

CLOCKS AND CLOUDS

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY'S UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

CHRISTOPHER CITRO

Environmentalism and Postmaterialism in China

MATTHEW LOZADA

Women in the Schoolhouse, Whitehouse, and Whorehouse: Empowering Sex Trafficked Women in Southeast Asia through Education and Political Participation

AUBREY ROSE

The Populist Bind: Death Penalty Abolition as an Anti-Democratic Decision

NICHOLAS TABER

Commercial Interests, Political Influence, and the Arms Trade

ERICA THOMAS

Busted by the Feds? Government Corruption and Drug Trafficking

TANYA VITUSAGAVULU

Trouble in Paradise: Fiji's Proclivity to Coups

VOLUME III, SPRING 2013

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY'S UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

CLOCKS
AND
CLOUDS

VOLUME III, SPRING 2013

INTRODUCTION

Over the past year, we have been thrilled to see *Clocks and Clouds* grow from a fledgling journal into a campus institution. The desire to establish a premiere outlet for undergraduate research in political science and international relations at American University brought together students, faculty, and administration last year, and it has continued to push the journal forward as we strive to carve out our place on campus. Our talented and dedicated student contributors have elevated the quality of the journal, and it has been an honor to work with all of them as authors, staff, and reviewers. While the editors keep the process on track, the success of the journal is really due to the tremendous effort that each and every one of the students has put into the journal. This issue of *Clocks and Clouds* is truly their journal.

We received a large amount of excellent research and we are excited to be publishing the work of the six authors. Each author contributes new ideas to their field, either through their novel methodological approaches or their completely new way of framing the issue. These authors show us that exemplary scholarship unites both analytical rigor and real-world relevance. They have the potential to change the way we think about some of the most puzzling questions in the modern social sciences. Although their topics seem to come from disparate subjects, the quality of research unites these authors as examples of the best undergraduate researchers that American University has to offer.

The articles in this issue examine a wide range of national and international issues. Some authors give us a different perspective on the variety of values around the world. Chris Citro examines the underlying causes of environmentalism in China, finding that the postmaterialist values traditionally driving Western environmentalism do not have the same effect in China. Tanya Vitusagavulu also studied a disparity of values, but this one was between the two major races on the island of Fiji. She finds that, among other factors, these cultural differences severely weaken Fiji's democracy, making it susceptible to coups.

Other authors decided to look at illicit international trades, helping us to understand exactly what is driving these black markets. Matthew Lozada takes a look at sex trafficking in Southeast Asia, discerning how political representation, education, and gender parity are intertwined in this complex issue. Similarly, Erica Thomas's research studies the effect that government corruption has on drug trafficking around the world, giving us vital clues into those countries where it will be difficult to eliminate drug cartels.

Finally, several authors chose to study national issues, which help us understand the country we live in. Aubrey Rose compared the death penalty abolition movements of the United States and Great Britain in order to determine what factors have led the U.S. to keep capital punishment while many other Western nations have abolished it. On the other hand, Nick Taber examines the effect that the U.S. defense industry has on U.S. arms trade, providing a crucial piece of the puzzle surrounding arms trade.

Clocks and Clouds is based on the premise that undergraduates have ideas that matter. Although we do not claim that our work will change the world overnight, we are convinced that the ideas we present can make genuine contributions to a broader academic dialog. We believe *Clocks and Clouds* can help shape and voice the extraordinary ideas of American University undergraduates, and showcase the real power that research can have. It is our sincere hope that this journal will continue to do so for years to come.

Carly Kinney
EDITOR IN CHIEF

Crystal Shatzer Espie
MANAGING EDITOR

CLOCKS AND CLOUDS SPRING 2013 STAFF

FACULTY ADVISOR Professor Kimberly Cowell-Meyers
Professor Dylan Craig

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Carly Kinney

MANAGING EDITOR Crystal Shatzer Espie
ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITORS Sean Dugdale
Maria Cribbs
Ozzie Chung
Emily Jorgensen
Nathan Thompson

MARKETING DIRECTOR Steven Ballew
ASSISTANT MARKETING DIRECTORS Allison Butler
Habib Emmanuel-Ibrahim

PRODUCTION MANAGER Jasmine Guo

REVIEWERS Alex Severin
Amanda Sands
Ananya Marathe
Ariel Mond Bradley Harmon
Dakota Freeze
David Troy
Fito Akinrinade
Jesse Bruner
Karanpreet Takhar
Leigh Maltby
Pranay Ahluwalia
Richard Bartoldus
Sam Cho
Tessie Burdette
Emily Schott
Emma Lydon
Irene Onufrey
Kara Naseef
Kaylee Kalinowski
Megan Nissel
Nathaniel Seeskin
Nick Taber
Noah Benjamin

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Christopher Citro

Environmentalism and Postmaterialism in China 1

Matthew Lozada

*Women in the Schoolhouse, Whitehouse, and Whorehouse:
Empowering Sex Trafficked Women in Southeast Asia through
Education and Political Participation* 15

Aubrey Rose

The Populist Bind: Death Penalty Abolition as an Anti-Democratic Decision 39

Nicholas Taber

Commercial Interests, Political Influence, and the Arms Trade 57

Erica Thomas

Busted by the Feds? Government Corruption and Drug Trafficking 71

Tanya Vitusagavulu

Trouble in Paradise: Fiji's Proclivity to Coups 87

ENVIRONMENTALISM AND POSTMATERIALISM IN CHINA

Christopher Citro

Abstract

Postmaterialist values, those that emphasize higher-order human needs, have become widely accepted as the determining force behind environmentalism in the West. Little research has been dedicated to studying the importance of these values outside of the developed world where experience with pollution has been the assumed cause for people's concern for the environment. This study seeks to expand the understanding of ecological concern in China by testing the values-based theory of environmentalism in China. Using survey data taken from the World Values Survey, this study finds no evidence of a relationship between postmaterialist values and environmentalism in China. Instead, it finds that widespread environmentalism there may not be the result of objective environmental conditions but the result of other cultural factors not shared by Western societies. This study thus addresses a gap in the understanding of ecological concern in China and suggests topics for future scholarship. This research also highlights the potential importance of cultural values in studying environmentalism in developing nations.

Introduction

In recent years, the topic of environmental concern has grown as an area of inquiry, beginning with the rise of environmentalism in the West during the later decades of the twentieth-century. Early scholarship treated environmental concern as a luxury good only available to citizens of the wealthy industrialized world, and postmaterialist values eventually emerged as the primary explanatory variable for ecological concern in the West. When environmentalism began to appear as a political force in developing nations, it was described as a materialist response to devastating ecological degradation, and a wholly distinct phenomenon from the postmaterial environmentalism in the developed nations. As a result, values in less industrialized nations generally have not been considered and little research has been dedicated to the subject.

China, despite its growing power and status as an advanced developing nation, is one of those places in which environmentalism is poorly understood. As China is the world's most populous nation and its second largest economy, environmental attitudes there may have profound effects on global efforts to address severe ecological threats. This is especially true on the issue of climate change, as China has fiercely resisted emissions limits. As the Chinese regime has moved away from

the ideological-based legitimacy of the past, it has taken care to be more perceptive of newly-important public opinions. Accordingly, popular attitudes towards environmental protection in China may play a very significant role in the continuing rounds of climate talks. Even on issues seemingly within China, the nature of pollution ensures that internal policies will have broad effects on the state of the global environment. Furthermore, the potential for environmental concern and destruction to affect the standing and legitimacy of the regime continues to grow as China eschews Communism in favor of state capitalism. A better understanding of environmentalism in China may also prove valuable in studies of other industrializing countries as they reach more advanced levels of development.

To contribute to the limited research on environmental attitudes in China, this study seeks to examine the role of values, specifically postmaterialism, in shaping concern. Postmaterialist individuals place great importance on the higher end of Maslow's hierarchy of human needs. Included among these concerns are morality, autonomy, expression, aesthetics, and quality of life. Postmaterialists, as a result of continued abundance, take for granted basic human economic needs such as health, safety, and sustenance that are lower down on the hierarchy. Environmentalism can be connected with postmaterialism through the significance postmaterialists place on the aesthetics of the natural world and on the broader effects of human activity. Postmaterialists value the environment beyond simple economic utility and see it as deserving of protection in spite of short-term costs. This type of concern does not require individuals to have experiences with pollution, and it includes issues that have little or no direct effect on the individuals' lives. Because China is an advanced industrialized country that has experienced three decades of continual development, postmaterialist values have likely taken hold in China to the point that their effect on environmentalism can be studied. As a result, this study seeks to examine the hypothesis that postmaterialism is directly related to environmentalism in China.

Literature Review

Environmental concern first emerged as a political force in Western Europe and North America in the mid-twentieth century. As a result, environmentalism was initially considered a luxury good, only available to affluent societies that had already undergone the often pollution-intensive process of creating an industrial society.

Dunlap, Gallup, and Gallup (1993) examined this relationship by analyzing the results of the global Health of the Planet Survey. This study compared national-level data on environmental attitudes and gross national product. While some differences were seen in comparing affluent to developing nations, namely the level of support for higher prices to pay for regulation, environmental attitudes were found to be largely consistent across the developing-developed gap. Hence, this analysis suggested that environmentalism was more than just the prerogative of postindustrial societies, and that affluence was not a proper way to examine these values.

In a later study of global polling data, Franzen (2003) also examined the relationship between affluence and environmental concern. Noting the assertion that economic prosperity is required for ecological concern was, as in the above scholarship, the subject of considerable debate, the author sought to contribute by comparing changes in environmental concern to changes in affluence over time using national-level data. From his research, Franzen found that environmentalism was only weakly correlated with affluence. Additionally, he found that economic growth had an extremely weak relationship with increases in ecological concern at the fringes of significance. Though affluent

countries were shown here to have a high level of concern for the environment, changes in prosperity were found to not be a useful predictor of differences in such attitudes. Therefore, another feature of industrialized nations must be relevant in such analyses.

As simple economic wealth failed to provide adequate power in explaining environmentalism, an alternative theoretical framework was proposed. In the seminal work on values in change, Inglehart (1995) targeted postmaterialist values as the driving force behind the emergence of environmentalism. This set of abstract cultural values is related to continued abundance and the author's explanation has gained widespread acceptance.

Inglehart linked postmaterialism with favorable opinions of environmental protection, as policy action on the environment often hinders economic growth and productivity but is strongly linked with aesthetics and quality of life. Using the World Values Survey, Inglehart demonstrated that respondents espousing postmaterialist beliefs were more likely to favor efforts to protect the environment, even at the cost of economic growth. This pattern held true for both types of economies, but was much weaker in developing nations. Postmaterialism was also demonstrated to be concentrated in developed nations and to have emerged around the same time that environmentalism became widespread. Inglehart took care to note that these industrialized nations often lacked the severe environmental degradation seen in the developing world yet still expressed substantial levels of concern. Respondents in the developed world were therefore more likely to express negative sentiments on the global environment but have positive views of their local one.

Inglehart also wrote that environmental conditions are able to explain the emergence of environmentalism in largely materialist societies. As postindustrial societies transitioned to their current state, pollution-intensive industries were largely moved to the developing world. As such, these countries have experienced high levels of ecological damage. Citizens of these heavily polluted nations, generally in the industrializing world, were found in this analysis to express greater levels of concern for the environment. In a reversal of an aforementioned relationship, these respondents were more likely to have a negative view of their local environment but care little for the state of the larger global one. A comparison of these two factors was inconclusive due to the limited availability of environmental data. In general, it did appear that both cultural and objective factors had roughly equal effects on the development of environmentalist attitudes but were rarely, if at all, important in the same society simultaneously. This important addition, however, addresses the main criticism of the postmaterialist theory of environmentalism by establishing how it can result from objective ecological conditions.

Building upon the cultural framework laid out in Inglehart, Lee and Norris (2000) looked at postmaterialism in Eastern Europe, as most in-depth analyses had hitherto been focused on North America and Western Europe. This study used the World Values Study to compare patterns that had been demonstrated in the West with those in the region. In general, the authors found that the same demographic relationships with environmentalism observed in the West held true in Eastern Europe across national lines. These demographic factors, namely education, wealth, and youth, can be connected to postmaterialist values, especially in the transitioning societies of the former Eastern Bloc. Again, postmaterialism was found to be strongly correlated with environmental concern. These results provided evidence to support the existence of a correlation between postmaterialist values and ecological concern in an advanced developing nation like China.

Cultural factors were also explored in Sarigöllü (2009). This study compared environmental

attitudes between the capitals of developing Turkey and postindustrial Canada. Residents of more polluted Istanbul were found to express a greater level of concern for the state of the environment than residents of Montreal in an analysis of original survey data. This result affirmed the importance of objective conditions. Strongly postmaterialist Montreal, however, was found to have a largely consistent level of environmentalism while such attitudes varied widely in Istanbul. In Turkey, the educated and wealthy respondents who generally expressed greater levels of postmaterialism were also more likely to express concerns over the state of the environment. This study provided further support for the possible significance of postmaterialism in advanced developing nations, among the other cultural factors considered.

In Pierce (1997), this values-based framework was critiqued using national-level survey data. The author demonstrated that wealthy nations such as Japan may demonstrate a greater level of concern for the state of the environment than other developed countries despite having fewer postmaterialists in its population. Accordingly, Pierce wrote that other cultural factors, such as traditionalism and religion, can have important implications for the study of these attitudes. Care is taken to support the use of postmaterialism as an explanatory variable for environmentalism. The author argued that unique aspects of national culture, however, should be considered if they have the potential to work with or against the widely-supported link between postmaterialism and environmentalism.

A recurring theme in the literature on global environmental attitudes is the relative lack of in-depth and individual-level research done on developing nations. Instead, early scholarship focused only on Western nations or a larger cohort in a comparative framework. More recent research, such as Lee and Norris (2000), has begun to focus on emerging economies. Despite recently surpassing Japan as the world's second largest economy and being the most populous nation on earth, China remains a relatively new territory for research on environmentalism.

Chung-en Liu and Leiserowitz (2009) presented findings from one of the first publicly-available nation-wide surveys on environmental attitudes conducted in China, completed in 2007. In general, the survey found widespread support for the protection of the environment, with respondents expressing a preference for such efforts over unfettered economic development. Those surveyed also expressed optimism on the potential for improvement in the local environment over the coming year and a greater level of concern for provincial conditions over global ones, including issues such as climate change. Surprisingly, respondents generally reported contentment with the quality of their local environment despite living in some of the world's most polluted cities. The positive perceptions of the immediate environment suggest that the objective conditions theory alone cannot explain ecological concern in China, even with its localized focus.

Cao, Chen, and Liu (2009) provided a deeper analysis of environmental attitudes in China, focusing on specific demographic factors. This analysis found that an overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that their nation was undergoing "severe environmental degradation" and that these conditions had negative implications for their health. Despite this fact, only around half of the respondents stated that protecting the environment was more important than economic growth. Stronger environmental attitudes were associated with higher education levels, white collar professions, and both high and low incomes. An analysis of limited geographic data also suggested greater concern in areas of China expected to be more polluted. While this fact, combined with the ambivalence of regulation vis-à-vis growth and the respondents' belief that pollution has pernicious health effects,

implies the strength of the objective conditions framework, the high levels of concern expressed by wealthy, well-educated, and professional Chinese suggests that values may also be of consequence. It is these very people who would be expected to be the most postmaterialist in Chinese society.

The next step in the development of a comprehensive understanding of environmental concern in China is to investigate the postmaterialist values theory that has become the widely accepted standard in the field. Once this gap in the literature has been filled, the base for further, more sophisticated research on environmentalism, such as examining its salience as a political issue, will have been firmly established. As China is an advanced developing economy, an in-depth look at cultural factors of environmentalism may also provide insight to the applicability of values-based theories in other industrializing economies.

Looking at the previous scholarship, it is clearly valid to test for a relationship between these two variables. Cao, Chen, and Liu (2009) have demonstrated that there is a high level of environmentalism expressed by the individuals most likely to be postmaterialist, mainly the young, educated, and economically secure.

Methodology

The hypothesis tested in the study was that, in China, individuals expressing postmaterialist values will also report a greater level of concern for the state of the environment, i.e. that the relationship so well-documented in the West will hold true. This hypothesis would be proven by a direct (and significant) relationship between the postmaterialism and environmentalism variables detailed below. On the contrary, the lack of a significant relationship between the variables, or an inverse one, would disprove the hypothesis.

The data used in this analysis was taken from the most recent wave of the World Values Survey. For China, this data dates to 2007. Additional data used for comparative purposes was also taken from the World Values Survey for Germany (2006) and Japan (2005). The former was used to establish a baseline as a secure, highly-developed, prosperous Western nation, and to indicate the appropriateness of the model, while the latter was included to provide a different baseline, that of a highly-developed nation that also shares a similar cultural tradition to China.

Postmaterialism was measured with an index calculated by the World Values Survey (see Appendix A). It is based on the respondents' answers to six questions about the desired goals of contemporary society. The six questions were divided over three sets of societal aims, with respondents directed to select only two. These sets included postmaterialist responses about protecting and expanding free speech, progressing towards a more humane and personal society, and increasing citizen input in important government decisions. Such concerns are quite clearly related not to basic human survival, but to the subjective human experience. These response sets also included standard materialist responses such as maintaining order, preventing inflation, and ensuring a strong national military. This group of potential responses is intimately related to meeting the base human needs of security and sustenance. The index score for respondents was then based on how many postmaterialist responses they chose in each of the three sets. The highest score individuals could receive was six (highly postmaterialist) while the lowest was zero (highly materialist). As the hypothesis the study sought to test was that postmaterialism is directly related to environmentalism, this variable was used as the primary independent variable (see below).

While empirically measuring values is certainly a difficult proposition, the above approach was designed to capture a key aspect of postmaterialists: the tendency to emphasize and to exhibit a clear preference for higher-order concerns over lower ones. This was done by directly pitting obviously postmaterialist and materialist goals against one another. By taking into account the expressed preference for a variety of different goals across three sets thereof, this method was able to approximate how strongly postmaterialist and individual is. Because of the hypothesis of the present study, such differentiation is essential. And as China is a place where postmaterialist values are not yet universal, an index variable designed to measure postmaterialism over a range likely presented are more accurate representation of the population in question.

Environmentalism was measured with an index based on the respondents' answers to three questions about environmental protection (see Appendix B). This set included the willingness to pay higher prices for the purpose of ecological protection, support for higher taxes to do the same, and the belief that such actions not cost citizens anything. For each question in the survey, respondents were able to state their level of agreement from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." For the first two questions, expressing "positive" concern for the environment was reversed coded so that agreement would increase the individual's index score. The composite variable was built by adding the scores for each question. The lowest score possible for respondents was three (least concern for environment) while the highest was twelve (highest concern). Based on the goal of examining the explanatory power of postmaterialism on environmentalism in China, this variable was used as the dependent variable (see below).

The environmentalism index was designed to accurately portray the level of a respondent's concern for the environment. It is quite possible to envision, in isolation, nearly all respondents expressing at least some level of support for environmental protection. The outlined approach, however, attempts to discriminate amongst respondents by imposing hypothetical costs for policies to protect and improve the state of the environment. As with the aforementioned postmaterialist values, the use of three different questions with varying levels of support allows for a true range across individual respondents and can thus be effectively incorporated into the examination of this study's hypothesis. It must be noted here that central to this approach is the assumption that all environmentalists, no matter the cause, would be willing to bear hypothetical costs for environmental protection. This assumption is reasonable because a postmaterialist environmentalist would be expected prefer the benefits over the economic costs while a materialist environmentalist would be expected to safeguard health and survival, the most basic of concerns, through these costs.

