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    <title>'Conflict Studies' - Tagged Articles - Inquiries Journal</title>
    <link>http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/keyword/conflict-studies</link>
    <description>Inquiries Journal provides undergraduate and graduate students around the world a platform for the wide dissemination of academic work over a range of core disciplines.</description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 00:54:19 -0400</pubDate>
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				<title>Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan as Third-Party Propagators: Categorizing the Participation of Private Security Companies</title>
				<link>http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/685/private-security-contractors-in-afghanistan-as-third-party-propagators-categorizing-the-participation-of-private-security-companies</link>
				<description>By Asad L. Asad - A public good is defined as a product or service that is both non-rival and non-excludable, meaning that one cannot withhold it from another without precluding all others from benefitting from it as well.[1] Examples of such products have come to be typified by air (for breathing), public access television, and national defense. In spite of the public nature of these services, the third good in the series&amp;mdash;national defense&amp;mdash;has become increasingly privatized in recent years, as state actors find themselves looking for alternatives to heighten their military strength.[2] In the face of...</description>
				<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2012 08:05 EDT</pubDate>
				<guid>http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/685/private-security-contractors-in-afghanistan-as-third-party-propagators-categorizing-the-participation-of-private-security-companies</guid>
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				<title>Influence Operations as Counterinsurgency: A Strategy of Divisiveness</title>
				<link>http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1259/influence-operations-as-counterinsurgency-a-strategy-of-divisiveness</link>
				<description>By Sam  Worby - Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, U.S. and coalition forces have found it difficult to win the &quot;hearts and minds&quot; of the civilian population. Like many other invading forces of the last half-century, the U.S. has found itself fighting an unmarked, non-state, and highly adaptable foe: the insurgent. Central to counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) is the concept of winning the &quot;hearts and minds&quot; of the civilian population. Insurgencies derive their power from popular support. A powerful insurgency or counterinsurgency, therefore, has a firm grip on the hearts and minds of...</description>
				<pubDate>Thu, 15 Apr 2010 12:00 EDT</pubDate>
				<guid>http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1259/influence-operations-as-counterinsurgency-a-strategy-of-divisiveness</guid>
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