pashtun mujahidin e.g. held three provinces in the east, Ismael Khan three provinces in the west and Pashtun Hekmetyar controlled small regions south and east of Kabul. In January 1994, the latter joined forces with General Dostum, who abandoned his alliance with then President Rabbani to lay siege to Kabul. Strong mafia-like structures and trafficking schemes stem from this period.
With the Taliban’s rise to power in 1996, strict application of sharia law, which had been implemented in Taliban-held provinces, quickly spread to large parts of Afghanistan, with the exception of provinces in the north and north-east held by the Northern Alliance. The Taliban systematically imprisoned or killed regional warlords and their supporters. During the Taliban reign opium production and trafficking was at a historic low, as a result of harsh measures for arrested farmers, such as the breaking of limbs. In the post-Taliban years heroin production and export exploded, and the fact that the Taliban now accept trafficking as a source of income and “extra-legal war economy”, makes it a priority issue for the security apparatus, but also for Iranian and Western health systems.
After the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban, an Interim Administration (AIA) held power for six months before a Loya Jirga, or “grand council,” appointed a Transitional Authority (ATA), with Karzai as President, in order to satisfy the large Pashtun population, while drafting the constitution. Elections held in 2004 and 2009 were highly contested, especially in the south where some voting offices recorded turnouts of below 5%, due to intimidation by the Taliban, but announced over 100% of possible votes in favour of Karzai. Although Karzai was internationally pressured into accepting a re-count of rigged results, there were no further consequences, encouraging him to repeat similar procedures during 2010 parliamentary elections.
The aforementioned trafficking issue and Afghan history in general, display strong external influence and emphasize the importance of going beyond the local spheres and considering all four levels of conflict. Well before the rise of the Taliban in Pakistani refugee camps, the country had been at the centre of power-struggles. Today, Pakistan sees Afghan territory as adding strategic military depth in case of an Indian attack. For Europe, Afghanistan holds promise of energy diversification by installing pipelines to deliver largely unexploited Central Asian oil.
Firstly, given Afghanistan’s history of patriarchal leadership and its persistent lack of strong institutions, the individual or personal level is of significant importance. As a result of the early U.S. strategy of CIA-provided funding for regional strongmen and smallest possible military involvement, warlords quickly re-emerged after 2001, and they were further strengthened by granting them political recognition through diplomatic visits. This mistake, even though later addressed by good governance missions and increased provision of security by ISAF weakened the Karzai government, which had emerged from the 2001 Bonn Conference and the subsequent Loya Jirga. The result of this CIA strategy was the creation of multiple regional militias, each some 10,000 strong, and the erosion of central monopoly over the use of force. Additionally, powerful warlords have refused to share taxes and duties with Kabul adding to the weakening of state capacities.
Secondly, societal organisation of family, business and, most importantly, ethnic and tribal association dominate Afghan politics, and have to be given specific consideration when discussing power-sharing and the Taliban’s future role. It is at this second level that corruption and power-brokering between Karzai and regional warlords halt progress and allow for the increase in heroin production. Tribal divides arise from the history of Afghanistan, linguistic differences and different lifestyles - from nomadic pastoralism to sedentary farming. While some cities see multiple ethnicities, most parts of the country can be associated with one group: Persian/Dari speaking Tajik in western and Hazara in central Afghanistan, Turkic-language speaking Uzbek, Turcoman and Kyrgyz in northern Afghanistan and finally, Pashto-speaking Pashtun tribes south and east. This largely constitutes the dividing line between Dari speaking Shia and otherwise Sunni Muslims. All of these observations are strong arguments for the need of a decentralised, federalist structure. Yet, considering the individual level analysis all progress will fail if regional strongmen are unwilling to share power with Kabul and if the “inextricable link” between political and economic structures is ignored.