Demographic variables were included in this analysis as well. These factors have been shown in previous scholarship to be of some consequence in determining environmentalism in China and/or other regions. Education level and income were broken down into ten point indices by the World Values Survey, with educational attainment and high incomes associated with higher values respectively. A profession dummy variable was also created, with white collar professions being assigned a value of one. All cases were weighted using the computed variable provided by the World Values Survey.

An additional set of two variables measuring perceptions of the local and global environment was prepared from the World Values Survey as well. These variables, and their use in place of postmaterialism in subsequent analyses as independent variables, are discussed in detail in the next

section.

To examine the relationship between postmaterialism and environmentalism, a multivariate regression analysis was performed. This statistical technique was selected due to the large ranges present in the two additive indices and the ability to control for the effects of variables demonstrated to be pertinent in prior research. With environmental concern as the dependent variable, postmaterialism, respondent age, education level, household income, and profession were selected as the independent variables. All statistical analyses were conducted using the IBM SPSS Statistics 19 software package.

Results and Analysis

Table 1 shows the mean values for the two variables in question.

| Nation | China | Germany | Japan |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Postmaterialist Index | 1.30 (1.10) | 2.66 (1.11) | 2.11 (1.14) |
| Environmentalism Index | 8.45 (1.59) | 5.98 (2.20) | 7.53 (2.00) |
| N | 1026 | 1772 | 675 |

As the above data demonstrates, China as a developing nation has not yet experienced the same level of acceptance of postmaterialism that Japan and Germany have after attaining industrialized status. China does, however, express a level of concern for the environment that is higher than in Japan or in Germany. While such a result would appear to call into question the theoretical framework for this study, it is important to note that the target relationships exist not in this aggregate national level data but instead at the individual level.

Table 2: Association of Independent Variables with Environmental Concern

| Nation | China | Germany | Japan |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Postmaterialism | .008 (.046) | .405 (.050)*** | .166 (.068)* |
| Income | .135 (.028)*** | .203 (.032)*** | .134 (.028)*** |
| Education Level | .019 (.023) | .227 (.028)*** | .106 (.051)* |
| White Collar | .207 (.130) | .292 (.125)** | .179 (.169) |
| Age | .023 (.076) | -.033 (.079) | .366 (.111)** |
| Intercept | 7.87 (.261)*** | 2.79 (.285)*** | 4.92 (.505)*** |
| Standard Error | 1.577 | 1.986 | 1.910 |
| R2 | .035 | .171 | .076 |
| N | 1026 | 1772 | 675 |

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Postmaterialism}) + \beta_2(\text{Income}) + \beta_3(\text{Education}) + \beta_4(\text{White Collar}) + \beta_4(\text{Age}).$$

As shown in Table 2, postmaterialism at the individual level lacked explanatory power

for environmentalism in China as it did not have a significant relationship with environmentalism. Accordingly, it can be said that environmental concern, clearly espoused by the Chinese people as seen in Table 1, is quite evenly diffused across the cultural boundaries created by postmaterialist values. As expected, postmaterialism as an independent variable in this model was significantly related to environmental concern in the other two countries included. This was particularly true for Germany, with postmaterialism having the greatest effect on environmentalism and the model overall having a rather robust R^2 value of 0.17. The German results serve to indicate that the model applied above was appropriately designed as it adequately explained environmentalism in a nation where environmentalism is largely understood. It is apparent that this values-based explanation of environmentalism, strongly expressed in previous literature on the developed world, failed in China.

As postmaterialist values fail to affect environmental concern significantly, the next logical explanation for environmentalism in China is the objective conditions theory. As severe ecological degradation can clearly become a devastating health hazard, not to mention an economic one, environmentalism can thus be the result of very materialist concerns of personal safety, and not that of cultural values. By all accounts, China is among the most polluted nations on Earth, the product of years of rapid economic growth and the relocation of heavily polluting industries and processes from Western postindustrial economies. If it is widespread environmental damage that causes the high level of concern expressed in China, then environmentalism would be expected to be observed across values-based boundaries. The above results do exhibit this pattern, with high levels of ecological concern that cannot be sufficiently explained by the regression model that was applicable to Germany and Japan.

There is no readily available data to objectively measure local environmental conditions that could be compared to environmental attitudes in China. The World Values Survey did, however, include several questions asking respondents about both local and global environmental issues. Since it is the subjective experience with environmental conditions that drives materialist-based concern, these survey questions are an excellent proxy through which to examine the objective conditions theory.

If objective conditions are the causal factor behind environmentalism in China, local ecological issues would be expected to be viewed in a negative light by respondents. Problems such as unsafe drinking water and poor air quality are intimately related to human health and are highly localized in scope. On the contrary, more abstract environmental issues such as climate change and biodiversity loss would likely be much less important to the materialist environmentalist, as they esoteric, if not minimal, effects on individuals and their well-being. Individuals that placed great significance on these issues are likely influenced by higher-order concerns than basic health and safety, and hence may express high levels of environmentalism despite having a positive perception of their local environment.

To provide insight on the strength of the objective conditions framework in explaining ecological concern, a second set of regression analyses was performed. The World Values Survey set this data was taken from asked respondents whether they believed poor water, air, and sanitation, biodiversity loss, ocean pollution, and global warming are significant problems (see Appendix C). The six issues can be separated into two groups by virtue of being, with regard to individuals, local and concrete (the former three) or abstract and global in nature (the latter three). A local and abstract environmental issues index was calculated for each respondent by reverse coding and adding together survey answers to the aforementioned questions. These questions were selected for their specificity: the

conditions-based theory of environmentalism is premised entirely on the proximity of environmental reality to the individual. Basing an index variable on inquiries as to concern for water, air, and sanitation quality, separately, was done to most directly probe this connection to environmental perception on those very aspects that relate most to human welfare. Each index had a range from three to twelve, with higher values associated with the respondent rating the presented issues as more serious problems. The indices were then used as independent variables in place of postmaterialism in the above statistical model.

Table 3: Association of Local and Abstract Conditions with Environmental Concern in China

| Table 3: Association of Local and Abstract Conditions with Environmental Concern in China | | |
|--|----------------|-----------------|
| | Local Issues | Abstract Issues |
| Index | .005 (.017) | .106 (.027)*** |
| Income | .107 (.025)*** | .159 (.028)*** |
| Education Level | .035 (.020) | .007 (.023) |
| White Collar | .104 (.122) | .014 (.127) |
| Age | .040 (.070) | .141 (.075) |
| Intercept | 7.85 (.267)*** | 6.67 (.356)*** |
| Standard Error | 1.537 | 1.454 |
| R2 | .026 | .067 |
| N | 1408 | 1006 |

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{local}) + \beta_2(\text{Income}) + \beta_3(\text{Education}) + \beta_4(\text{White Collar}) + \beta_4(\text{Age});$$

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{abstract}) + \beta_2(\text{Income}) + \beta_3(\text{Education}) + \beta_4(\text{White Collar}) + \beta_4(\text{Age}).$$

As Table 3 demonstrates, concern about local environmental problems was not significantly related to environmentalism in China. Instead, expressed concern about abstract environmental problems was, to a high degree. This result serves to suggest that objective conditions may not be the dominant narrative, as the high level of ecological concern is not related to negative perceptions of respondents' immediate environment. The explanatory strength of abstract concerns supports a values-based framework, as efforts to address these issues likely involve economic costs that materialists would avoid without direct harm. In general, they are more a function of societal interaction with the natural world, divorced from the individual. While postmaterialism is an example of such a theory, its weakness as an independent variable suggests that other values are more important.

The relevance of different cultural factors is also supported by statistical results for Japan. Though the data resembled that for Germany, the model overall was weaker here ($R_2=0.076$), with postmaterialism being a more minor, albeit significant, variable in determining environmentalism (see Table 2). Hence, while Japan is comparable to Germany economically and in terms of objective conditions, ecological concern is somewhat different. Pierce (1997) argued that Japan, by virtue of cultural traditions, was unique among postindustrial economies as an excellent example of a nation in which the postmaterialist values theory lacks strength. As an East Asian neighbor, one that exerted

great influence on the region for centuries, China has cultural traditions that are very similar to Japan, especially in comparison to the West. It follows then that relevant cultural factors beyond postmaterialism would be shared by the two nations. The likely importance of these other values implies that the objective conditions paradigm is not the overriding relationship behind environmental concern in China. Instead, subjective values outside of postmaterialism are supported as the possible explanation behind the dependent variable.

Pierce (1997) called attention to the less individualistic nature of Eastern societies compared to Western traditions. Individualism, according to Pierce, leads to an anthropocentric worldview, one that sees the natural world as justly exploited for human needs and benefit. By subscribing to this viewpoint, one would be expected to place economic needs over environmental protection and see no inherent importance in such efforts. Because Eastern societies place a greater value on the community, they are more likely to see the environment as part of larger society and as a provider of shared goods, thus deserving of protection (Pierce 1997). It follows that communitarian individuals would likely express support for environmental ideas even in the absence of personal experiences with severe pollution, and be concerned with even abstract human effects on the natural world.

Confucian values, shared in at least some form by China's neighbors, also may be able to explain environmental concern. Despite the efforts to expunge these cultural traditions, Confucian values have remained a powerful cultural force in China. As discussed in Snyder (2006), Confucian thought is well suited towards an anthropocentric viewpoint, in which humans act in concert with nature. A harmonious relationship with nature is an essential component of this belief system. The great importance placed on moral relationships in Confucianism would thus lead individuals to see an inherent value in the natural world and seek to interact with it in a sustainable and just way. Like communitarian beliefs, this outlook likely leads to concern with impacts on the environment that are divorced from everyday life.

Conclusion

With the inability of postmaterialism to explain the strong environmental concern expressed in the absence of postindustrial abundance in China, additional cultural values emerge as the possible impetus behind the strong level of ecological concern expressed in the World Values Survey. The ability to link Confucian belief systems and communitarian outlooks with environmentalism philosophically further supports this assertion. At the present time there is not enough sufficient data to allow for an empirical study of the effects of these Eastern values on environmentalism in China. This analysis does affirm, however, that culture must be a topic of further research to expand the knowledge of ecological concern in China.

This study serves to highlight the shortcomings of the postmaterialist theory of environmental concern. Though the relationship has been well-documented in the Western world, it has been found to be less important to understanding environmentalism in East Asia. And although it is not unreasonable to predict that, as China continues to develop, such values may grow in stature, these findings suggest that postmaterialism may never be the driving force behind environmentalism there as it is in the West. Additionally, this study highlights the need to consider a broad range of cultural factors, many unique and not shared in the West, when analyzing such topics as environmentalism.

Environmental concern in China may yet prove to have profound implications for the global

environment and economy. Growth in environmentalism has the ability to propel the nation towards accepting emissions limitations, a key term that has kept the United States from signing on to any meaningful climate treaty. Internal regulations brought about by public pressure could also make doing business in China much more costly. Failure by the regime to adequately respond to potentially strong environmentalist sentiment may very well have a deleterious impact on its grip on power and help provide an impetus for more radicalized political actions, outside of tightly controlled Chinese politics. ✕

Appendix

Appendix A

Postmaterialism in this study was measured with an index variable calculated by the World Values Survey. Participants were directed to select two responses from three sets of four societal aims as the most important. These goals can be easily categorized as materialist or postmaterialist and this method thus indicates when respondents elevate higher-order concerns directly over lower ones, the essence of postmaterialism. Respondents that chose more postmaterialist goals as societal imperatives were given a higher value for this variable. The range of the index was zero (materialist) to six (postmaterialist). The three sets of aims are listed below.

First Group: a high level of economic growth; making sure this country has strong defenses, seeing that more people have a say; trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful

Second Group: maintaining order in the nation; giving people more say in government decisions; fighting rising prices; protecting freedom of speech

Third Group: a stable economy; progress towards a more humane society; progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money; the fight against crime

Appendix B

Environmentalism in this study was measured by calculating an index based on three World Values Survey questions, a similar approach to Lee and Norris (2000). Participants were shown three statements on environmental protection and could respond that they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed. These statements are as follows:

I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution;

I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution; and

The Government should reduce environmental pollution, but it should not cost me any money.

For the first two statements, the “strongly agree” response was assigned a value of four and the subsequent responses assigned decreasing values. The responses for the final question were reverse-coded from the World Values Survey dataset to follow a similar pattern. For each respondent, the value for each question was summed, to give a maximum value of twelve and a minimum value of three for this environmental concern index.

Appendix C

The perceptions of local and abstract conditions were measured by calculating two index variables based on six questions about different environmental issues (three for each set). For local conditions these issues were poor water quality, poor air quality, and poor sanitation and sewage. For abstract conditions, these issues were biodiversity loss, ocean pollution, and climate change. Respondents could answer that they felt the problem was very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious, or not serious. The responses were reverse-coded so that high levels of the indices were associated with rating the issues as being more serious. The minimum value for both variables was three and the maximum was twelve.

Works Cited

- Cao, Shixiong, Li Chen and Zhande Liu. 2009. "An investigation of Chinese Attitudes Towards the Environment: Case Study Using the Grain for Green Project." *Ambio* (February): 55-65. www.proquest.umi.com
- Chung-en Liu, John and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2009. "FROM RED TO GREEN? Environmental Attitudes and Behavior in Urban China," *Environment* (Summer): 33-47. www.proquest.umi.com
- Dunlap, Riley E., George Gallup, and Alec M. Gallup. 1993. "Of Global Concern: Results of the Health of the Planet Survey," *Environment* (November): 6-15, 22-39. www.proquest.umi.com
- Franzen, Axel. 2003. "Environmental Attitudes in International Comparison: An Analysis of the ISSP Surveys 1993 and 2000," *Social Science Quarterly* (June): 297-309. www.proquest.umi.com
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1995. "Public Support for Environmental Protection: Objective Problems and Subjective Values in 43 Societies," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (March): 57-72. www.jstor.org
- Lee, Aie-rie, and James A. Norris. 2000. "Attitudes Towards Environmental Issues in Eastern Europe," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* (Vol 12 No 2). www.proquest.umi.com
- Pierce, John. 1997. "The Hidden Layer of Political Culture: A Comment on "Postmaterialist Values and the Environment: A Critique and Reappraisal." *Social Science Quarterly* (March): 30-35. www.web.ebscohost.com
- Sarigöllü, Emine. 2009. "A Cross-Country Exploration of Environmental Attitudes," *Environment and Behavior* (Vol. 41 Issue 3): 366-389. www.proquest.umi.com
- Snyder, Samuel. 2006. "Chinese Traditions and Ecology: Survey Article," *Worldviews: Environment Culture Religion* (Vol 10 No 1): 100-134. www.web.ebscohost.com

WOMEN IN THE SCHOOLHOUSE, WHITEHOUSE, AND WHOREHOUSE: EMPOWERING SEX TRAFFICKED WOMEN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THROUGH EDUCATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Matthew Lozada

Abstract

While the enslavement of humans has been occurring even before the dawn of written history, today's form of slavery occurs on an unprecedented scale in both scope and reach. This work attempts to understand the most vulnerable sectors of population groups and the strength of the laws in Southeast Asian countries that address the human trafficking epidemic in the region. This endeavor uses quantitative analysis through the linear regression function of the SPSS program to operationalize and see whether the factors of gender parity, educational attainment, or political representation show strong and statistically significant correlations with the strength of anti-trafficking laws. The findings reveal that primary school education has both positive and negative effects on the country's laws depending on the year they were passed. The research is consequential in understanding how policy proposals in each country have varying effects on the susceptibility of certain demographic groups as well as the effectiveness of human trafficking laws in particular contexts. The fundamental question this article seeks to examine is to what extent gender parity, political representation, and education levels for women affect the government action taken against sex trafficking in Southeast Asia.

Human trafficking has become a widespread issue that affects 161 countries and over 2.5 million people in the world at any given time (ILO, 2007). With a variety of estimates ranging from 200,000 to 800,000 persons a year, international sexual trafficking has reached worldwide 'epidemic' proportions according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Dubbed by a prominent human trafficking scholar Kevin Bales as "modern day slavery," the trafficking of humans takes a wide variety of forms that include forced labor, begging, and sexual exploitation. While the signs and symptoms of trafficked victims vary, one pattern that emerges within the trend is that it yields increasingly high profits at virtually little to no risk. Even the most modest estimations reveal that profits from sex trafficking yield approximately \$217.8 billion a year or \$23,000 per victim (ILO, 2005). Traffickers have historically faced very little opposition from both their national governments and the international community at large. Only in 2003 with the establishment of the UN protocol on Human Trafficking did countries even begin to have an international standard by which to define the problem. Prior to that, the majority of countries in Southeast Asia used varying definitions of human trafficking that either undermined the gravity of the issue or ignored the problem altogether. Based on the United Nations trafficking protocol, hereby referred to as the Palermo Protocol (Erez, E., Ibarra, P. R., & McDonald, W.

F., 2004), human trafficking is defined as,

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation (164).

Understanding the breadth and parameters of this definition, sex trafficking is part of a much larger problem that plagues most countries regardless of its political or economic context. While the study of sex trafficking as a global trend is hugely important, a regional focus on Southeast Asia is a more viable and useful area of focus because of the prevalence of sex work throughout the region. Currently the region with the highest number of people involved in sex trafficking, with estimates in the upper 1.4 million, Southeast Asia constitutes 56% of all human trafficking throughout the world (International Labour Organization, 2007). Countries which this paper will analyze in the Southeast Asian region include Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Singapore, Indonesia, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Burma (Myanmar), and Brunei. In particular, this paper will examine three variables within each country: (1) women's educational attainment, (2) gender parity, and (3) political participation. The task of this analysis is to ask which of these three factors, if any, is a good predictor of the level of government action being taken to regulate sex trafficking in the country.

As the results will show, despite the data returning inconclusive, one variable did show strong statistical significance—the level of educational attainment of girls. The findings reveal that primary school education has both positive and negative effects on the country's laws depending on the year they were passed. Interestingly, secondary and tertiary education did not come up as statistically significant. With the disturbing trend of an increased demand for younger girls by an increase of 50% from 1999 to 2006 (Maack, 2008), men seeking to pay girls for sex believe that the younger the girl, the likelier they are to be virgins and free of HIV and other STDs.

Rival Views

Modern-day human slavery can be viewed from a variety of angles. In the past it has been analyzed as a legal problem, a gender equality issue, a consequence of systematic poverty and a lack of basic education, a human rights problem, a public health issue, and a multi-national crime problem. While many rival views and explanations exist, this analysis will focus on three main paradigms within each country to explain the strength and efficacy of the laws passed against sex trafficking—the educational attainment level of women, gender parity levels, and the political representation of women within each country's government.

These three variables repeatedly come up in the current academic and political debate revolving around the subject and are commonly listed as “push-and-pull factors” in several reports that explain how women are lured into the trap of sex trafficking (Wolfe, 2005; Maack, 2008, UNGIFT 2009; Hodge and Lietz, 2007; et al). It is also important to understand that each of these factors have profound economic effects in terms of market demand and market supply—hence, if any effective anti-trafficking policy is to be crafted and implemented in any country, each of these factors, should be carefully considered. As explained in the table below, the three hypotheses that explain the strength of

laws passed against sex trafficking within each country are compartmentalized into three categorical explanations.

| Reason | H0: |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| H1: Gender Parity | Societies that permit women equal access to education as males are more likely to create laws and take steps to ensure that women in society are protected from sex traffickers. Measuring gender parity takes into consideration cultural contexts that are more or less likely to provide a place for women to become educated and be better equipped to take part in the licit economy. |
| H2: Educational Attainment | Countries with women who have higher educational attainment (primary, secondary, and tertiary education) are more likely to pass laws and take action. Women become better equipped to take part in different sectors of the economy with higher education levels—moving away from low paying domestic and agricultural labor to skilled higher paying factory or office jobs that make them less vulnerable to traffickers. |
| H3: Political Representation | Countries with governments that have higher percentages of women representatives are more likely to pass laws that are sympathetic to women’s rights, recognize trafficked women and children as victims, and punish only the traffickers rather than criminalize the trafficked. |

Table 1

While all three factors are related to some degree, a distinction must be made in order to understand how each individual factor affects the strength of legislation issued against sex trafficking. Current dialogues between scholars and researchers tend to have a particular focal point when addressing such a complex issue with a wide array of societal consequences. For example, the issue of gender parity is examined closely by Maack and Kuo. Educational attainment, on the other hand, is analyzed by Jan and Mark Rodgers. Lastly, Ekberg and Wolfe expound upon political representation of women in parliament. These viewpoints, while distinct, often times inform and reference each other and acknowledge the importance of the contributions each vantage point brings to the overall analysis. With this considered, the correlation between the three variables may reveal patterns of overlap—a rise in educational attainment may lead to greater levels of gender parity and political representation of women in parliament; or perhaps an increase in women’s political representation in parliament may result not only in better legislation for the protection of women and children in the issue of sex trafficking but in the issue of increased educational attainment and gender equality as well.

Gender Parity and the Case of Legal Prostitution

Among the scholars addressing this issue, all seem to agree that the nature of trafficking is highly gendered (Hodge and Lietz, 2007; Emmers, Ralf, Beth, and Thomas, 2006; Kuo, 2000;

Leuchtag, 2003; Ekberg, 2004). Among the roughly 800,000 of those trafficked internationally, 70-80% are women while 50% of them are children. Among them, 70% are trafficked for prostitution and sexual exploitation (U.S. Department of State, 2004). While the working definition provided by the United Nations largely ignores legal forms of sex trafficking and assumes that the state is responsible for all victims of trafficking, others would argue that many voluntary prostitutes see themselves as workers seeking to improve their economic conditions and not as victims (Kuo, 2000).

In her article, "Asia's Dirty Secret," Kuo argues that policy should be clear to distinguish between voluntary sex work and those who are coerced or deceived into working. While many of its proponents see that a clear line between volunteerism and coercion is difficult to draw, they do see the need to expand economic opportunities for women who have limited options for work. In focusing on the political factors that shape and inform a woman's choice to be involved in the sex trade, Kuo focuses in on the issue of gender parity and the prevalence of patriarchal and misogynist cultures in Southeast Asia. In the study, Kuo reveals how female prostitutes are often times abused and exploited by their pimp or partner, "Studies have found a direct correlation between the extent of violence against the prostitutes and the level of illegality of the work" (Kuo, 45 2000).

While Kuo sees prostitution and legal sex work as an integral part of the Southeast Asian economy, Maack argues for better distinctions in the law between sex slaves and professional prostitutes. While human trafficking is illegal in all Southeast Asian countries, prohibition is rarely enforced because of culturally ingrained attitudes about women and the fact that sex is a highly lucrative enterprise (Maack, 2008). The overt commercialization of women in many Southeast Asian societies from Brunei to Vietnam leads to a reinforced normative reality that women's sexuality can be bought with a price. Because women are treated as second-class citizens in these cultures, schooling and job opportunities in the region are limited. Most legal and well paying jobs are given to men because most girls do not get the kind of educational training their male counterparts receive. Hence, women are left with very few options for licit and gainful employment—and with sex work being one of the more lucrative options for women to engage in, many end up entangled in a web of abuse and exploitation in the sex-trade industry.

With Maack's call to a victim-centered perspective of sex trafficking, more adequate responses and policies can be instituted to help rather than hurt the 70-80% of trafficked women through empowerment. Using both expansive economic and educational opportunities, women go from being potential targets of traffickers to proponents of change and political advocates for the thousands of other women trapped beneath the glass ceilings of brothels and misogynistic cultures. According to Maack,

Women and children are not viewed on an equal platform with men, their human rights are not fully recognized within their own societies and cultures. Prostitution is often viewed as completely acceptable or normative as a pervasive social phenomenon, and not as a violation of human rights [...] When women and children are forced into sexual slavery they fall under the same laws regarding professional prostitution, rather than recognizing that involuntary sexual-slavery is a violation of their innate human rights (6).

While there are many ways to address how women and children are lured into the sex trade that include disbanding legitimate organizations that traffic children to increasing attempts at stopping

and apprehending large crime syndicates and transnational organizations that kidnap children (Hodge & Lietz, 2007), this viewpoint sees that the end of the sexual slavery begins by empowering women to recognize their inherent equality as persons rather than as mere objects of sexual gratification.

Increasing Education Levels for Women

General consensus shows an upward trend in the quantity of children being educated as well as a general increase in higher levels of education. Scholars such as Jan and Mark Rodgers have seen how general education can be a good preventative measure that equips women and children against potential threats from sex traffickers and other sexual predators. According to the Rodgers' report, "the lack of public education about sexual abuse and domestic violence, coupled with poverty, low economic resources and lack of job opportunities contributes to the sexual exploitation of women and girls" (Rodgers, 2005).

In order to better understand the relationship between education levels and the gravity of and response to sex trafficking, they utilized the Prevention, Education, Assessment Coalition Model (ABA/LALIC) in Ecuador—a measure of a number of factors such as, "(1) organizations around the country working on trafficking and trafficking-related issues; (2) major trends/themes in the trafficking and anti-trafficking activities; (3) gaps in service and public policy as well as the existing legislative framework for prosecution; and (4) recommendations for the ABA/LALIC project" (Rodgers, 2005). In crafting the study, the ABA/LALIC focused on public awareness and education. Targeting local communities, parents, schools, libraries, victims/survivors, and service providers, the ABA/LALIC proposed things such as a "stay in school program" which includes qualified teachers to keep children off the streets and less vulnerable to traffickers. This framework of measuring prevention of sex trafficking recruitment through education and community-based initiatives is adopted to suit the question of whether greater levels of educational attainment will improve the kind of legislation present in a country. What the ABA/LALIC noted in the study was the willingness of students to organize and start movements about the issue.

Yet, while the good intentions exist to battle sex trafficking in many countries, there seems to be a lack of young children who say that they know where they can find help. With this in mind, the ABA/LALIC surveyed women who claim to have been victims of sex trafficking to see what levels of education they had attained. What they found was a various spread with 15% having post graduate degrees, 46% having college level education and 33% with high school education. They followed this up with a post training evaluation survey that had questions clearly about the sex trafficking industry. Their conclusion states,

Significant findings suggest that there was knowledge gained by the students about human trafficking. It also indicated that training increased their motivation to start a student organization. Knowledge is important to help children and students to protect themselves which is crucial in the safety of children. Results indicate that training is an effective method in having children gain knowledge on the subject of human trafficking and have the tools necessary to protect themselves and to organize student organization to support and help others (11).

The data gathered indicated that the level of skills in assessing victims of human trafficking by professionals increased and also suggested that education is a powerful and effective model in working to empower women to fight against sex trafficking.

Empowering Women through Political Participation

While gender parity and educational attainment levels are good suspects for what kind of laws are created to prohibit sex trafficking within a country—Leslie Wolfe and Gunilla Ekberg would argue that the leading suspect is, in fact, the need for women's issues to be better represented and championed by greater numbers of women in parliament. Shirley Chisholm who served in Congress in the 1970s stated, "The law cannot do the major part of the job of winning equality for women. Women must do it for themselves. They must become revolutionaries" (Ekberg, 2004). The fact that laws are in place to prohibit human trafficking in all countries yet are usually treated with impunity and often times persecute the victim as well as the trafficker goes to show the lack of intentional purpose, reach, and scope that is necessary for such laws to protect the rights of women who are victims of sex trafficking. Wolfe argues the need for more women and feminist representatives in the government in her treatise, "Fighting the War on Trafficking of Women and Girls: The Role of State Legislatures." In it, Wolfe argues that, "task force members must include top level state officials—attorneys general and secretaries of health, human services, and social services—as well as state and local law enforcement and key members of the state legislature [...] Of utmost importance, experts on women's human rights must be leading members of these task forces" (Wolfe, 2005). Organizations such as the Center for Women Policy Studies is currently paving the way to craft the proper legal and policy framework that enables local and national governments to prosecute and punish traffickers while protecting the women and girls who are victims of sex and labor trafficking. According to Wolfe, trafficking of women and girls is a, "disease of patriarchal society, the quintessential violation of women's autonomy and human rights and the ultimate reflection of women's status as the property of men, as commodities and as creatures who exist primarily to service men's sexual desire" (Wolfe, 2005). Because all governments and societies within Southeast Asia tend to be male-dominated—women's issues are often times pigeon holed as women's rights rather than human rights. Wolfe and Ekberg attempt to remedy this by increasing the number of women's rights representatives in both government and politics. According to Wolfe,


[Governments] must include advocates for refugee and immigrant women, providers of services and support for survivors of domestic violence and sexual assault, advocates for women's human rights in multiple arenas, community based organizations that serve women and girls and the feminist scholar activist whose research is essential to our understanding of these issues (Wolfe, 188-189 2005).

In places such as Sweden where fighting sex trafficking is a priority of the country's government, these efforts are seen as crucial to creating a democratic society where "full gender equality is the norm" and recognizes the right for men and women equal participation in all areas of society. While Wolfe and Ekberg only provide a single case study in understanding the role of increased female representation in government in fighting sex trafficking, Sweden is seen as a pioneer in championing women's rights and equal representation for highly gendered issues such as sex trafficking.

Relevance

This study is important for several reasons. First, sexual exploitation and trafficking are on the rise and increasingly more globalized than ever. While sex workers from Asia are trafficked to the most numerous regions, Europe remains to be the largest recipient of sex workers from the widest range of destinations. The Americas also make up the second largest demographic of sex tourists in Southeast Asia. Even Japan has an entire underground economy created with the sole purpose of importing sex workers from Thailand and the Philippines. In 1996, these three economies and Australia contributed nearly five million sex tourists in Thailand alone, bringing in \$26.2 billion—thirteen times more lucrative than the exporting of computers in Thailand. Some 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the United States each year, mainly from Asia and Latin America (UN GIFT).

Second, the rise of sex trafficking is inextricably tied to the rise of HIV/AIDS in the region. According to a recent quantitative study done by the UNDP entitled “Sex Trafficking and STI/HIV in Southeast Asia,” “findings revealed a consistent pattern that women who were victims of sex trafficking, appear to suffer qualitatively and quantitatively different and greater levels of sexual risk [and...] provide consistent evidence that trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation places such individuals at high risk for HIV/ STI infection” (UNDP, 4 2009). What was seen as an epidemic in the African continent in the 1980s has increasingly become a health catastrophe in the Southeast Asian region as well. In a span of just 20 years, Southeast Asian countries that have relatively high rates of sex trafficked women also experience increasingly high rates of their population living with HIV. According to the most recent statistics, Thailand’s sex trafficking problem is only slightly below that of Ghana.



Minding the Gaps in Data

In the course of research and data collection, it has become evident that there is a huge gap of knowledge due to the lack of reliable and useful statistical data regarding the subject. There is considerable variety and inconsistency in the quantitative data available. Most of the studies pertaining to sex trafficking in Southeast Asia tend towards case studies rather than statistical analysis. Because of that, studying both legal and illegal forms of sex trafficking often yields questionable and inconclusive results because the numbers most social workers use are rough estimates. Each organization collects its own data and operates with the assumption that their data is the most accurate. Unfortunately, the gap between estimates is often so large that institutions and governments craft policy that either overemphasizes sex trafficked victims or under represents them (see Data Comparison Sheet #1 below).




**Data Comparison Sheet #1
Worldwide Trafficking Estimates by Organizations**

Figures cited by or attributed to various organizations regarding the annual flow of trafficked people worldwide. (data compiled on September 2004)



UNESCO Trafficking Project
www.unesco.org/culture/trafficking



Despite these setbacks, what can be better understood is whether gender parity, educational attainment, or female political participation is a better predictor of sex trade supply in Southeast Asia. In order to do so, this review examines the data readily available from reliable data sets from the UN Global Initiative to Fight Trafficking (UN GIFT), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO,) the World Bank, and UNICEF in order to understand the general consensus in each country's attitudes towards sex trafficking as well as the debate over what is the best predictor of what will produce better laws against human trafficking.

Research Design

In order to operationalize how gender parity, educational attainment, and female representatives in parliament affect the laws being passed in each country, we begin by establishing both dependent and independent variables. While other factors such as the size of the economy, poverty rates, drug use, and prevalence of birth control could have been used as independent variables to measure the strength of anti-trafficking laws in each country, many of the existing field research (Maack, 2008; Rodgers, 2005; Wolfe et. al, 2005) refer to gender parity, educational attainment, and female political representation to understand the symptoms of sex trafficking which include high levels of violence against women, a low availability of licit and gainful employment for women, and limited or failed cases of prosecution of traffickers. Individually considered, gender parity is used as an independent variable because we expect to see weaker laws against trafficking in countries where a low level of gender parity exists. A level of educational attainment is also considered because we expect to see stronger laws against trafficking in countries that place a high premium on women's education. Furthermore, educational attainment is a key factor in social, political, and economic development. Lastly, we consider female political representation as an independent variable because of the role female political figures play in ensuring strong laws are passed to prosecute traffickers as well as to protect the victims of trafficking.

Ideally, a perfect dependent variable would be to measure the real numbers of enslaved sex trafficked women in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, no official numbers of sex workers exist because prostitution is technically illegal in all Southeast Asian countries. While the best estimates are provided by Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) that rank Thailand as the country with the highest number of prostitutes ranging from estimates between 300,000 to 2.8 million women—a third of whom are minors, the data estimates provided are extremely unpredictable and leave a huge margin of error when analyzed. Hence, an alternative way of measuring sex trafficked women is through the proxy variable of the Trafficking in Persons Report (TiP report) done annually by the U.S. State Department. The tier systems, while an imperfect measurement of the effectiveness of the laws, at least follow the trend of numbers involved in sex trafficking—with Thailand having 52.6% of its population involved in the informal economy followed by 43.4% in the Philippines.

Dependent Variable

| Tier Ranking | |
|--|--|
| Tier 1 | Description |
| | Countries whose governments fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The standards are as follows: |
| | (a) The government of the country should prohibit severe forms of trafficking in persons and punish acts of such trafficking. |
| | (b) For the knowing commission of any act of sex trafficking involving force, fraud, coercion, or in which the victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of giving meaningful consent, or of trafficking which includes rape or kidnapping or which causes a death, the government of the country should prescribe punishment commensurate with that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault. |
| | (c) For the knowing commission of any act of a severe form of trafficking in persons, the government of the country should prescribe punishment that is sufficiently stringent to deter and that adequately reflects the heinous nature of the offense. |
| (d) The government of the country should make serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons. | |
| Tier 2 | Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. |

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| Tier 2 Watch List | Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards AND: |
| | a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing; |
| | b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year, including increased investigations, prosecution, and convictions of trafficking crimes, increased assistance to victims, and decreasing evidence of complicity in severe forms of trafficking by government officials; or |
| | c) The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional steps over the next year. |
| Tier 3 | Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so. |

Table 2

Independent Variables



| | Index |
|--|---|
| | Description |
| Gender Parity Index (GPI) | The ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary, and tertiary education as recorded annually by the Institute for Statistics of UNESCO. |
| Level of Educational Attainment | The level of educational attainment as measured by the number of females over the total number of students measured annually by the World Bank Data Systems. This is broken down into Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary education. |
| Political Representation | The ratio of females to males in each country's government as provided by the World Bank Data Systems. |


Table 3

In order to best understand the relationships between the independent variable of each country's tier ranking and the dependent variables of gender parity, educational attainment levels, and political representation, each variable in the compiled data set was run through a linear regression for each year beginning in 2001 when the country tiers were established up until the present day.

This endeavor primarily entailed quantitative analysis operationalized using the linear regression function of the SPSS program. This process attempts to find strong significant relationships and positive or negative correlations as well as counter-intuitive patterns that may be revealed after the data has been processed. The significance level cut-off in order for a variable to be deemed as statistically significant is for the P-value to be less than 0.1. The effects are significant at the 90% level. In order to better understand the basic general trends and movements of each variable, graphs are also included to measure each variable over time .

Data





Analysis

After running linear regressions on each of the dependent variables over the independent variables, results returned inconclusive. Although it is important to note that two variables were deemed highly statistically significant. The first significant factor is a measure of significance of educational attainment levels and how they relate to country tiers in 2002. What the data revealed is a .087 significance that passed the test for needed value in order for it to be deemed statistically significant at the 90% level. As there is a .3 increase in Tier ranking, meaning the laws got weaker, as there was an increase in numbers of primary education attainment for girls in 2002. Interestingly, the data revealed opposite results for the same variable in 2004. As the percentage of female-male primary education attainment rose, a .237 decrease in Tier ranking occurred, meaning the laws become stronger.

Based on the data, no firm prediction can be made conclusively. Because the same variable of primary education both confirms and rejects H2 for different years—2002 rejects the hypothesis while 2004 confirms it, the results are said to be inconclusive. But this is not to say that general inferences cannot be made. Based on general trends of the graphs that account for the primary levels of education for women and the graph that accounts for the each country's tier ranking, we can infer a correlation between the increase in primary educational attainment and Tier Ranking.

Policy Implications

The data makes sense in terms of Hodge and Lietz's "push-and-pull factors"—variables that argue that while some variables push individuals away from their originating country, others pull them towards countries that have glamorous industrialized nations. Although they cite most of the push-factors to be economic such as poverty, war, and the lack of a promising future to foster discontent, the pull-factors they mention are sociological such as media-constructed images that offered a chance at

a better life.

Children in primary school are particularly vulnerable to sex traffickers. Because the years spent in primary school is an age where young boys and girls are most impressionable, this leads them to believe that a family friend or even an acquaintance that offers them a better life will deliver on such promises. Instead, the situation that many young girls find themselves in is no paradise but a reality of hellish sexual and psychological abuse that lasts for years.

When it comes to regulating the world's oldest profession, scholars and policy makers are divided as to what, if anything should be done with the issue of sex trafficking in Southeast Asia. Although the trafficking of women and children across domestic and international borders is an ancient phenomenon, it poses serious contemporary social, political, and economic complications in an increasingly globalized world. Because of its lucrative nature, positive influence in employment rates, national income, and the region's economic growth, scholars and policy makers often rationalize sex trafficking as a profitable industry in the rising Southeast Asian economy. But in spite of the economic benefits of sex trafficking, it comes at a high cost to the region's social and political development. The prominence of both legal and illegal sex trafficking industry in the ASEAN countries makes their economies dependent upon the presence of this industry.