Thirdly, Afghanistan more so than many other countries has to be viewed from an international level. In recent history, after the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, Taliban became synonymous with al-Qaeda and international terrorism. The attacks demonstrated that Lakhdar Brahimi rightfully feared the dangers of disregarding Afghanistan as a “small and far away country”. However, even after the establishment of ISAF, international priority was the dismantling of al-Qaeda, and the elimination of ‘terrorist cells’, rather than assistance for economic development. It took the UN ten years to distinguish between al-Qaeda and the Taliban on their terrorism blacklist in June 2011, thus preventing a more constructive approach towards the Taliban’s national agenda.
This initial analysis demonstrates the relevance of multiple levels, which according to Dugan demands a specific focus on structural violence, or discrimination by the system based on ethnic belonging.Continued on Next Page »
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Endnotes
1.) Afghanistan spans 652,230 km² and has 29.8m inhabitants (2011). It is divided into 34 provinces (velayat) each having one governor and 329 districts (woluswali). Its biggest cities are Kabul (2.4m (outskirts 4.9)), Kandahar (362,000), Herat (355,000), Mazar-e-Scharif (290,000), Jalalabad (156,000) and Kunduz (113,000). In 2010, the country’s GDP was at $15.61b and expected to grow given the expected doubling of the mining sector between 2016 and 2024 (copper, iron ore, marble); for more information see: (CIA 2013) and (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, 24)
2.) The Harvard Approach teaches us to focus not on positions (what actors say they want) but on interests (why they want what they say they want). Cf. (Fisher and Ury 1992)
3.) Cf. (Sedra 2002, 6)
4.) Terrorism is defined by the UN Security Council “as violent or criminal acts designed to create a state of terror in the general public” (UNSCr 1373) and by the U.S. Government “as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” (Department of State, 2002) as quoted in (Zartman 2003, 444).
5.) Cf. (Berghof Foundation 2012, 1)
6.) Cf. (Wilmot and Hocker 2001, 177-179)
7.) Cf. (Sandole 1998)
8.) Cf. (Bright n.d.)
9.) Cf. (Bright n.d., 2)
10.) Bright enlists soft factors such as interpersonal linkages, communication skills, expertise and hard factors including control over any kind of material, natural or military resources. (Bright n.d., 2)
11.) Cf. (United States Institute of Peace 2004)
12.) Cf. (Rondeaux, Reconsidering Reconcilitation in Afghanistan 2011)
13.) Cf. (International Crisis Group 2012, ii)
14.) Cf. (International Crisis Group 2012, 2)
15.) Cf. (International Crisis Group 2012, 3)
16.) Cf. (Rashid 2009, chapter 7)
17.) Cf. (Sedra 2002, 6)
18.) Ismael Khan was held prisoner by the Taliban for two years in the late 1990s making him persecute many Pashtuns living in his Western provinces. Cf. (Rashid 2009, 126)
19.) Cf. (Rashid 2009, 125-126)
20.) (United States Institute of Peace 2004)
21.) Cf. (Rondeaux 2010)
22.) Cf. (BBC Productions 2011) describing Quetta, Pakistan as the “centre of the Taliban and other jihadi groups.”
23.) Cf. (National Geographic 2008)
24.) Cf. (Rashid 2009, 128)
25.) Cf. (International Crisis Group 2012, 3, 16): ICG instead envisions the UN to be in the lead of a broad-scale mediation process.
26.) Cf. (Wilmot and Hocker 2001, 177)
27.) India has previously signed a strategic partnership agreement (SPA) to train and equip the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and aims to reduce Pakistan’s influence through its memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Afghanistan and Iran discussing non-Pakistani access to ports. Cf. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, 15)
28.) The EU signed a partnership act with Afghanistan centred around counter-terrorism, anti-drugs and development on 14 November 2011. Cf. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, 16)
29.) Cf. (Bright n.d., 3)
30.) U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry laments this missed opportunity of excluding the Taliban from the political process and treating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban indiscriminately. Cf. (BBC Productions 2011)
31.) Pakistan’s former President Musharraf in (BBC Productions 2011)
32.) Cf. (Wilmot and Hocker 2001, 90-92): “Currencies [of power] are valued resources or assets that if unequal in distribution contribute to conflict. Power currencies can consist of interpersonal linkages, resource control, communication skills, or expertise.”