Scholars and policy makers alike also share a common understanding of the lucrative nature of the sex trade industry with modest numbers in the estimation of about 200,000 sex slaves generating an annual profit of around \$10.5 billion for their slaveholders (Leuchtag, 2003), sex trafficking is the second most lucrative form of organized crime next to narcotics and arms sales (U.S. Department of State, 2004). Because there exists an understood assumption that sexual exploitation almost always involves fraud and deception, the issue of consent is deemed irrelevant by the United Nations.

Because of the fraudulent and deceptive nature of sex traffickers, as the data has revealed the primary years of a child's education is crucial in being able to protect them against being caught in the snare of sex trafficking rings. The most important policy implementation that can be made are Southeast Asian governments commitment to protect and inform both the children and their parents of the threat of sex trafficking from the early years. This can be done through increased investment in educational infrastructure and the creation of a division in the Department of Education in each country that deals solely with raising awareness of the issue and where children and parents can run if they find themselves being solicited by a trafficker.

Question of Legalizing Prostitution

While the issue of prevention through childhood education is crucial in combating against sex traffickers, the question remains whether or not the legalization of prostitution will help distinguish between sex slaves and professional sex workers. No research exists that conclusively proves that legal prostitution decreases illegal prostitution. Trends reveal, however, that legalization only seems to increase both legal and illegal prostitution while nations that already have legalized prostitution such as the Netherlands and Germany, have become magnets for traffickers (Erez, E., Ibarra, P. R., & McDonald, W. F., 2004).

While liberal Feminists like Kuo tend to argue for the temporary necessity of prostitution as a legitimized market within the Southeast Asian economy, Leuchtag makes a stronger case against Kuo by arguing using the case study of the legalization of prostitution in Victoria, Australia. In her argument,

she warns policy makers against the pervasive assumption that legalizing prostitution will diminish the negative effects suffered by women in the sex industry such as violence, exploitation, and health effects. What the case study reveals in Victoria, Australia is that legalization led to the strengthening and perpetuating of the culture of violence and exploitation inherent in prostitution. Under the auspices of protecting voluntary prostitutes, the legalization of the industry only led to the proliferation of both legal and illegal brothels all the while increasing the trafficking of women in order to meet the new demand (Leuchtag, 2003). She continues to warn against the assumption that the “Amsterdam model” works to protect prostitutes within the country. In reality, this model that legalized prostitution in the name of “self-determination and empowerment for women,” failed on multiple levels to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the women in the country. In Amsterdam’s 250 officially listed brothels, 80% of the prostitutes were trafficked from other countries—of which 70% possess no legal papers. Leuchtag argues that legitimizing prostitution merely allows the government to wash its hands clean in giving men the “right” to buy, sexually use, and profit from the sexual exploitation of someone else’s body. In arguing so, she cites economic desperation as a driving factor, failed policy initiatives as an open invitation for recruiters of the sex industry, while the patriarchal culture often acts as a conduit to sex work in seeing women as a “cash crop” to be exploited by both men and the state. While men use women as an object for their sexual pleasure, the state has often used them as a means to pay off interest on the foreign debt. Leuchtag discusses the dangerous policy implications of viewing prostitution from the human-rights approach and that, historically speaking, governments with the higher demands for sex trafficking are also the same ones to want to separate issues of trafficking from that of prostitution.

The most recent and noticeably effective political measure taken to combat sex trafficking was instituted in Sweden. Since its adaptation of the Law That Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services in 1999, the country has seen a mixture of a stagnant and often steady decline of men procuring sex and has been touted as a model for crafting policy against prostitution. According to Swedish law, prostitution is viewed as a form of male sexual violence against women and children. By implication, men who purchase sexual services from women are criminalized rather than the women who are provided with services to assist them in leaving the prostitution industry. Further sanctions are placed against Swedish citizens by subjecting them to prosecution if they are caught attempting to procure sexual services anywhere in the world (Ekberg, 2004). Although no other country has followed Sweden’s lead, data reveals promising results in diminishing the demand for sex workers from Southeast Asia. If this is the case, then the laws of basic macroeconomics are in our favor and we may, perhaps, see the supply follow the downward trend of demand.

Conclusions

While the data from this research reveals no definite conclusions in which factors are the best at predicting the efficacy of laws, there appears to be a correlation in the data of primary level of education and the extent to which laws are passed to protect women and children against sex trafficking. However, because of the small sample size, gaps in the available data, and a lack of information regarding the quality of primary education in each specific context, no firm conclusions can be made and the results should be taken loosely. Further research should focus on the relationship between primary education and the strength of anti-trafficking laws in each individual context. But if the findings reflected the reality of sex trafficking in the Southeast Asian region, with better

preventative measures installed in primary schoolhouses, we should hope to see an overall decrease in sex trafficked girls in the future. While other variables will shape and affect how the sex trade will look in any particular context, there are still clear political sanctions that can be enforced in order to protect and educate the victims and punish the sex trafficker. As this inquiry has determined, governments must integrate better preventative measures in the primary schools to protect children where they are most vulnerable. As we see schoolhouses become more and more equipped to protect and inform their students, we hope to see more efficient laws and less girls recruited for brothels. ✕

Works Cited

- Leuchtag, Alice. "Human Rights Sex Trafficking and Prostitution." *Humanist*. 63. no. 1 (2003): 10-16.
- Kuo, Michelle. "Asia's Dirty Secret: Prostitution and Sex Trafficking in Southeast Asia." *Harvard International Review*. 22. no. 2 (2000): 42-46.
- Hodge, David R., and Cynthia A. Lietz. "The International Sexual Trafficking of Women and Children." *Journal of Women and Social Work*. 22. no. 2 (2007): 163-174.
- Ekberg, Gunilla. "The Swedish Law That Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services." *Violence Against Women*. 10. no. 10 (2004): 1187-1218.
- U.S. Department of State, "Trafficking in persons report." (2004) Accessed March 19, 2012. <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/34021.htm>.
- Erez, E., Ibarra, P. R., & McDonald, W. F. "Transnational sexual trafficking: Issues and prospects." *International Review of Victimology*. 11. (2004): 1-9.
- Yea, Sallie. "When Push Comes to Shove: Sites of Vulnerability, Personal Transformation, and Trafficked Women's Migration Decisions." *SOJOURN*. 20. No. 1 (2005): 67-95.
- Maack, Jenna. "Sex Trafficking in Southeast Asia: the need for a Victim-Centered Perspective." Last modified Spring 2008. Accessed May 9, 2012.
- Leslie, Wolfe. "Fighting the War on Trafficking of Women and Girls: The Role of State Legislatures." *The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law*. 6. no. 2 (2005): 179-192.
- Jan, Rodgers, and Rodgers, Mark. North American Association of Christians in Social Work, "Prevention, Education, and Intervention Strategies in Combating Human Trafficking: Collaborative Efforts Producing Sustainable Action." Last modified February 28. Accessed May 9, 2012. <http://www.nacsw.org/Publications/Proceedings2008/RodgersJPrevention.pdf>.

THE POPULIST BIND: DEATH PENALTY ABOTION AS AN ANTI-DEMOCRATIC DECISION

Aubrey Rose

Abstract

The continued application of the death penalty in the United States marks the country as an extreme outlier among its allies and like-minded nations in the 21st century. In order to explain America's retention of this criminal punishment, scholars have sought to first explore: what explains variation in a Western democracy's retention or abolition of the death penalty? In an attempt to eliminate intervening variables present in past studies, this paper provides a comparative historical analysis of death penalty abolition movements in Great Britain and the United States. While many scholars have asserted that cultural dispositions explain the survival of capital punishment in the United States, this analysis ultimately supports the contentious hypothesis that the U.S. has not abolished the death penalty because the nation is more democratic in structure and practice than Great Britain.

Introduction

As three countries abolish the death penalty every year, over two-thirds of the world has now abandoned execution as an acceptable punishment for crime today (Amnesty International 2012). Beginning with the repeal of the death penalty in Western European nations during the 1960s, a sweeping international trend towards abolition has pressured even Rwanda, a nation still prosecuting genocide-related atrocities, to reject execution as a means of establishing justice in 2007. Despite this emerging global norm, the United States is consistently ranked among the top six nations with the most confirmed executions, led only by China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq (DPIC "An International Perspective" 2013). Since the retentionist countries are almost exclusively developing or undemocratic nations, capital punishment as a policy places the United States in a distinctly unfamiliar category, removed from its allies and like-minded nations in the 21st century. This policy divergence was recently highlighted when the United States declined to vote alongside a record number of countries in the United Nations General Assembly for a worldwide moratorium on executions in November 2012 (DPIC "UN Death Penalty Resolution" 2013).

It has been suggested that the United States and European nations "are now farther divided on the question of capital punishment than on any other morally significant question of government policy" (Zimring 2003, 181). While the United States saw the abolition of the death penalty recently

in Connecticut in 2012 and Maryland in 2013, thirty-two American states still retain execution as a punishment for murder (DPIC "Year End Report" 2012). Since American support for the death penalty has declined substantially from 80 percent in 1994 to 63 percent in 2012 (Gallup 2012), it is an appropriate time to isolate the roots of America's staunch retention of the death penalty. Without providing a value judgment on the appropriateness of the death penalty as a policy, this paper simply seeks to apply a high level of scrutiny to an often overlooked but significant policy divergence in the Western world. An informed explanation of America's retention of the policy begins with the basic question: what explains variation in a Western democracy's retention or abolition of the death penalty?

This paper will begin with Section (1), a literature review of the major theories that past scholars and social scientists have put forth in regards to death penalty politics in modern Western democracies. Section (2) presents a joint hypothesis that was constructed based on recent academic literature in the field. Section (3) provides an overview of the methodology employed to test the hypothesis and Section (4) states the findings. Section (5) explores implications of the findings on the sustainability of death penalty abolition in Europe and potential death penalty abolition in the United States. Section (6) acknowledges the limitations of the study and puts forth suggestions for future research. Finally, Section (7) provides a conclusion and a look to the future of transatlantic death penalty politics in the 21st century.

Literature Review

The first step in this academic inquiry is to examine the popularly cited answers to America's idiosyncratic retention of the death penalty and assess their merit in the social science field. Two variables that are often discussed in the public forum are the nation's homicide rate and the influence of special interests. The most common kneejerk explanation for America's retention of the death penalty is the assertion that high homicide rates, spurred by lack of gun control and urban crime, make the death penalty a more urgent mechanism than in small European nations. While the United States homicide rate is higher than most European countries, the national murder rate has dropped dramatically from almost 10% in 1990 to 4.7% in 2011 (DPIC "Murder Rates Nationally and By State" 2013). Additionally, if high homicide rates are a compelling variable for death penalty retention, the internal state-by-state trends of abolition in America offer an entirely contradictory trend. For example, Maryland, a state with one of the highest murder rates at 7.5%, just abolished the death penalty in 2013. Meanwhile Texas, a state with a murder rate of only 4.4%, retains and actively uses the death penalty. In this way, the homicide rate answer does not emerge as a prominent variable.

Secondly, individuals are often apt to attribute retention of any potentially outdated policy to the influence of special interests, in this case a lack of power in the anti-death penalty advocacy community. Ironically, the United States was one of the success sites for death penalty reformers led by Cesare Beccaria's doctrine in the 1780s (Hood & Hoyle, 11). While the policy decisions on the death penalty in European nations were certainly influenced by lobbying groups and the political advocacy of leaders like Sydney Silverman in Great Britain, neither actors can compare to the massive influence of lobbyist giants like Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States today. Furthermore, the survival of the death penalty as a policy is peculiar among other legislative issues because the pro-death penalty lobby is hardly an organized force at the national or state level. Considering this logic, neither homicide rates nor the influence of special interests are recognized as

significant variables under review today.

A review of the literature concerning death penalty abolition in different countries has revealed the prevalence of two significant competing theories, cultural disposition and political structure (Guess 1999, 54). Building on previous work, this literature review examines comparative historical analyses and longitudinal case studies that identify at least one of these theories in the findings. This narrowing process exposed an ongoing academic debate over whether political structure or cultural disposition is the defining variable that explains a Western democracy's policy towards execution. After reviewing a range of findings, it is clear that the academic literature now slant heavily towards a political structure explanation.

In the comparative historical analysis "Transatlantic Perspectives on Capital Punishment," Austin Sarat and Jurgen Martschukat explore the historical differences between the United States and Europe and identify both cultural disposition and political structure as key indicators of abolition (Sarat and Martschukat 2011). The article first discusses the influence of cultural disposition, for example how the American death penalty can be seen as a "vestige of frontier mentality" (Ibid., 6). The authors then discuss the influence of a more "porous" political structure, for example how the two-year term in the U.S. House of Representatives ties public officials to the emotions of their constituents. Sarat and Martschukat argue, "the European experience posits this: public opinion tends to follow decisions by political elites rather than leading them" (Ibid., 4). The findings suggest that cultural disposition and political structure both should be considered as explanations for differences in death penalty politics across the Atlantic.

For years, many criminal justice scholars have insisted that cultural disposition is the most influential variable in whether a Western democracy abolishes or retains the death penalty in the 21st century. Notable scholars on American capital punishment, such as Zimring, maintain that the American cultural tradition of punitiveness is the ultimate explanation for its death penalty policies (Zimring 2003). In "Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism," Steiker focuses on the theory that the United States has a sub-culture of violence derived from its Wild West roots (Steiker 2002, 127). Other scholars point to the Puritan notion of a social deviant's estrangement from society as a key cultural disposition that supports the continuation of the policy in the United States (Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, & Kimpel 1993, 296). All of these theories on cultural disposition are supported by the fact that the death penalty is complemented by other punitive elements in the American criminal justice system, including the imposition of lengthy incarceration sentences and felony disenfranchisement.

However, these cultural disposition theories err by highlighting certain cultural facets and disregarding those that contradict the hypothesis. For example, America's "frontier mentality" may suggest a proclivity to the death penalty but America's emphasis on individualism and self-determination certainly suggests an opposing tension. If the full range of cultural facets is considered, the influence of the cultural dispositions on a certain policy is much more complicated than the reductionist theories in the field today. While each of the cultural conception theories add interesting dimensions and contribute to a multi-causal explanation, cultural disposition theories alone paint an overly simplistic picture for this policy divide between like-minded Western democracies (Sarat and Martschukat 2011, 7). In order to fill in a perceivable gap, scholars have started to assess the importance of political structure as a critical variable in death penalty abolition across Western democracies.

In "The Myth of the Dedicated Public Servant," Gerber and Johnson shift the debate by

illustrating how political structure alone can influence death penalty politics (Gerber & Johnson 2007). In his comparative historical analysis of the United States and Europe, Gerber posits that the American democratic structure has historically bound the nation to retention while the European democratic structures have allowed for more flexibility. In general, the process of frequent, open, and direct elections encourages American political candidates to use appeals to pathos in order to capitalize on the public's fear and insecurity. Gerber suggests that once politicians have campaigned as tough on crime, their decisions in office do not give proper weight to any powerful social science data that may contradict their position on the death penalty (Gerber & Johnson 2007, 199). This populist bind is not found in the prototypical European democracy with institutions that remove decision-making from popular demand. Through his evaluation, Gerber suggests that political structure deserves more attention as a variable in the transatlantic study of death penalty abolition.

In "Civilized Rebels: Death Penalty Abolition in Europe as Cause, Mark of Distinction, and Political Strategy," Hammel adds an important dimension to the political structure theory by contrasting the effects of American populism and European elitism (Hammel 2011). Hammel argues that European intellectuals considered opposition to the death penalty a "mark of distinction" that demonstrated their superiority to the masses (Hammel 2011, 174). In stark contrast, America's populists have always been hostile to any semblance of elitism in politics. In this way, American populist attitudes have minimized the opportunity for strong independent political leadership on the issue, which is often essential on the path to abolition. By building on the findings of Gerber and Johnson, Hammel enhances the political structures theory and further supports its validity as a fresh explanation for variation in a Western democracy's policy on the death penalty.

Research Question

Together, recent scholars have created the foundation for a hypothesis that is worth exploring. A literature review on this complex issue reveals a provocative idea: is abolition or retention of the death penalty steered by a Western nation's political structure of democracy? Keeping in mind the dimension added by Hammel, political structure theory considers the influence of a) institutional make-up and b) the decision-making practices that accompany these institutions. The theory must be two-fold because both elements inform each other in a cycle. With this relationship in mind, I seek to tighten the corresponding hypotheses presented by Gerber & Johnson and Hammel by examining the influence of differing political structures through a comparative historical analysis of the United States and Great Britain.

Hypothesis

The United States has not abolished the death penalty because American political institutions are more democratic in structure than Great Britain. In this hypothesis, "more democratic" refers to a) an institutional make-up that gives constituents immediate control over their representatives and b) populist decision-making practices that encourage respect for public opinion over a public official's individual conscience.

Methodology

A comprehensive comparative historical analysis of the United States and Great Britain is an appropriate method for substantiating the controversial premise of this hypothesis. A comparative historical analysis is a type of explanatory research that uses systematic comparison between two cases and the analysis of processes over time in order to explain large political phenomena and often predict possible outcomes to current events (Mahoney 2004). As demonstrated in the literature review, many scholars have used comparative historical analyses or longitudinal studies of the United States and Europe as a framework for examining the factors of successful and unsuccessful movements for death penalty abolition. Social scientists in the field tend to agree “scrutiny of the transatlantic situation of capital punishment and punitiveness is crucial if we are to understand where America is on the road to abolition and what the European experience has to offer” (Sarat and Martschukat 2011, 13).

Given the diversity of legal systems and political cultures across Europe, I suggest the alternative strategy of a comparative historical analysis of the United States and Great Britain. After all, many European countries, such as Italy and France, maintain a civil law system with very different legal procedures. With a collective ancestry, the United States and Great Britain share a common law system, basic cultural customs, and long history of using execution as the ultimate sanction. By comparing two nations that are so closely related in legal system and cultural custom, third variables can be easily isolated and set aside as explanations. In this way, a comparative historical analysis of the United States and Great Britain helps to narrow the search for what may explain variation in a Western nation’s retention or abolition of the death penalty.

This comparative historical analysis focuses on three crucial time periods in the historical evolution of capital punishment in the United States and Great Britain. In the first section, I examine the early historical roots of the death penalty in U.S. and Great Britain in order to confirm that similar legal developments did indeed occur in both regions. A review of this time period is critical for validating the basic premise of the comparative historical analysis and a logical elimination of intervening variables. In the second section, I examine the time period of the 1960s-1970s, during which the first major divergence in capital punishment policy manifested between the two nations. While the last execution in Great Britain occurred in 1964 and the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act of 1965 suspended the death penalty sanction for murder, the United States established a similar national moratorium period for executions from 1972 to 1976 while the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the practice. However, America diverged with Great Britain at this time when the Supreme Court ruled in *Gregg v. Georgia* that the death penalty did not violate the Eighth Amendment and therefore could not be abolished by federal mandate. In the final section of the historical analysis, I examine the third crucial time period, the 1990s. The 1990s was the ultimate period of differentiation in capital punishment policy, as the United States dramatically expanded the institution through “tough on crime” political efforts while the British House of Commons repeatedly denied motions to re-institute capital punishment in Great Britain.

In examining these three crucial time periods, the comparative historical analysis employs several methods of original research to accurately track trends in death penalty politics, including polling data, discourse analysis and documentary analysis. In terms of historical polling, the data came from Ipsos MORI for Great Britain and Gallup for the United States. In terms of discourse analysis, the paper relies on archived articles from *The Times* (referred to as the London Times in the United

States) and the New York Times. Finally, in terms of documentary analysis, the paper uses transcripts from proceedings in the British House of Commons and speeches made by American political officials. Ultimately, this paper uses original documents and other primary sources to test a new structural theory on how death penalty politics historically progressed in two major Western democracies.

Findings

Background

Before the findings of the comparative historical analysis are presented, a brief inquiry into the differences between American and British political structures is required. The United States is essentially a collection of democratic states with an enormous breadth of political dispositions and diversity. A central tenet of the American federal institution is the emphasis on states' rights, which is based on a fundamental respect for local determinism. In contrast, Great Britain, like many other European democracies, is a smaller, more centralized parliamentary democracy. This structural distinction is important because, while Great Britain can only abolish the death penalty on a federal level, the American federal government has the default option of letting the contentious issue work itself out in the state legislatures. Since only eighteen American states have abolished the death penalty (DPIC "Year End Report" 2012), this procedural strain alone could account for the United States lagging behind its European counterparts in death penalty abolition.

While the United States is sometimes referred to as one of the most direct representative democracies in the world, the British democracy is complemented and influenced by political relics from a time past. The British government still involves their constitutional monarchy and maintains a House of Lords, a legislative body with hereditary and appointed members. While the British House of Commons certainly supplements the political structure with elected representatives, it is important to note that even the most democratic legislative body in Great Britain is not held hostage by public sentiment. For example, the Prime Minister has the power to set the date of general elections as long as it does not exceed a five-year gap. While the United States attempts to create some distance from the public with six-year terms in the Senate as opposed to the diminutive two-year House of Representatives terms, even U.S. Senators are given no where near the political flexibility afforded British government officials.

Early Historical Roots

Despite these structural differences, the shared historical roots of capital punishment in Great Britain and the United States can be traced back as far as American independence. In fact, the ceremony of public execution in colonial America was modeled after that of early modern England and Continental Europe. When the Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria made waves in Europe with his treatise against capital punishment *On Crimes and Punishment* in 1794, the Founding Father Benjamin Rush, sometimes referred to as the "American Beccaria," adopted and utilized these ideas in his push for abolition in America. The United States and Great Britain followed a similar timeline with the privatization of execution in the 19th century. As the masses became increasingly uncomfortable with the concept of public execution, the ceremony was moved behind closed doors. Privatization occurred in most major European countries from 1850 to 1870 and in the Northeastern region of the United

States between 1830 and 1860 (Spierenburg 2011, 21).

Although some states like Rhode Island and Wisconsin abolished the death penalty altogether in the mid-1800s, it was not until the Progressive Period that America started to see a significant shift in state policy. In the first two decades of the 20th century, six states officially abolished capital punishment and many others imposed strict restrictions on its application (DPIC “History of the Death Penalty” 2013). Until the 1970s, political discourse in America on the death penalty concentrated largely on classifying capital crimes and debating different humane execution methods. The dialogue hardly touched the option of abolition. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, abolitionist campaigns had pushed the British Parliament to severely limit the use of capital punishment in the Homicide Act of 1957.

1960s-1970s: The Reflective Moratorium

1. Great Britain: A Successful Moratorium

Historical trends with respect to the death penalty in the United States and Great Britain followed a parallel evolution until a critical period, the mid-1960s. In 1965, the British Parliament voted to suspend the death penalty for an experimental five-year period with the Murder (Abolition) Act of 1965. This bill was pioneered by Labour politician Sydney Silverman and generated a lively debate over political conscience on the death penalty. After a rigorous five-year review of social science research and careful analysis of crime rates, the British Parliament voted with a majority of 158 to renew the Murder Act and the death penalty as a sanction for murder was permanently abolished on December 16, 1969 (“1969: MPs Vote to Abolish Hanging” 2013). Interestingly, at the time of the introduction of this bill, Sidney Silverman represented an overwhelmingly pro-death penalty constituency. Even after the Murder Act of 1965 passed, Silverman won re-election (Hammel 2011, 196). This particular case points to the level of political flexibility afforded British politicians to vote in accordance with their conscience, even if it conflicts with the will of the constituency.

In order to examine my hypothesis, I cross-referenced public polling data in Great Britain on the death penalty in the 1960s in search for a gap between popular sentiment and the decision of the British House of Commons. Since central British polling organization Ipsos MORI was founded at the end of the decade, polling data on the death penalty in the 1960s can only be gleaned from digitally archived articles in *The Times*. Nevertheless, a cross-reference of articles in *The Times* illustrates that private pollsters found the majority of the public supported the death penalty. My findings with the polling data were further substantiated by a documentary analysis of archived transcripts of the proceedings in the House of Commons for the Murder Act of 1965.

A thorough textual review of debates on the floor revealed that Members of Parliament were fully aware of the polling numbers and consciously decided to reject them as an influence on their vote. In fact, many politicians explicitly cited polling numbers in their speeches on the floor. For example, Member of Parliament (MP) Duncan Sandys reminded the Parliament on June 24, 1969 that “recent opinion polls show that over 80 percent of the country want capital punishment restored” (785 Parl. Deb. House of Commons, 1229).

Furthermore, an analysis of these transcripts provided insight into the political rhetoric of British intellectual elitism. During the floor debates in 1969 concerning the Murder Act, multiple Members of Parliament (MPs) used elitist rhetoric to encourage officials to separate themselves from

the emotions of the masses in the decision-making process. For example, on December 15, 1969, MP Hogg gave a passionate speech on the floor of the House of Commons in which he called on MPs to vote in accordance with their conscience and the social science research presented to the assembly.

“It is precisely because we regard the question of the death penalty as a matter for the individual conscience and on which the House of Commons may very well prove itself to be out of tune with a considerable body of public opinion, that we felt, and we think now, that when a decision is reached, it should be reached in a way to ensure that it has the maximum moral authority behind it.” (793 Parl. Deb. House of Commons, 942)

MP Hogg, a Conservative Member of Parliament, went on to suggest that the government was wise in attempting to “divorce this subject from the emotional atmosphere of an election year” (793 Parl. Deb. House of Commons, 943). In subsequent days of debate, MPs from the Labour and Conservative Party echoed this sentiment. On the same day, MP Winnick suggested that the determination of some moral issues is best left to educated politicians.

“Unfortunately, some hon. Members opposite want to make hanging an election issue. We are told that public opinion is in favor of hanging. That has been indicated in the opinion polls. If we (British Parliament) had listened to public opinion, slavery and public executions would not have been abolished in our country. It is sometimes right for the House to take the lead, and it would be right to do so tomorrow night.” (793 Parl. Deb. House of Commons, 973)

It is important to note here that even the idea of “making hanging an election issue” would seem foreign to American citizens who expect their political leaders to vote alongside the majority of constituents on all issues. Indeed, many speeches on the floor referred directly to the concept of Burkean trusteeship, a political theory of representation that “allows elected representatives to deny their constituents on matters of high principle” (Hammel 2011, 203).

One of the most surprising findings in the documentary analysis was that even the British public celebrated Parliament’s detachment from popular opinion. For example, in *The Times* in February 1965, R.A. Bickford Smith wrote in a Letter to the Editor, “is an appeal to public opinion valid in this matter of social advance? I would suggest that on occasion public opinion should be led rather than be allowed to do the leading” (Bickford Smith 1965). Several other Letters to the Editor were published in *The Times* from 1965 to 1969 that supported the sentiment of Bickford Smith. The discourse analysis suggests that this type of Burkean trusteeship was accepted by at least some of the British public as a legitimate approach to political representation on the issue of death penalty abolition.

2. The United States: A Failed Moratorium

Curiously, when the British Parliament approved the Murder Act of 1965 against the will of 80 percent of their constituents, American support for the death penalty was at an all-time low. In 1966, a Harris Survey indicated that only 42 percent of Americans supported the death penalty (Bohm 2003, 31). In fact, Gallup polling of death penalty support in the United States from the 1930s onward has revealed a v-shape progression with the 1960s as the nadir (Gallup 2012). The American

government launched into its own experimental moratorium in 1972 when the Supreme Court ruling in *Furman v. Georgia* temporarily halted executions for four years. The justices' decision to evaluate capital punishment in *Furman* was heavily influenced by public opinion polling and a decline in public support was cited as a potential measure for "evolving standards of decency" (Falco and Freiburger 2011, 1).

In 1972, Gallup tracked the fluctuation of death penalty opinions surrounding the *Furman* announcement. In the pre-*Furman* poll, 50 percent of Americans supported the death penalty. According to the post-*Furman* polling data, four months after the ruling, support for the death penalty had increased by 7 percentage points (Bohm 2003, 31). Death penalty issues received significant media attention until 1976 when *Gregg v. Georgia* ruled that capital punishment was not "cruel and unusual" and therefore dissolved the de facto moratorium in the states. Since it was unlikely that the *Gregg v. Georgia* decision would be reversed in the next few decades, the opportunity to review the constitutionality of state execution, a process supposedly independent from public opinion influence, was exhausted for the time being.

As the issue of the death penalty received heightened media attention and scrutiny in the 1970s, public opinion was treated as the most important barometer for the legitimacy of capital punishment in America. In fact, many Americans launched petition campaigns to restore the death penalty in states during the *Furman* moratorium period. For example, in March of 1972, an organized effort to gather more than a half a million signatures for a constitutional amendment to restore the death penalty was supported vigorously by then Californian Governor Ronald Reagan ("A Death Penalty is Petitions Aim" 1972). A state senator was quoted in the *New York Times* for suggesting, "this question will never be properly resolved until the people have had the opportunity to decide the issue" ("A Death Penalty is Petitions Aim" 1972).

Furthermore, many politicians suggested that state legislators should find a way to subvert the *Furman* moratorium in order to better represent the will of their constituents. For example, NY Assemblyman Vito P. Battista was quoted in the *New York Times* for advocating that lawyers "put an argument in the proper legal mumbo-jumbo" so that the state could disregard the potential unconstitutionality of the death penalty ("Opponents Clash on Death Penalty" 1972). A review of the media coverage of political speeches in the time period suggests that conservative and liberal politicians alike were reaching out to a constituency that largely favored the death penalty and therefore heartily echoed their wishes for retention coming out of the moratorium period in the 1970s.

1990s: "Tough on Crime" Decade

1. Great Britain: Abolition Solidified

As support for capital punishment remained high in Great Britain, there were fourteen unsuccessful attempts to reinstate it between 1969 and 1994 (Hood 2003, 26). As Great Britain entered what America experienced as the "tough on crime" decade, the British Parliament remained steadfast in their defense of death penalty abolition every time a bill was proposed on the floor. In 1995, 76 percent of the British public still supported the death penalty, a decrease of a mere four points from the 1960s (DPIC "International Polls and Studies" 2013). With the influence of the European Union's

human rights standards and the gradual acclimation to a justice system without execution, public support for execution dropped in the late 1990s when Great Britain adopted the Sixth Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights (Ipsos MORI 2007). Forty years after the Murder (Abolition) Act of 1965, the Ipsos MORI agency documented a dramatic drop in support for capital punishment at the turn of the century, with only 56% support in 2002 (Ipsos MORI 2007).

The most recent British large-scale poll in 2007 illustrated a populace split down the middle, 50% in support and 45% against capital punishment (Ipsos MORI 2007). In fact, in 2011, an Internet-based campaign referred to as Restore Justice has gathered significant momentum with a petition to reinstitute capital punishment for child and police officer murderers. This campaign is utilizing the British government e-petition website, a new democratic measure that allows the public to submit proposals to be debated in Parliament. If the Restore Justice e-petition gathers more than 100,000 signatures, Members of Parliament have agreed to open up debate on the floor and re-consider the issue of capital punishment in the United Kingdom (Cafe 2011). Considering this fresh development in European death penalty politics, the political proceedings in the coming years will be pivotal in the evaluation of the sustainability of the “anti-democratic abolition” of the death penalty in Great Britain.

2. The United States: Abolition Delayed

Considering the influences of the “tough on crime” agenda in politics, it is no surprise that support for the death penalty in America peaked at 80 percent in 1994. Crime politics in the 1990s created a climate where any position perceived as “soft on crime” was a serious political liability for conservatives and liberals alike (Gerber 2007, 199). In this time period, government leaders could be seen “echoing the lowest levels of public anger and fear” (Ibid., 200). Because Richard Nixon had effectively used this platform to tap into the electorate’s pathos, Republican political strategists pushed a conservative crime and punishment agenda nationwide. In March 1991, President George Bush Sr. gave a rousing speech that framed an actively utilized death penalty as instrumental in “giving back our streets to America’s families” (Bush 1991). For one of the more extreme examples in political discourse, Newt Gingrich proposed the death penalty for drug smuggling in 1996, citing his reasoning as, “I have made a decision that I love our children enough that we will kill you if you do this” (“Gingrich Suggests Tough Drug Measure” 1995).

The expectation of “tough on crime” rhetoric was not confined to Republicans and aggressively infiltrated the Democratic leadership agenda. In the 1988 presidential debate, Democratic Governor Mike Dukakis was asked if he would support the death penalty for someone that raped and killed his wife. Dukakis infamously appalled audiences when he insisted that his opposition of the death penalty was independent from those emotions. On the night of the debate, Dukakis’s polling numbers dropped from 49% to 42% (Terry 2012). After this political debacle, Democratic officials were urged to stick to conservative death penalty positions. For example, Democratic President Bill Clinton ran three television advertisements for re-election that emphasized the expansion of death penalty statutes (Gerber 2007, 183). Crime control was so central to national politics that capital punishment had become “our nation’s litmus test for measuring suitability to handle all the delicate affairs of high office, even those having nothing to do with capital punishment” (Gerber 2007, 183).

While death penalty statutes had been primarily determined in state legislatures, the federal Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 passed with sweeping bipartisan support in Congress during this time period. While the first act expanded the punishment to apply to sixty new offenses, even some non-homicidal crimes, the second piece of legislation tightened habeas corpus laws in an attempt to speed up and reduce the cost of execution. The popularity of the “tough on crime” agenda did not just influence national legislation but also judicial and prosecutorial discretion. The 1990s saw a tremendous rise in the number of executions nationwide, from 117 to 763, an increase of nearly 650 percent between decades (Gallihier 2002, 4). This American development in the 1990s provided a clear juxtaposition with Britain’s gradual “phasing-out” of the institution despite temporal variations in death penalty opinion.

Summary of the Findings

The findings of the comparative historical analysis in both critical time periods support the hypothesis of the study. Considering that policy-making in democracies is invariably multi-causal, the findings merely suggest the relevance of a structural variable that transcends the influence of other variables effecting a Western democracy’s abolition or retention of the death penalty. In the case of the United States, a comparative historical analysis reveals that, at a decisive turning point, “more democratic” institutions and practices hindered the country on the path to death penalty abolition. The U.S. emerged from the 1970s re-affirming the moral legitimacy of capital punishment because American institutions, including the independent Supreme Court, were structurally influenced by a change in public opinion. As public support for the death penalty peaked in the 1990s with the advent of “tough on crime” agenda, death penalty retention was further entrenched by American political leaders who echoed popular sentiment to score well in their campaigns. In a broad sense, the death penalty debate at these two junctures in history serve as a perfect example of the functioning of the quintessential American democracy, in institutional make-up and decision-making practices. At the political tipping point for the nation on the death penalty issue in the 1970s, it was America’s direct democratic institutions that held the country back from abolishing the death penalty at the Supreme Court level or gaining momentum in the state legislatures.

In the case of Great Britain, a comparative historical analysis reveals that, at a decisive turning point, “less democratic” institutions and practices spurred the nation forward on the path to death penalty abolition. The distanced political system allowed British politicians to make the initial leap of abolishing the death penalty in the 1960s through the Murder Act despite the fact that 80 percent of constituents supported the mechanism. The British Parliament exercised accepted practices of Burkean trusteeship, a theory of political representation that allowed them to gamble on the fact that general support for the death penalty would decrease after the public saw the criminal justice system functioning without this ultimate sanction. History followed course, as the British public’s support for restoration of the death penalty declined substantially from the original 80% to 50% today. At a ripe time in history, it was Great Britain’s flexible democratic structure that allowed the abolition of the death penalty as an “anti-democratic” decision. If the British political structure had been structured like the United States, this comparative historical analysis suggests that this variable would have resulted in death penalty retention in Great Britain in the 1960s.

While there is a lot of focus on moving American public opinion towards death penalty abolition in the United States, a comparative historical analysis of the United States and Great Britain

makes a preliminary suggestion that abolition of the death penalty has been an “anti-democratic” phenomenon historically. Furthermore, the historical case study of Great Britain proposes that abolishing the death penalty as an “anti-democratic” decision can precipitate a drastic fall in public support for the death penalty. This supports the findings of other social scientists, such as Sarat and Martschukat, who suggest that many European democracies have only accomplished solidified abolition by taking a step ahead of public opinion. For example, Germany abolished the death penalty as early as 1949 and attempts in the 1950s to reinstitute the practice based on public support were continually rejected by the political elite (Demleitner 2008, 150). When France abolished capital punishment in 1981, the French public consistently polled at a 60 to 65 percent majority in favor of capital punishment (Hammel 2011, 193). Nonetheless, a couple decades later, public support for capital punishment has dwindled considerably to 35 percent in Germany and 45 percent in France (Ipsos MORI 2007). While a blanket statement about these different European nations must be corroborated with further analysis, a preliminary review does suggest that this process of “anti-democratic abolition” is not simply a British political phenomenon.

Most importantly, the research findings serve to weaken the popular cultural dispositions theory, or the idea that retentionist nations have cultures that are inherently more inclined towards violence and revenge. This theory was informally cited recently in international headlines in September 2011 when the audience of a Republican presidential debate erupted in applause for Governor Rick Perry because he executed 234 people during his time as governor of Texas. However, the interesting implication of the “anti-democratic” phenomenon is that European countries like Great Britain cannot claim to have drastically different cultural dispositions informing their political opinions at the time of abolition. When public support for the death penalty hovered around 80 percent in Great Britain, history demonstrates that abolition was triggered by structure in spite of the country’s cultural dispositions. The logical inverse of this finding is that America’s retention of the death penalty and current support of 63 percent does not necessarily suggest a country that is culturally more attached to retribution or death as the ultimate sanction. The “anti-democratic” phenomenon found in this comparative historical analysis clarifies that an irreconcilable cultural divide alone does not urge the policy rift to persist between the United States and other European democracies.

Implications for Future Research

The first implication for future research stemming from this study is the examination of the sustainability of death penalty policy as an “anti-democratic” decision in the Western world. Although America’s state-by-state abolition process moves slowly alongside local public opinion, moderate change over time may dig a deeper trench in the long run. While the “anti-democratic” decisions to abolish the death penalty in Great Britain and Europe could prove unsustainable and lead to calls for restoration, death penalty abolition in Europe is unique because 21st century international governmental organizations have locked states into this particular policy preference. Even though elected officials once achieved death penalty abolition against the popular will of the people, the state’s refusal to execute its own citizens has become a cornerstone of European collective principles on human rights. For example, the European Union makes abolition of the death penalty a requirement for member-states and any candidates that wish to be considered for accession. Additionally, the Thirteenth Protocol of the European Convention ensures that nations in the Council of Europe cannot

temporarily suspend their obligation to right to life and restore the death penalty in times of crisis. In this way, Europe has created a supranational structure that severely weakens the chances of any nation restoring the death penalty as a policy based on popular demand. This study puts forth the influence of supranational and international organizations on death penalty abolition as a significant subject for future research.