33.) The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution is a department of the George Mason University outside of Washington D.C.: www.gmu.edu/departments/icar.
34.) Cf. (Bright n.d., 2)
35.) Cf. (Rashid 2001, 8-12)
36.) Cf. (Rashid 2001, xiii-xiv)
37.) See section 2.6 and Appendix D for further details.
38.) Own graph based on (Rashid 2001, 1-20)
39.) Cf. (Rashid 2001, 74): The Taliban killed an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 according to the UN after taking Mazar in ‘98.
40.) Cf. (BBC Productions 2011) and cf. (Clark, Afghanistan, the United States and the BSA: Who blinks first? 2013) quoting Karzai: “Giving bases to the USA from a logical and emotional perspective is not an easy and cheap thing. It is very hard. I swear to God that our honour (gheirat) does not accept that. But we have no other option because of our situation 30 years ago and due to all sorts of foreigners' conspiracies…”
41.) Cf. (Rashid 2001, 18). The U.S. is said to have channelled $4-5 billion to the mujahidin between 1980 and 1992 with Saudi Arabia matching all funds leading to over $10 billion in military assistance.
42.) Rashid describes the many Taliban leaders sustaining serious eye and limb injuries from the fighting; cf. (Rashid 2001, 17-18)
43.) Cf. (Rashid 2001, 21)
44.) Please consult Appendix A for a map of Afghanistan.
45.) Cf. (National Geographic 2008)
46.) In 2007 some 2,000 km² were cultivated with opium poppies in Afghanistan supplying 90% of the world market and producing 30% more than the global demand that year. Cf. (National Geographic 2008)
47.) (Bright n.d., 4)
48.) The Loya Jirga is the traditional instrument choosing a King or deciding to go to war which consists of 2,500 tribal elders and leaders across Afghanistan. The first in 1747 founded the modern state of Afghanistan and the last pre-Taliban one was held in 1977. The Taliban considering it anti-Islamic refused to hold Loya Jirgas. An emergency Loya Jirga on 10 June 2002 represented 1,575 delegates including 200 women and elected President Karzai with 1,295 votes. Cf. (Rashid 2009, 138-140) and (Sedra 2002, 7-8)
49.) The President as head of state and leader of the government is elected for five years and appoints the government which reflects all ethnicities. Following a 2004 law, the parliament (National Assembly) consists of 249 members in the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) and 102 in the upper house (Mushrano Jirga). Cf. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, 5)
50.) Cf. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2003, 4-5)
51.) Cf. (Rashid 2012, 83-86)
52.) Cf. (Bright n.d., 3): 1) Individual, 2) Societal, 3) International, 4) Global/environmental level. The fourth level is excluded from the analysis since none of the actors position themselves towards ecological, but rather social, political and economic, issues.
53.) One early instance being the “Great Game” in the late 18th and 19th century between Russia and Britain over Afghanistan as a buffer state between Russia and British-India; Cf. (Rashid 2001, 11)
54.) Cf. (Rashid 2009, 133): Human Rights Watch coined the term “U.S. warlord strategy” used to “be relieved of Afghanistan's security and political and human rights responsibilities". Senator Joe Biden acknowledged this in a 2002 speech, cf. Full text of Biden's speech reported in "Biden Promises $130 Million for Security in Afghanistan"
Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2002
55.) Cf. (BBC Productions 2011)
56.) The UK launched such a governance mission in Helmand in 2006, but was quickly drawn into military engagements e.g. fighting against opposing drug trafficking gangs in Sangin. Cf. (BBC Productions 2011)
57.) Cf. (Rashid 2009, chapter 7)
58.) UNODC found that only 10% of opium production was targeted by government plantation eradication teams while most warlords were able to evade persecution in return for financial or other favours. Cf. (National Geographic 2008)
59.) Cf. (Rashid 2001, 9-10)
60.) (Berdal and Keen 1997, 798-799)
61.) (BBC Productions 2011)
62.) Cf. (Der Spiegel 2011)
63.) Cf. (Bright n.d., 4)
64.) Such tools include Moore’s “Circle of Conflict,” “Basic Human Needs,” “Three-Tiered Paradigm,” “Situation-Attitude-Behaviour,” “Diametric Formats,” “Decoding Communication” or “Determining Levels.” Cf. (Bright n.d., 6-9)
65.) Cf. (Grono 2012)
66.) Own figure based on (Bright n.d., 6-7)
67.) Cf. (Bright n.d., 7)
68.) Cf. (AlJazeera, Further delays for US deal with Afghanistan 2013) which quotes National Security Advisor Susan Rice as saying: "Without a prompt signature, the US would have no choice but to initiate planning for a post-2014 future in which there would be no US or NATO troop presence in Afghanistan".