Social scientists and this comparative analysis have further supported the notion that “successful and sustainable abolition of capital punishment has never been a result of great popular demand” (Zimring and Hawkins 1986, 12). Consequently, what wisdom does this “anti-democratic” phenomenon leave for America and the thirty-two states that continue to retain capital punishment today? If most countries have managed “anti-democratic abolition” and public support for the death penalty has declined in the ensuing years, then America’s direct and accessible democracy gives birth to a populist bind in the majority of American states, especially in the South. In the states with highly active death penalty mechanisms, such as Texas, support for the death penalty is still as high as 73% (Ramsey 2012), roughly parallel to “tough on crime” figures in the 1990s. Additionally, though some state legislatures like Delaware are posturing for possible abolition in the future, death penalty repeal by each state may need to pass a public referendum based on different state laws. For example, in November 2012, California put death penalty abolition on the ballot but Proposition 34 was defeated by 52.8% to 47.2% when the public took a direct vote (Mintz 2012). Given these factors, grassroots campaigns have a long journey ahead of them if they hope to galvanize public sentiment towards abolition on a state-by-state basis and overpower the American structural bind that only allows change from the bottom up instead of top down.

Nevertheless, the historical findings of “anti-democratic” abolition in Great Britain do not need to imply that America’s populist bind eliminates the chance of an imminent change in death penalty policy. First, the role of bold political leadership is not to be disregarded. Although it is a rarity in American politics, the adoption of a Burkean trustee position has been known to occur in state politics on execution. While few American political representatives are willing to vote against the preferences of their constituents and risk looking “soft on crime,” former New York Governors Hugh Carey and Mario Cuomo and former California Governor Jerry Brown are three exceptions to this rule. These governors vetoed death penalty legislation despite the strong will of their state constituents (Bohm 2003, 28). Most recently, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley took a substantial political risk with his rumored bid for the 2016 American presidency in order to push death penalty repeal in the Maryland legislature (Jacobs 2013). If the death penalty emerges as a national topic for debate in the 2016 presidential elections, the public discourse and rhetoric surrounding Governor O’Malley’s campaign could serve as an excellent case study in the populist politics of death penalty abolition going forward.

Limitations of Study

As in any honest academic inquiry, this study has weaknesses and limitations that could be improved upon in future research. The first limitation concerns technical flaws with examining public polling data in a comparative historical analysis, across time periods and across agencies. First, the study was confronted with the absence of original polling data in the 1960s in Great Britain because the Ipsos MORI polling agency was founded a year after 1969. Nevertheless, the historical analysis substantiated claims by using a cross-reference of London Times articles and archived transcripts of

the British Parliament debates that cite the same numbers. On a broader level, when examining polling data across decades and different agencies, it is difficult to examine the consistency and quality of the questions asked in different surveys. For example, Gallup and other agencies now often ask Americans to gauge their support for the death penalty if life without parole is the alternative sanction. Research has shown that when individuals are presented with another tough alternative to the death penalty, they are much less likely to support death penalty retention in the polls (Clear & Cole 2010, 549). For example, in a May 2012 Texas Tribune poll, Texans supported the death penalty 73% without alternatives listed and expressed 53% support for death penalty as a preference over life without parole (Ramsey 2012). These are just a few discrepancies that usually accompany the large-scale analysis of public polling data and compel the tolerance of a slight margin of error.

The second limitation is the intellectual limitations of the researcher in removing all value judgments from the social science research. In evaluating why a policy divergence exists, researchers strive to transcend value judgments or biases concerning the content of the policy under review. However, how the researcher approaches such a complex policy divergence is inherently affected by the assumption that abolition is a positive or negative trend. Additionally, researchers evaluating the cultural dispositions of their own country cannot be entirely isolated or immune to the influences of the very culture under review. In order to mitigate any unconscious management of information, this study calls for other researchers who are unfamiliar with the content of the policy or who are diametrically opposed to abolition to re-examine the “anti-democratic” phenomenon. For American researchers hoping to circumvent the unconscious influence of an American cultural mentality, research into Belarus, the only remaining European retentionist country, is highly encouraged as an excellent supplement to the findings of this study.

Conclusion

By eliminating intervening variables present in past studies, this comparative historical analysis of death penalty politics in Great Britain and the United States hopes to move the literature closer to a richer understanding of what explains variation in a Western democracy’s retention or abolition of the death penalty. While a few American states will likely abolish death penalty in the coming decade, the politically entrenched regions of the South and Midwest will continue to aggravate the tensions between the United States and Western Europe over this significant policy divergence. “Triggering events” will shine a light on this division and hopefully catalyze meaningful public debate and further academic inquiries on the matter. For example, the Norway gunman Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 84 people in a summer camp in July 2011, served to test and reinforce Europe’s newly ingrained principles on the death penalty. When the Norway mass killer received a maximum of 21 years for one of the worst mass shootings in history, outrage over Norway’s leniency sparked a cross-Atlantic comparison with another recent notorious murderer James Holmes, who is awaiting trial and possible execution in Colorado for killing 12 people during a Batman movie screening. The coinciding of these two “triggering events” and the subsequent ways the U.S. and European systems handle policies hereafter will provide yet another interesting historical juxtaposition for the continued study of this policy divergence in the Western world. ✎

References

- “1969: MPs Vote to Abolish Hanging.” 2013. BBC News On This Day. Accessed January 20. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/16/newsid_3258000/3258437.stm.
- 785 Parl. Deb., House of Commons (5th ser.) (1969) 1229-1235. Accessed January 2013. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1969/jun/24/capital-punishment>.
- 793 Parl. Deb., House of Commons (5th ser.) (1969) 939-1060. Accessed January 2013. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1969/dec/15/capital-punishment-1>.
- Amnesty International. 2012. “Death Sentences and Executions 2011.” Amnesty International Website. March 26. <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/death-sentences-and-executions-2011>.
- “A Death Penalty is Petitions Aim.” 1972. New York Times, March 19. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/119481382?accountid=8285>.
- Bohm, Robert M. 2003. “American Death Penalty Opinion: Past, Present, and Future.” In *America’s Experiment with Capital Punishment*, edited by James R. Acker et al., 27-54. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.
- Bush, George H. W. 1991. “Give Back The Streets to America’s Families,” March 5. CSPAN Video Archives. <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/16941-1>.
- Bickford Smith, R. A. 1965. Letter to the Editor. *The Times*, February 13.
- Cafe, Rebecca. 2011. “Does the public want the death penalty brought back?” BBC News, August 4. Accessed December 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14402195>.
- Clear, Todd R., and George Cole. *American Corrections*. Wadsworth: Cengage Learning.
- Death Penalty Information Center. 2013. “History of the Death Penalty.” Death Penalty Information Center Website. Accessed January 19. <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty>.
- Death Penalty Information Center. 2013. “International Polls and Studies.” Death Penalty Information Center Website. Accessed January 19. <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/international-polls-and-studies#ip05>.
- Death Penalty Information Center. 2013. “An International Perspective.” Death Penalty Information Center Website. Accessed January 19. <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-international-perspective>.

- Death Penalty Information Center. 2013. "UN Death Penalty Resolution Backed By Record Number of Countries." Death Penalty Information Center Website. Accessed January 19. <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/international-un-death-penalty-resolution-backed-record-number-countries>.
- Death Penalty Information Center. 2012. "The Death Penalty in 2012: Year End Report." Death Penalty Information Center Website. Published December 2012. <http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2012YearEnd.pdf>.
- Demleitner, Nora. 2002. "Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead." *Oregon Law Review*: 81.
- Falco, Diana L., and Tina L. Freiburger. 2011. "Public Opinion and the Death Penalty: A Qualitative Approach." *The Qualitative Report* 16: 830-847.
- Gallup. 2012. "U.S. Death Penalty Support Stable At 63%," December 19. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/159770/death-penalty-support-stable.aspx>.
- Galliher, John F. 2002. *American Without the Death Penalty: States Leading the Way*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Gerber, Rudolph, and John M. Johnson. 2007. "The Myth of the Dedicated Public Servant." In *The Top Ten Death Penalty Myths: The Politics of Crime Control, 182-207*. Westport: Praeger Publisher.
- "Gingrich Suggests Tough Drug Measure." 1995. *New York Times*, August 27. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/109537548?accountid=8285>.
- Grasmick, Harold G., Cochran, John K., Bursik, Robert J., and M'Lou Kimpel. 1993. "Religion, Punitive Justice, and Support for the Death Penalty." *Justice Quarterly*: 10.
- Guess, Teresa J. 1999. "Ritual Action and Death Penalty Abolition: A Case Study." PhD diss., University of Missouri-Columbia.
- Hammel, Andrew. 2011. "Civilized Rebels: Death Penalty Abolition in Europe As Cause, Mark of Distinction, and Political Strategy." In *Is the Death Penalty Dying?: European and American Perspectives, 173-203*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hood, Roger and Carolyn Hoyle. 2008. *The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ipsos MORI. 2007. "Death Penalty-International Poll," April 26. <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/163/Death-Penalty-International-Poll.aspx>.

- Jacobs, Ben. 2013. "Is Martin O'Malley Gambling His Future on Death-Penalty Abolition?" *The Atlantic*, March 13. Accessed March 2013. <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/is-martin-omalley-gambling-his-future-on-death-penalty-abolition/273974/>.
- Jary, David, and Julia Jary. 1991. *The HarperCollins Dictionary of Sociology*. New York: HarperPerennial.
- Karacasulu, Nilufer, and Elif Uzgoren. 2007. "Explaining Social Constructivist Contributions to Security Studies," *Perceptions*: 20.
- Mintz, Howard. 2012. "Proposition 34: Death Penalty Repeal Fails." *Mercury News*, November 7. Accessed March 2013. http://www.mercurynews.com/elections/ci_21943752.
- "Opponents Clash on Death Penalty." 1972. *New York Times*, October 17. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/119473501?accountid=8285>.
- Sarat, Austin, and Jurgen Martschukat. 2011. "Transatlantic Perspectives on Capital Punishment." In *Is the Death Penalty Dying?: European and American Perspectives*, 1-13. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Spierenburg, Pieter. 2011. "The Green, Green Grass of Home: Capital Punishment and the Penal System from a Long-Term Perspective." In *Is the Death Penalty Dying?: European and American Perspectives*, 17-46. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Steiker, Carol S. 2002. "Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism," *Oregon Law Review*: 81.
- Terry, Allison. 2012. "Presidential debate: 7 defining moments in history." *Christian Science Monitor*. Accessed March 2013. <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/President/2012/1002/Presidential-debate-7-defining-moments-in-history-video/1988-George-H.W.-Bush-vs.-Michael-Dukakis>.
- Zimring, Franklin. 2003. *The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, POLITICAL INFLUENCE, AND THE ARMS TRADE

Nicholas Taber

Abstract

Given the importance of the global defense trade to geopolitics, the global economy, and international relations at large, this paper examines the political economy of the U.S. defense industry. The goal of this study is to determine the extent to which the U.S. arms trade is driven by commercial interests. This study hypothesizes that an increase in the political influence of the U.S. arms industry leads to any increase in arms exports. Using the congruence method, this study observes campaign contributions in given years from defense corporations with the largest market shares. While strong causal inferences could not be made based on the findings, there is room for further research on this topic if stronger data can be found on the arms industry's influence in the public sphere. The question posed by this paper will find itself increasingly relevant as debates over defense spending continue to unfold.

In 2008 alone, global arms sales totaled 385 billion U.S. dollars (USD) (Jackson 2012). For the largest exporters of weapons, including the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, this represents a crucial part of their economies. There are also a growing number of smaller economies that have begun to export weapons, which has increased competition in the global arms market. Within each of these exporting nations, political actors have various motivations for promoting the arms industry and the weapons trade.

Despite the great importance of the arms trade to our understanding of international relations, scholars have not yet fully considered the extent to which the arms trade is driven by economic interests over foreign policy considerations in the United States. This study asks the question: To what extent is the U.S. arms trade driven by commercial interests?

This paper will begin by examining the existing literature on the domestic determinants of the arms trade supply, followed by an explanation of the study's argument. The study hypothesizes that an increase in the political influence of the arms industry leads to an increase in foreign arms sales. Following the argument, I will detail the variables used, observations, and methodology of the study. Next is a thorough analysis of all data findings and the argument. Overall, the findings did not support the hypothesis. The final section outlines possible reasons for these results, suggestions for future research, as well as policy implications of the study.

Literature Review

In this literature review, I will survey what previous scholars have determined about the drivers of the supply side of the arms trade that impact its exporting behavior. Due to the lack of literature, this essay will not limit itself to studies that have focused exclusively on the U.S. Looking at other nations will help to provide insight into the politics of international arms sales.

While there has been some empirical research conducted that looks at the politics of the international arms trade, it is minimal and does not appear to have been highly circulated within the part of the academic community that is focused on international relations or political economy. Additionally, there have been no previous answers to the question posed above. Of the work that has been done on the domestic politics of the international arms trade, much of it has focused on the demand side of the international arms trade. Perhaps one reason why there is little work done on the politics of the supply side of the arms trade is that it is difficult to tell what the motivating factors are because there are many different individual actors within a state that have various goals regarding the international sale of arms. For example, the goal of a defense contractor might be to generate profit. On the other hand, a senior policy maker might wish to use arms sales as a foreign policy tool. At the same time, interest groups (such as AIPAC or the Republic of China lobby) may have both emotional and pragmatic interests in promoting the military strength of certain arms customers. A general issue with the scholarly literature on the topic is that much of it is outdated, having been written during the Cold War. The ending of the Cold War has engendered substantial changes in the relationship of arms sales to exporting states' politics. Therefore, I have largely ignored these studies.

As previously stated, the existing literature on the impact of a nation's internal politics on the arms trade is small. The most relevant study on this question is Margherita Comola's "Democracies, Politics, and Arms Supply." Comola examines the influence of nations' internal politics on the quantity of its arms exports. The study finds that arms exports increase when governments are under right-wing leadership. The study also finds that arms exports decrease when executive leaders are in the final year of their term before reelection. The author makes the important distinction between the arms exporting habits of democracies and autocracies, but goes no further in examining authoritarian governments. Thus, depending on their arms exporting behavior, non-democratic nations may act as the supplier for these nations that are at odds with democratic weapons exporters. A limitation of this study is that while it looks at the domestic determinants of the arms trade, it does not examine the commercial interests of the nations observed.

There have been a handful of studies conducted that offer insight into the question posed by this paper, while looking at other variables. In "The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Reasoning," the authors look at why a declining power like Russia would sell arms to a former adversary and rising power like China (Donaldson and Donaldson, 2003). The findings show that commercial interests were the primary motivating factor. The world saw a shrinking of the global demand for arms following the end of the Cold War resulting from the declining demand from third-world countries. The political powers in Russia were not only fearful of massive unemployment from the cumbersome arms industry but also pressured by their powerful lobbying groups. Thus, Russia provides a useful example of a country with a large armaments industry acting in favor of its industrial interests but against its own strategic interests, in that the arms trade with China

strengthened its main strategic rival, one with possible manifest aspirations toward Russian territory in Northeast Asia. Another study entitled “Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports” looks, within the U.S., at the impact of a concern for human rights on the trading of arms to other nations. The results show that, during the Cold War, human rights were not a significant concern in the eligibility of nations to receive arms from the U.S. However, since the end of the Cold War, human rights have become an important component in determining the eligibility of nations to receive arms transfers. This study deals largely with the foreign policy of the United States and does not link this finding with domestic political factors (Blanton, 2005).

Other findings have shown that the international arms trade has become increasingly revenue-driven both as a result of the ending of the Cold War and the overall increase in weapons suppliers. In “The Arms Trade: Business as Usual?” the authors argue that, in addition to the ending of the Cold War, the increase in arms manufacturing nations worldwide contributed to the commercialization of the industry. In other words, greater competition led to more protection of domestic industries and less willingness on the part of major exporting nations to transfer production technology (Nolan and Keller, 1997). Another major work on the global arms supply entitled, “Developments in the Global Supply of Arms; Opportunity and Motivation” has stated similar facts, in particular, demonstrating the shift from an oligopolistic market structure to a more competitive one (Pearson and Brzoska, 1994). While the assertion in this study that the arms trade is becoming increasingly commercialized is a credible one, neither of the aforementioned works conducted empirical research on the commercialization of the weapons trade. Rather, they make these assertions and provide anecdotal facts and data to support these claims. Thus, the lack of empirically tested research on the commercialization of the arms trade represents a major gap in the existing literature on the supply side of the arms trade. Additionally, these articles largely ignore how foreign policy interests are at play in arms exporting nations.

The general lack of contemporary research on the domestic factors that influence the arms trade makes it difficult to envision the existing literature in different conceptual frameworks. It appears that only Comola’s study has produced empirically sound findings on the domestic political determinants of arms sales. Again, the primary issue with her study is that her results are only applicable to democracies. There seems to be a consensus that the arms industry has become increasingly commercialized. There has been a handful of studies produced that focus on certain domestic political factors as they relate to the arms trade in the U.S. and Russia.

Other than a few exceptions, the existing scholarly literature largely ignores how commercial interests influence the arms supply. The research that follows should be an attempt to fill this gap in the existing literature by providing empirically tested findings on the commercial determinants of the arms trade supply. Given the importance of the arms industry to many national economies, as well as the greater implications for the working of the international system and the behavior of exporting countries, a closer look at this question is critical.

Background of the Industrial and Political Environment

The arms and defense industry of the United States evolved greatly during the twentieth century and is continuing to evolve today. History has shown that changes in the size and structure of the defense industry are closely aligned with levels of U.S. government and defense spending. From the economic standpoint of the defense industry, the central issue with having primarily one customer (the

U.S. government) is that the defense industry is extremely vulnerable to shocks in demand. The Cold War saw large growth in the private sector side of the defense industry. In 1961, President Eisenhower spoke of the massive growth in the nation's military-industrial complex. Eisenhower was referring to the development of the defense industrial base that emerged as a result of increased demand from the U.S. government for military equipment and arms. This military buildup was intended to aid the U.S.'s efforts to contain the spread of communism and fight proxy wars, such as our military efforts in Korea and Vietnam.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, decreased demand for military equipment and technology led to a consolidation of the defense industry whereby many major mergers and acquisitions took place (Watts, 2008). For example, Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta and Northrop merged with Grumman. These are just two examples among many events that occurred in the 1990's as the industry was consolidated. Another key change was that corporate management within the industry became increasingly sophisticated as revenue constraints intensified. Similarly, increased global competition made greater efficiency a priority to strengthen companies' competitive advantages. Most importantly, by the 1970's foreign arms transfers quickly grew in significance. Foreign military sales grew to more than 20 percent of total industry revenues by 1976, while prior to this period they made up less than 5 percent. This helped the industry to protect itself from exposure to shocks in demand as government procurement levels fluctuated (Watts, 2008).

The arms and defense industry in its current form is characterized by a high concentration of activity within a small number of corporate entities. Aircraft production and technological development is primarily done by Lockheed Martin and Boeing. Armored vehicle production is primarily under the control of General Dynamics and BAE systems. Finally, shipbuilding is mainly conducted by Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics. This type of functional segmentation is a modern characteristic of the defense industrial base. The high concentration of capital, industrial activity, and revenue generation in only a few corporate entities may suggest that the industry has a high level of influence on the public sphere (Watts, 2008).

Argument

The argument put forth by this study is that commercial interests are the driving forces behind the U.S. arms trade. This is in contrast to foreign policy interests (strategic and humanitarian interests) as the primary determinants of the arms trade. It would appear intuitive that a nation transfers arms to nations that serve its strategic foreign policy interests (i.e. the U.S. arming the Afghan Mujahedeen to fight against the Soviet Union or exporting weaponry to Republic of Korea). In the headlines, we see this dynamic play out frequently. In a democratic system, trade decisions as determined by elected officials are shaped by the demands of societal interests. Elected officials often promote trade in an effort to keep America's export-competing industries strong, leading to job-growth and greater support from powerful industry leaders.¹ While strategic foreign policy interests can have a powerful impact on a nation's trade politics, pressure from industries can do more to guide trade policy because politicians


¹ In International Political Economy, political scientist Thomas Oatley describes the society-centered approach to trade politics, emphasizing the impact that societal interest groups have on politicians. The limitation of this approach to trade policy-making is that it minimizes the interests of government officials independent of domestic interest groups.

rely on the public's support to be reelected. This dynamic plays out in the relationship between the arms industry and politicians. In other words, politicians promote the international arms trade because they are compelled to do so given the influence that the arms trade wields in the political sphere.

The industrial environment that arms producers operate in impels them to rely on foreign arms sales due to the monopsonistic market structure of the domestic defense industry, whereby U.S. Department of Defense procurement levels fluctuate greatly.² Therefore, politicians' decisions about the international transfer of U.S.-produced arms are motivated by a number of factors. First, politicians rely on the support of leaders from large national industries to be reelected. Secondly, politicians have a strong desire for their nation's industries to be globally dominant. This is partially why governments often use industrial policy instruments, including subsidies, tax policy, tariffs, and quotas, to protect their domestic markets (of both export-oriented and import-competing industries) and allow them to become internationally competitive. Third, politicians desire to minimize unemployment and maximize the prosperity of the arms industry. The three largest arms manufacturers account for approximately one percent of the U.S. GDP, illustrating the importance of the industry to the U.S. economy at large ("The U.S Defense Industry and Arms Sales).

In addition to the arms industry's overall importance to the U.S. economy, its relative proximity to the U.S. government amplifies its influence. The arms industry often works very closely with the U.S. military, resulting in frequent exchange between the arms industry and the U.S. government at large.

The historical context of the arms industry helps to further explain why commercial and industrial interests might be the primary determinants of the arms trade. The Cold War led to a massive expansion of the U.S. military-industrial complex. The end of the Cold War led to a massive decrease in demand for the defense industry, resulting in the loss of 2 million defense and military jobs in the U.S.(Gholz and Sapolsky, 1999). Additionally, during the 1980's, the arms industry focused on managerial reform and increased efficiency. This was likely to have caused a shift from strategic foreign policy to commercial and economic interests as a driver for the arms trade. Therefore the argument put forth by this study is only applicable to the post-Cold War era.



² Procurement levels typically fluctuate because of the presence or absence of U.S.-involved armed conflict.

Hypothesis

This study hypothesizes that an increase in the political influence of the U.S. arms industry leads to an increase in U.S. arms exports. The unit of analysis for this hypothesis is at the state-level, because it deals with the institutional relations within the state. Examining this hypothesis will allow us to assess the extent to which commercial interests are a determinant of the U.S. arms trade.

Defining the Variables

The dependent variable (arms exports) is fairly simple to define. For our purposes, we will define it in terms of the volume of U.S. arms exports in given years. Statistics regarding the specific volume of U.S. arms exports from year to year are available from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which is regarded as one of the foremost sources for data on the international arms trade. This information can be found in the organization's Arms Transfer Database. In a given set of two years (refer to table 1 below), U.S. arms exports below 16 billion USD will be considered a low amount for that given time period. Arms exports between 16 billion USD and 24 billion USD will be considered a medium amount. Finally, arms exports above 24 billion USD will be considered a high amount. Total arms sales to non-autocratic and autocratic regimes are also shown to provide further reference. This is operationalized by providing the aggregated totals in arms transfers to both autocratic and non-autocratic regimes in the given time period for each observation. If arms transfers to autocratic regimes are under 3 billion in a given observation, this will be considered a low amount. If transfers to autocratic regimes are between 3 billion and 6 billion, will be considered a medium amount. Finally, if transfers to autocratic regimes are above 6 billion, this will be considered a high amount for that given observation. Data regarding autocratic and non-autocratic regimes will be borrowed from the Polity IV Project; an organization at the University of Maryland that conducts research on the characteristics of political regimes.

Regarding the independent variable, political influence has been conceptualized as the potential for one political actor to induce a change in the behavior of one or more other political actors. Thus, a high level of political influence of the arms industry implies that it has a substantial impact on the decisions of policy-makers, but doesn't necessarily imply that it determines arms exports. This does, however, mean that policy-makers take the arms industry into account when making policy decisions.

Operationalizing the political influence of the arms industry is rather difficult. We will observe data on campaign contributions from the arms industry to measure the independent variable. The limitation of this is that it is unclear to what extent this actually influences politicians. Nonetheless, it illustrates a connection between the arms industry and the political system which could imply influence. Furthermore, economic logic theory would suggest that the contributions would cease if they were ineffective in procuring influence. The Project on Government Oversight will provide this study with data on campaign contributions from various defense corporations. The Project on Government Oversight is nonpartisan research organization that has collected data on money flows within the military-industrial complex. This study will look at campaign contributions from the industry's top 4 organizations, being Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's top 100 arms-producing and military services companies. If the combined campaign contributions from these corporations are below 3

million USD, this will be considered a low amount of political influence as illustrated on the data chart below. If campaign contributions are between 3 million USD and 6 million USD, this will be considered a medium amount of political influence. If campaign contributions are above 6 million dollars, this will be considered a high amount of political influence.

Strategic foreign policy goals will be the control variable. If there is an increase in arms exports from one year to the next, we need to control for strategic foreign policy interests that could be causing a rise in the level of arms exports. The state department has listed democracy and human rights as two of its major strategic objectives. Additionally, the Department of Defense has stated that counterterrorism is central to our strategic national security objectives (“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 2012). While there are certainly other strategic foreign policy interests, it is difficult to find hard data and accurately identify them. Additionally, there may be more variation of foreign policy interests amongst specific years that could influence the flow of arms to other nations. Data regarding autocratic governments will be borrowed from the Polity IV Project.

Observations

This study will be looking at the U.S.’s arms exporting behavior (amount of arms exports) in different years since the end of the Cold War. As previously mentioned in the literature review, a number of scholars have suggested that the arms industries of many major conventional weapons exporting nations became more commercialized after the end of the Cold War. Following the most likely case logic, this study will look at data on arms sales during the years after the end of the Cold War. As discussed above, observing statements from politicians regarding the arms industry is arguably the most accurate way of determining the level of influence the arms industry has over politicians. Observing data following the end of the Cold War conforms to the most likely case logic because the literature suggests that commercial interests became the primary determinant of the global arms trade around this time period. Furthermore, if there is evidence in support of the hypothesis, this study’s argument would only be applicable to the post Cold War era. Given the available resources, this study has only uncovered one such statement of this type. Because there are very few instances of this sort, this study will be looking primarily at the Arms industry’s campaign contributions.

Methodology

This study will be using qualitative methods. More specifically, this paper takes a case-study approach to analyzing the research question. The design for this study will be based around observing campaign contributions from the arms industry and examining the level of exports in given years. Using the congruence method, this study will observe the presence or absence of a correlation between the variables. Given the lack of information on the temporal sequencing between the variables, this study will not be using process tracing to analyze the hypothesis.

Possible Presence of Support for the Hypothesis

In order to find support for the hypothesis, we should see a pattern of congruence between the values present in the independent variable and the dependent variable. For example, an observation that would provide support for the hypothesis might be one in which political influence of the arms industry was high while arms exports were also high. Regarding the control variable, if democracy

is the U.S.'s specified foreign policy priority while arms exports to autocratic regimes are high, this would lend support for the hypothesis because it suggests that the discrepancy between the U.S.'s strategic goals and exporting behavior can be accounted for by the pressure of the arms industry on the political system. If, on the other hand, our foreign policy strategy emphasizes counterterrorism, the implications this would have on the hypothesis are less clear. However, if counterterrorism concerns are high, we would arguably expect to see a high level of arms exports to autocratic regimes in order to deter conflict and combat terrorism. Furthermore, if counterterrorism is the U.S.'s primary priority in its foreign policy strategy, we can not make any inferences about the validity of the hypothesis.

Data Analysis

In this section, we will analyze the variables' values in each observation and use these values to test the hypothesis. In addition to analyzing the values of each variable in terms of high and low, we will look at changes in variables from one year to the next, to provide further understanding of the data.

1993-1994

In the first observation, the influence of the arms industry (the independent variable), according to the operational definition specified above, was low. In this period, Lockheed Martin spent a mere 700 USD on campaign contributions, Boeing spent 672,870 USD, Northrop Grumman spent 608,070, and General Dynamics spent 556,496. Thus, the four largest arms manufacturers spent a combined total of 1,838,136 USD on campaign contributions. Given that this total came well under 3 million USD, this is a low value.

The dependent variable (arms exports) for this observation was high, with a total of 25,838 million USD in sales. The industry's biggest national customer in 1993 and 1994 was Turkey, with a total of 3,298 million USD in weapons transfers. The U.S. sold 18,871 million USD worth of arms to non-autocratic regimes. There were 6,967 million USD in weapons sales to autocratic regimes, which was the highest amount among the observations presented. Among the U.S.'s largest customers with non-autocratic regimes were Turkey, Japan with a total of 3,000 million USD, Israel with a total of 1,557 million USD, South Korea with a total of 1,301 million USD, and Taiwan with a total of 1975 million USD. Among the U.S.'s largest customers with autocratic regimes were Egypt with 2,781 million USD, Kuwait with 686 million USD, and Saudi Arabia with 2,947 million USD. Additionally, this time period saw a handful of isolated instances in which certain nations with autocratic regimes received small arms transfers. This is in contrast to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of which are autocratic regimes receiving large quantities of U.S. arms almost yearly. The isolated instances of this type that occurred in 1993 and 1994 include Angola with 7 million, China with 14 million, Indonesia with 8 million, and Oman with 26 million.

Regarding the control variable, there was a strong emphasis on democracy in the United States' national security strategy. Because arms exports were high, the relationship between the control variable and the dependent variable suggests some support for the argument in this observation.

The data for this observation does not support the hypothesis, because the value of the independent variable was low while the dependent variable was high. In order for this observation to have shown support for the hypothesis the dependent variable would have had to have been low

as well. While there is no conclusive support for the hypothesis, the level of arms sales to autocratic regimes was comparatively high, which could potentially suggest industry influence given that the support of autocratic regimes is often considered to be not in our nation's interest. While the promotion of democratic values and human rights is frequently cited by foreign policy makers as a priority, the U.S. may also transfer arms to autocratic regimes for strategic purposes that are particular to specific regions and instances. This study does not analyze at these micro-dynamics in the international arms trade. Therefore, no strong causal inferences can be made.

1995-1996

As observed in this period, the political influence of the arms industry was at a medium level, with a total of 4,766,980 USD in campaign contributions from the 4 largest arms producers. Due to the fact that this total is between 3 and 6 million USD, it is considered by this study to be a medium value. This value represents an enormous increase from the previous year. Lockheed Martin spent 1,955,799 on campaign contributions, Boeing spent 1,064,830 USD, Northrop Grumman spent 1,009,493 USD, and General Dynamics spent 736,858 USD. Each industry leader spent significantly more than in the previous observation, with Boeing and Northrop Grumman both spending upwards of 50 percent more than in the previous observation.

The level of arms sales was medium and had a total of 22,221 million USD. There was a total of 15,517 million USD sold to nations with non-autocratic regimes and 6,704 million USD sold to nations with autocratic regimes. Considering the fact that this period saw a medium amount of foreign arms sales overall, the amount of transfers to autocratic regimes was noticeably high and close to the same amount as the previous year. Sales to the more regular autocratic customers, including Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, were also present. There were also smaller sales to Bahrain, China, Morocco, Oman, and Venezuela.

In this observation, there was a greater emphasis on counterterrorism in the U.S.'s foreign policy strategy. With a high level of arms exports to autocratic regimes, the relationship present between the control variable and the independent variable suggests support for the argument.

The data in this observation does support the hypothesis because the independent and dependent variables are congruent with one another, both being at medium levels. In this way, we might infer that a medium amount of political influence of the arms industry has led to a medium amount of arms sales.

1997-1998

The political influence of the arms industry observed in this time period was medium. Campaign contributions from the top four arms producers totaled 5,342,399 USD. Though still considered at a medium level because it is under 6 million in value, this is a significant increase from the previous year. Lockheed Martin spent a total of 1,811,037 USD representing a slight decrease. Boeing spent a total of 1,905,664 USD, representing a very significant increase. Northrop Grumman spent a total of 741,620 USD, representing a significant decrease of more than 200,000 USD. Finally, General Dynamics spent a total of 882,978 USD, showing a moderate increase.

The amount of arms exports during this period was high, with a total of 30,317 million USD, the highest among all of the years observed. There was a total of 24,687 million USD in arms sold to

non-autocratic regimes, representing a 57 percent increase from the previous observation. Arms sales to authoritarian regimes amounted to 5,635 million USD, showing a slight decrease from the previous observation. Among some of the more unique instances of arms sales to autocratic regimes were those to Mauritania, receiving 5 million in arms transfers, and Qatar, which received 1 million. As detailed in previous observations, these instances are unique in the sense that they are isolated occurrences in contrast to another autocratic regime like Saudi Arabia which receives arms from the U.S. almost yearly, likely because Saudi Arabia is regarded as a strategic ally..

Regarding the control variable for the years 1997 to 1998, there was an emphasis on democracy. Because arms sales to autocratic regimes were medium, we do not find support for the argument in the relationship between these variables.

In order to find support for the hypothesis, we would need to find a medium level of arms exports, given that the influence of the arms industry itself is at a medium level. Therefore, we do not find support for the hypothesis in this observation because there was a high level of arms exports.

1999-2000:

In this time period, the political influence of the arms industry was high, with a total of 7,643,583 USD in campaign contributions from the arms industry's top four producers. Lockheed Martin spent a total of 2,757,269 USD in campaign contributions, representing a very large increase from the previous observation. Boeing spent a total of 2,688,529, showing a large increase on the same order of magnitude as Lockheed Martin. Contributions from Northrop Grumman saw a slight increase in campaign contributions, spending a total of 826,158 USD. General Dynamics spent a total of 1,371,637, representing a significant increase.

Arms sales in this year were at a medium level, with a total of 19,108 million USD in arms transfers. There was a total of 16,290 million USD sold to non-authoritarian regimes and a total of 2,818 sold to authoritarian regimes, both of which were significantly down from the previous year.

In this observation, there was an emphasis on democracy in the U.S.'s foreign policy strategy. Because total arms exports to autocratic regimes were low, we do not find support for the argument in the relationship between the control variable and the dependent variable.

The observation does not show support for the hypothesis because the independent variable has a high value while the dependent variable has a medium value.

2001-2002:

In this observation, the independent variable was high, with a total of 8,448,495 USD in campaign contributions from the industry's top four leaders. Lockheed Martin spent a total of 2,654,958 USD, showing a slight decrease from the previous observation. Boeing spent 2,543,425 USD, also showing a slight decrease from the previous year. Northrop Grumman spent a total of 1,665,935 USD, showing a very sharp increase from the previous observation. Finally, General Dynamics spent 1,587,177 USD, showing a minor increase in campaign contributions from the previous year.

For the dependent variable, the value of arms sales was low with a total of 11,009 million USD. This is the most dramatic marginal decrease among all of the observations observed. Arms to non-autocratic governments totaled 9,386 million USD while sales to autocratic governments totaled 1,623 million USD both of which are dramatic decreases from the previous year.

This observation does not show support for the hypothesis because the level political influence was high while the value for arms exports was low. Additionally, counterterrorism was the predominant priority in our foreign policy strategy and the relationship between the control variable and the independent variable shows no support for the argument.

2003-2004

In this period, the independent variable was high with a total value of 8,683,209 in campaign contributions from the industry's top producing leaders, representing a significant increase from the previous year. In this observation, Lockheed Martin spent 2,211,092 USD in campaign contributions, Boeing spent 2,614,820 USD, Northrop Grumman spent 2,338,695 USD, and General Dynamics spent 1,518,602 USD.

For the dependent variable, the value of arms exports was low, with a total of 12,455 million USD, showing a small increase from the previous observation. Sales to non-autocratic regimes were 11,114 Million USD in total, also showing an increase. However, sales to autocratic regimes totaled 1,341 Million USD, showing a 17 percent decrease.

In this observation, we do not find support for the hypothesis because the independent variable was high while the dependent variable was low. Regarding the control variable, the U.S.'s foreign policy emphasized counterterrorism. As, previously stated in the research design, we can make no inferences about the validity of the argument when counterterrorism is the primary focus of the U.S.'s foreign policy strategy.

2005-2006

In this observation, the political influence of the arms industry was high, with campaign contributions totaling 8,950,141 USD, showing a modest increase from the year before. Lockheed Martin spent 2,764,428 million USD, Boeing spent 2,428,469 million USD, Northrop Grumman spent 2,066,613 million USD, and General Dynamics spent 1,690,631 million USD.

The value of the dependent variable was medium, with a total of 14,100 million USD in foreign arms sales. Sales to non-autocratic regimes were 12,186 million USD while sales to autocratic regimes were 1,914 million USD.

In this observation, we do not find support for the hypothesis because the independent variable was high while the dependent variable was medium. Additionally, counterterrorism was strongly emphasized in our foreign policy strategy and, thus, we can make no inferences about the argument in the relationship between the control variable and the dependent variable in this observation.

Analysis of the Argument

From the analysis of the variables, we do not find support for the argument. No correlation has been found between the political influence of the arms industry and the level of arms exports.

Conclusion

The goal of this paper is to assess the extent to which the United States' foreign trade in arms is driven by commercial interests. The scholarly literature on the international arms trade has yet to provide an explanation for the role of commercial interests in the arms-exporting behavior of states.

This study argued that commercial interests are the primary driving forces behind the U.S. arms trade and hypothesized that an increase in the political influence of the arms industry leads to an increase in foreign arms transfers from the U.S. to other nations. This study used the congruence method to assess the relationship between the research variables and observed the years 1993-2006.

Overall, this study found no support for the hypothesis, as congruence between the variables was rarely present. These results are likely because the independent variable (the political influence of the U.S. arms industry) was operationalized by looking at campaign contributions in each given year. The problem with this operational definition is that, arguably, it does not show the true political influence of the industry, but rather can provide insight on the extent to which the industry intends to influence the political sphere.

Due to this limitation of the operational definition for the independent variable, I recommend that in future studies, scholars focus on finding data that more accurately explains the political influence of the arms industry. While data on arms industry- government relations is extremely limited, it would be useful for future scholars to interview various political actors and arms industry leaders as a way of operationalizing this variable.