69.) Any attempt at changing the constitution and running for a third term might have disastrous results as seen in West Africa during similar attempts e.g. by President Tandja in Niger leading to a military coup in 2010. Cf. (Yabi 2010, 12)
70.) (Sedra 2002)
71.) Cf. (Maslow 1943 (50))
72.) Own figure based on (Maslow 1943 (50))
73.) (Bright n.d., 9)
74.) Own figure based on (Bright n.d., 9)
75.) “The other three styles [except avoiding and competing] are less severe and emphasize a willingness to work with the other conflict party to achieve a solution.,” (Bright n.d., 10)
76.) For a detailed analysis of the controversial terms ‘deradicalisation’ and ‘disengagement’, please see (Metzger 2013)
77.) Cf. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, 9)
78.) Cf. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, 9-10) and (International Crisis Group 2012, 3)
79.) Cf. (Sedra 2002, 30, 33, 87): Defence Minister Fahim drafted 90 out of 100 generals from Panjshiri Tajiks and citizens from Taliban-dominated areas are almost entirely unrepresented in the military and police (while constituting 17% of the population only 1.5% of soldiers since 2009 are from these areas).
80.) Cf. (International Crisis Group 2012, 2)
81.) Cf. (Rondeaux 2011)
82.) The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the release on its website in mid-September: “In order to further facilitate the Afghan reconciliation process, the detained Taliban leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, would be released tomorrow.,” cf. (Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013)
83.) Cf. (Bright n.d., 10): “Competition is characterized by the use of power or violence to change the status quo or achieve a win-lose situation.”
84.) Cf. (Clark 2013)
85.) Cf. (Khan 2013)
86.) Cf. (AlJazeera 2013)
87.) Cf. (Bright n.d., 10-11)
88.) Cf. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1997, 282) as referenced in (Bright n.d., 11)
89.) For a discussion of ‘terrorist’ categories including ‘absolute’ (‘revolutionary’ and ‘conditional’), ‘contingent’ (e.g. barricaders, kidnappers or hijackers) and ‘social revolutionary or religious terrorists’, please refer to: (Hayes, Kaminski and Beres 2003), (Donohue and Taylor 2003),(Spector 2003) or (Zartman 2003, 445-447).
90.) (Zartman 2003, 443)
91.) (Zartman 2003, 447)
92.) Cf. (Clark, The Taleban in Qatar (2): Biographies – core and constellation 2013)
93.) Cf. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2013): Only the Pakistani Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) is included.
94.) Cf. (Deutsche Welle 2011)
95.) Cf. (United States Institute of Peace 2004)
96.) Ripeness can be evaluated using various approaches including MHS, MEO, Entrapment, Readiness, and Leadership. For more details, please see(Zartman 2001)
97.) (Fisher and Ury 1992) as quoted in (Spector 2003, 613-4)
98.) Cf. (Spector 2003, 613); Jimmy Carter as quoted in (Rose 1995); Cf. ‘The Duty to Negotiate’ (Eban 1994)
99.) (Hayes, Kaminski and Beres 2003, 452)
100.) Cf. (Mason and Rychard 2005, 6-7)
101.) Cf. (Röminger 2011, 23)
102.) The Taliban delegation including current Qatar office negotiator Stanakzai offered to talk with President Rabbani and Hekmatyar “if they are honest with the other factions” and suggested for violence to stop and freely select a new leadership under UN supervision which it would not take part in being “a movement and not a party that wants to participate in the elections.” (Ruttig 2013)
103.) Cf. (Rashid 2001, 64)
104.) Cf. (Khan 2013)
105.) In a 17 November 2013 meeting the issues discussed ranged from the convening of the Consultative Loya Jirga on the BSA to preparations for the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections. Cf.(Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013) and cf. (Der Spiegel 2012)
106.) German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder as quoted in (Hyde-Price 2003)
107.) Both International Crisis Group as well as the Afghanistan Analysts Network envision a strategy of either a UN appointed envoy or a UN mediation team with broad support in the international community and the region itself to broker a peace deal between the Taliban and other ‘insurgent’ groups and the Afghan Government. Cf. (Osman and Clark 2013) and cf. (International Crisis Group 2012)
108.) Cf. (Sedra 2002, 32-33)
109.) Cf. (Brinkmann 2006, 60-61): Brinkmann emphasizes that the aim of dialogue is understanding, not agreement. Facilitation of dialogue can include: 1) Assisting the process of communication, 2) Helping participants identify their own objectives, 3) Assisting participants to agree on ground rules, 4) Encourage active listening e.g. by reframing
110.) Afghanistan Analysts Network suggests that the “Doha office was a product of secret talks between Taleban and US representatives that since spring 2010 have been facilitated by Germany “. (Osman 2013)
111.) (Brinkmann 2006, 50)
112.) Cf. (Spector 2003, 618)
113.) Cf. (Berghof Foundation 2012, 2-3): The Berghof Foundation calls for actors to pay specific attention to three dimensions “in contexts of polarised societies ... emerging from, protracted violent conflicts”: 1) inclusivity of all conflict stakeholders with the capacity to promote or impede constructive social change, 2) participation on ‘how to engage’ these stakeholders, 3) comprehensiveness (e.g. embedding DDR and SSR approaches in their economic, political and social context).
114.) Cf. (Zartman 2001, 14)
115.) Cf. (Brinkmann 2006, 58-59): These confidence-building measures have to be further broken down to cover:
1) Level of intervention, 2) Target groups, 3) Change which is hoped for, 4) Challenges, 5) Self-perceptions of Germany as a mediator, 6) Advantages, 7) Risks, 8) Starting points,
116.) (Spector 2003, 617)
117.) Cf. (Röminger 2011, chapter 4)
118.) Cf. (Lederach 1997, 46)
119.) Cf. (Brinkmann 2006, 61): Influence can be exercised by reframing and repeating the parties’ common positions or by asking them to express their own feelings and possible feelings of the other party.
120.) For a thorough analysis of women rights during the Taliban reign and in post-Taliban Afghanistan, please refer to (International Crisis Group, Women and Conflict in Afghanistan 2013).
121.) Cf. (AFP 2013): In 2013 alone, more than 30 employees were killed across Afghanistan making it the deadliest year for aid workers.
122.) Cf. Crisis Group interviews, former Taliban officials, Kabul, March-August 2011 as quoted in (International Crisis Group 2012, 4)
123.) Cf. (BBC Productions 2011): Osama bin Laden’s son stated that it was his father’s dream for the U.S. to invade Afghanistan and be defeated by guerrilla fighting as a consequence of 9/11, which is why an al-Qaeda suicide bomber killed Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance, one day prior.
124.) (UN 2011)
125.) Own figure based on (International Crisis Group 2012)
126.) Cf. (Bright n.d., 5)
127.) (International Crisis Group 2012, 3)
128.) Own figure based on (International Crisis Group 2012, 5-9)