Policy Implications

In light of recent events concerning the political discourse surrounding the United States' fiscal policy, this question posed by this paper is of increasing relevance to contemporary policy makers. The current debate surrounding the looming fiscal cliff has resulted in policy makers debating substantial cuts in defense spending. If Department of Defense procurement levels plummet as a result of cuts in defense spending, the arms industry will clearly suffer greatly as domestic demand for defense goods would decrease accordingly. In order to survive in this monopsonistic market structure, defense corporations will likely seek revenue sources beyond the government. The defense industry has few options other than to try to increase foreign arms sales. Politicians have good reason to promote the health of the arms industry (they wish to be reelected and promote the strength of the domestic economy). In this way, we see how the argument posed by this study can play out in the dynamics within the military-industrial complex and remains relevant to the most recent of events occurring in the ever-changing political sphere. ✕

Works Cited

- Barry Watts. "The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present, and Future," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. (2008).
- Dustin Tingley, "Donors and Domestic Politics; Political Influences on Foreign Aid Effort," Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. Vol 50 (2010).
- Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky. "Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry," International Security. Vol. 24 (1999-2000).
- Frederic S. Pearson and Michael Brzoska. "Developments in the Global Supply of Arms: Opportunity and Motivation," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 535 (1994)
- Janne E. Nolan and William W. Keller. "The Arms trade: Business as usual?" Foreign Policy Vol. 109 (1997)
- John Donaldson and Robert Donaldson. "The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Reasoning," International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 47 (2003)
- Margherita Comola. "Democracies, Politics, and Arms Supply," Review of International Economic. Vol. 20 (2012)
- Polity IV, last updated February 15, 2012, accessed November 16, 2012
- Project on Government Oversight. Accessed 10/29/2012, <http://www.pogo.org/>
- Shannon Blanton. "Foreign Policy in Transition? Human rights, democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports." International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 49 (2005)
- Susan Jackson. "SIPRI Yearbook 2010," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2010.
- "The U.S. Defense Industry and Arms Sales," Stanford University, <http://www.stanford.edu/class/e297a/U.S.%20Defense%20Industry%20and%20Arms%20Sales.htm>, accessed September 28, 2012
- Thomas Oatley, International Political Economy, (Glenview: Pearson Education, Inc., 2012): 89.

BUSTED BY THE FEDS? GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

Erica Thomas

Abstract

The international drug trade and the power of drug cartels have perplexed both analysts and policy makers for years. As drug production and trade grow, cartels have climbed to unthinkable heights of power and, in some cases, have crippled governments. This study explores this problem and attempts to answer the predominant question raised: why do states struggle to eradicate such powerful drug cartels and drug trafficking organizations? While multiple schools of thought emerge that answer this question, research finds that existing literature shows little quantitative and holistic analysis of government corruption as a possible explanation. Therefore, this study looks to government corruption as one possible answer to states' struggle to eradicate drug cartels. This study hypothesizes that high levels of government corruption lead to a decrease in a state's eradication of drug cartels. By looking at a corruption score per country and police reported drug trafficking offenses per country, the study uses a simple linear regression to test the hypothesis. Some data results, such as moderate correlation and low r-squared, show that many other factors affect a state's eradication of drug cartels, and government corruption plays only a small part in explaining cartels' power. However, the analysis suggests that higher levels of government corruption may lead to a decrease in a state's elimination of cartels.

Introduction

Throughout the world, drugs are an expanding business (UNODC 2010). As the demand for drugs grows, so do the cartels that supply the drugs. With the cartels' expansion comes power, and the state's eradication of these cartels may diminish. This predicament poses the question: Why do states struggle to eradicate drug cartels? This study will identify several paths, yet will explore only one reason as to why these organizations are able to not only exert such power over a government and its people, but how states have such a problem combatting them. Having a greater knowledge of why the cartels are so powerful can help action-based researchers understand how to stop them. Understanding the cause and effect behind drug cartels is important not only for the wellbeing and prosperity of the country itself, but also in terms of U.S. foreign policy. A huge percentage of drugs in the United States come from outside countries, and U.S officials are constantly struggling to stop this immense inflow of drugs. Drugs are being smuggled into the United States from states and cartels across the globe such as Russia, Asia, and South America at an alarming rate (UNODC, "Drug Trafficking" 2010). Understanding why states are unable to control drug cartels provides pertinent information for future action or policy-

based research that wishes to provide solutions to combat the cartels.

In order to answer the question of why states struggle to eradicate drug cartels, this study will first explore all possible answers to this question in terms of the evidence in the current literature. After exploring these answers, the study will look to government corruption as a possible explanation, hypothesizing that higher levels of government corruption lead to a decrease in state's eradication of drug cartels. In order to test this hypothesis, the study will conduct a statistical analysis of data from seventy four countries. First testing for statistical significance and correlation among corruption and cartel persistence, a simple linear regression analysis will provide an estimate of the change in the drug trafficking arrests that are associated with lower levels of government corruption. The results show that the association is statistically significant and a moderate positive correlation exists between the variables. Although lower levels of corruption only explain a modest proportion of the variation in drug trafficking arrests, suggesting that multiple other factors contribute to a state's eradication of drug cartels, statistical testing suggests that higher levels of government corruption lead to a decrease in a state's ability to eradicate drug cartels.

Four Accounts Explaining a State's Struggle to Eradicate Drug Cartels

Four schools of thought emerge that try to explain why cartels and drug trafficking organizations seem so immune to the counternarcotic policies brought against them. Extensive literature exists on the problem of drug cartels due to the fact that it can be considered a global problem. Countries in which strong cartels operate face the many, frequently violent, problems that come with cartels. Countries that are not plagued by cartels still feel their influence in the drugs imported from the cartels. The four most widely accepted explanations are insurgency group theory, negative international interference, poverty, and government corruption. Insurgency group theory, the first of these schools, makes the argument that often revolutionary or guerilla groups are the drug traffickers, and their political power makes them extremely hard to control (Robins 2008, 634). Second, scholars stress that international interference, specifically U.S interference, often has an extremely negative effect on a state's ability to fight cartels (Friesendorf 2005, 37). The poverty explanation asserts that high levels of poverty within a country increases a drug cartel's power in multiple ways, making it harder for the states (Klein 1999, 51). Lastly, scholars have often found high levels of government corruption in countries with powerful drug cartels (Knoester 1998, 94).

The insurgency group theory asserts that many countries' cartels are not primarily drug trafficking organizations, rather powerful political revolutionary groups that use drug trafficking as a means to fund their cause. Robins (2008, 632) uses the country case study of Turkey to illustrate this theory. Turkey had almost beaten their drug problem until the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) came in as a revolutionary group. With the arrival of the PKK came an increase of violence, and in turn, an encouraged narcotics trade (Robins 2008, 634). The powerful political influence that the PKK was able to exert over civilians made it extremely hard for the standing government to focus on the increasing narcotics problem, especially as they were already preoccupied with an existing revolution. It can also be argued that in countries with strong counterinsurgency groups, the people of the country are often not pleased with the government and perhaps less likely to support any government policies, even if they are counternarcotic policies. This school of thought is an extremely good explanation of the situation in Turkey specifically as well as other select states plagued by revolutionary groups. However,

it cannot be broadly applied since not every country hindered by drug cartels is also experiencing a political revolution. The first school of thought can be explored in countries where strong resurgent groups are present, but all revolutionary groups do not traffic drugs to fund their activities as a profit. The insurgency group theory should be explored with countries experiencing political revolutions, but is inapplicable in the present case.

The theory that international interference, specifically interference by the U.S, impedes a state's eradication of their cartels is one that is widely accepted by drug policy scholars (Friesendorf 2005, 37). There are multiple reasons cited by scholars for this phenomenon. Friesendorf argues a displacement theory and maintains that U.S attempts to eradicate drug cartels simply create more unintended problems. By applying their economic and military aid in one place, the U.S simply creates problems in others. Drug use and location grown are simply shifted to another area, global opinion of the U.S is weakened, and the power of the existing state government is often undermined. Another key point that Friesendorf emphasizes is the detrimental effects that arise when the aid falls into the hands of paramilitary groups (Friesendorf 2005, 37). Knoester also uses this argument as his central thesis in determining the negative effects of U.S and foreign aid. Both scholars assert that often the aid is given to groups who are notorious for violence and civilian abuse. Therefore, an increase in aid from the U.S. corresponds with an increase in violence, civil unrest, and narcotics. While Knoester's argument is clearly defined and supported by careful empirical evidence, he applies it specifically to the case study of Colombia. These numbers cannot be applied in every situation and, as was the case with Robins' research, the theory therefore cannot be applied on a broader level. Friesendorf does an excellent job of applying his research on a more comprehensive level, even though his goal was to explain the specific displacement of the South American cocaine business.

The third theory is that poverty not only increases cartels' production and power, but decreases a state's eradication of cartels. Klein points to the correlation between poverty and drug use: a strong positive correlation exists between individual consumption intake of drugs and the level of poverty in certain areas or states (Klein 1999, 51). Thus a supply and demand market is present; this theory argues that an increase in demand for drugs causes an increase in quantity of drugs supplied, and thus an increase in cartel production. Chouvey (2011) similarly argues that economic development is necessary to a state's successful eradication of drug trafficking organizations. States that suffer from poverty often have fewer resources to fight drug cartels, thus hindering their suppression. Similarly, states that suffer from poverty may also suffer from a myriad of other problems that divert the governments' time and attention. Chouvey sees economic development as an answer to these problems. Theoretically, a decrease in poverty will result in a decrease in demand that will bring a decrease in cartels. This argument certainly provides a direct answer to the question posed. However, since many drug cartels export internationally, solving economic problems in one country will not immediately decrease poverty and drug consumption in another.

Klein (1999) and Block (2001) argue that poverty increases drug production, and thus the size and power of cartels. Block explains how in many underdeveloped countries with few other viable sources of income, farmers have no other choice but to farm agricultural drugs. Between punishment and survival, poor farmers will choose survival and face the few consequences that drug farming brings (Block 2001, 3). Smith supports this argument in the case of coca producers in Colombia, who also have little to no other means for survival and will therefore continue their coca production (Smith 1992, 99).

Cartels continue to have their supply of drugs, and states cannot eradicate those who have no other means of income. While this theory can point to why drug production is still high in cartel states, it can only indirectly answer why cartels themselves are so powerful.

Government corruption is the last argument as to why cartels are so hard to eradicate, and in this case it seems the most applicable theory. Ulloa (1998, 3-18) states that entire legislative systems, from the police to the courts, are often undermined by cartels. Both Robins (2008) and Knoester (1998) point to government corruption as a cause of the cartels' power in their case studies. Both also state that in almost any country that struggles with cartels, there will be some level of government corruption (Robins 2008, 635; Knoester 1998, 94). In countries that are plagued by cartels, the corruption reaches to the highest levels of government.

Grillo also supports this theory and discusses how, in Mexico, governments accepting drug money for favors is simply another means of business and fundraising. In their government, "corruption was not a rot but rather the oil and glue of the machine" (2011, 35). Grillo references similar attitudes by the government in Chinese opium growth (35). Government corruption, although changing in form, continues today; this corruption further complicates the problem and hinders the governments' ability to fight the drug cartels (Grillo 2011, 104). In order to solve the cartel problem, a state must rid itself of government corruption (Grillo 2011, 24). Grillo's argument successfully answers the question as to why Mexico in particular has such trouble ridding itself of cartels. Even though his argument is specific to Mexico, the literature from Knoester, Robins and Ulloa suggests that government corruption is often an underlying problem for states struggling with cartels. Although almost every study references government corruption as a possible cause, there is very little research that explores the relationship on a broader scale, which is what this paper will attempt to do.

In conclusion, government corruption is an extremely applicable answer to why states struggle to eradicate drug cartels. The power of paramilitary or revolutionary groups cannot answer the question since these groups do not exist in every single country suffering from drug cartels. International interference has been shown to impede states' fight against cartels, yet not every state garners international attention and much of the literature is too context-dependent, and hard to apply in a more general sense. Poverty is also a plausible explanation, yet poverty does a better job explaining the power of drug consumption, and it does not give a direct answer as to why states struggle to eradicate drug cartels. However, the account of government corruption directly answers the question, instead of pointing to indirect factors that could provide a speculative relationship. Almost all country case studies and broad literature point to government corruption as a means of power for the cartels, yet very little existing literature explores underlying theories of this relationship. This paper will attempt to test for a possible relationship between a states' eradication of drug cartels and government corruption on a more comprehensive scale.

How to Explore Corruption's Effect on a State's Eradication of Drug Cartels

One hypothesis that explains this relationship can be derived from the fourth school of thought, or the theory of government corruption. This hypothesis states that if there is an increase in government corruption, then states' willingness or ability to eradicate of drug cartels will decrease. Countries with high levels of government corruption will theoretically have more powerful drug cartels. Government corruption, the independent variable, will be operationalized by a corruption perception

index score, or CPI score, by country. Transparency International rates countries' government corruption on a scale from zero to ten, with ten being the least corrupt and zero being the most corrupt (Transparency International 2006). The 2006 CPI score is computed by "12 different polls and surveys from 9 independent institutions. The data must be well documented and sufficient to permit a judgment on its reliability. All sources must provide a ranking of nations and measure overall extent of corruption. This condition excludes surveys which mix corruption with other issues" (Transparency International, CPI 2006). Using two years of data, the surveys include the observations of both resident and non-resident business and state analysts on government corruption. "It is important to note that resident's viewpoints correlate well with those of non-resident experts" (Transparency International, CPI 2006).

The eradication of drug cartels, the dependent variable, will be operationalized by the drug trafficking crime rate by police recorded offenses in each country. High levels of police reported offenses of drug trafficking equates to high levels of eradication of drug cartels by the states. The measure of drug trafficking crimes does not include offences that relate to personal use. This definition eliminates the problem of small time users and gives a better indication of the overall trafficking by cartels in each country. Using the rate per 100,000 also accounts for a possible population bias between smaller and larger countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime conducts data and analysis reports, and the Drug Crimes statistics contains data per country of the rate per 100,000 offences for drug trafficking as reported by police (UNODC 2010). The analysis uses the year 2006 to keep the results consistent. The UNODC did not list the drug trafficking crime rate for each country in 2006, so data were drawn for Cote d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Armenia, Estonia and Oman from 2007 and for Sierra Leone from 2008.

Since this is a quantitative study of seventy-four countries with two key variables, a linear regression analysis will be used to test this hypothesis. The analysis will primarily assess correlation and statistical significance. It is assumed that the police in countries with lower levels of government corruption (i.e. higher scores on the CPI) are also less corrupt. Countries with less government and police corruption will have a police force that is more likely to be report drug trafficking between cartels and organizations. Higher levels of police reporting drug trafficking means that the government is doing a better job of eradicating drug cartels. The police, who are acting as agents of the states, are stopping the flow of drug trafficking by cartels. Since the effect of government corruption changes the positivity or negativity of the relationship between the operationalized definition of each variable, Table 1 shows the hypothesis applied to each variable.

Hypothesis Applied to Each Variable and their Operationalized

Definition

| | X (Independent Variable) | Y (Dependent Variable) |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| Variable | Increase in government corruption | Decrease in Eradication of Drug Cartels |
| Opr. Def. | Decrease in CPI | Decrease in Police Recorded Drug Trafficking Crime Rate |

Table 1.

Thus, data analysis should yield a positive linear association between CPI and the drug

trafficking crime rate by police reported offenses. If there is a higher CPI score, government employees, such as policemen, are less influenced by corruption. Higher police reports of drug trafficking should thus translate to higher eradication of drug cartels, supporting the hypothesis that if there are lower levels of government corruption, then eradication of drug cartels will increase.

Government Corruption and Drug Trafficking as Indicator of Eradication of Cartels

Data Analysis and Results

Before running the regression, it is helpful to test for correlation and statistical significance. This will show whether government corruption, or CPI, has any relation at all to eradication of drug cartels, or the level of the drug trafficking crime rate. Table 2 shows the results from a simple correlation and statistical significance test between the drug trafficking crime rate and the CPI.

| Correlations | | | |
|---|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | Drug Trafficking Crime Rate | Corruption Perception Index |
| Drug Trafficking Crime Rate | Pearson Correlation | 1 | .344** |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | | .003 |
| | N | 74 | 74 |
| Corruption Perception Index | Pearson Correlation | .344** | 1 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .003 | |
| | N | 74 | 74 |
| ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). | | | |

Table 2.

The Pearson correlation, also commonly referred to as r , is .344. This means there is a positive correlation between the two variables, although it is only a moderate correlation. The moderate correlation suggests that there are other variables that factor into this relationship and that could be accounted for in future research, and it is still unclear which factor causes the rise in the other. Furthermore, the significance level for the correlation is .003. Using conventional standards for the social sciences, the correlation is only considered significant at the .01 level which means that the correlation is statistically significant. The statistical significance allows a rejection of the null hypothesis, or the idea that no association exists between the two data sets. However, it does not test for causation, so it is still unclear whether a rise in CPI causes a rise in the drug trafficking crime rate, or vice versa. It is still important to take away that a positive relationship does exist between the two variables and that this relationship is statistically significant.

A simple linear regression is used to test for associations that can support the hypothesis. It is important to remember that causation can never be explicitly proven in these types of tests, although data can often suggest a causal relationship. The linear regression uses government corruption, operationalized by the 2006 CPI per country, as the independent variable, and eradication of drug

cartels, operationalized by the 2006 drug trafficking crime rate per country, by police recorded offenses. The regression analysis produces the results shown in Table 3.

| Coefficients ^a | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------|------|
| Model (R2 = .118) | | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | T | Sig. |
| | | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| 1 | (Constant) | .722 | 14.787 | | .049 | .961 |
| | Corruption Perception Index | 8.291 | 2.671 | .344 | 3.104 | .003 |

a. Dependent Variable: Drug Trafficking Crime Rate Per 100,000, police recorded offenses

Table 3.

The Beta of .344 again shows the positive correlation of the two variables. Furthermore, the linear regression produces an r-squared of .118, which signifies that variation in government corruption explains about twelve percent of the variation in the rate of police recorded drug trafficking crimes. Other factors explain eighty-two percent of the variation in the rate of police recorded drug trafficking crimes. This is a relatively low r-squared, which again suggests that many other variables factor into the relationship between government corruption and eradication of drug cartels. Although the estimate of the constant (i.e., the y intercept of the regression line) would be zero in a perfectly deterministic relationship, the significance statistic shows that the listed B₀ value of .722 is not significantly different from zero. The model produces the following function for drug trafficking arrests (Y):


$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * CPI + e$$

$$\hat{Y} = 0.772 + 8.291 * CP$$

The function shows the estimated impact of the CPI on drug trafficking. It is important to note that higher values of CPI mean less corruption, which has an estimated association with higher arrest rates of drug trafficking, and thus a higher eradication of cartels. More specifically, it shows that when the CPI increases by one unit, the police recorded drug trafficking crime rate will increase by 8.3. The presence of a positive slope supports the idea that a positive relationship exists between the two variables. In other words, an increase in CPI, or a decrease in government corruption, is associated with an increase in the police recorded drug trafficking crime rate, or an increase in the eradication of drug cartels. The evidence is in support of the hypothesis that if there are higher levels of government corruption, states' eradication of drug cartels through arrests will decrease. A slope of zero or a negative slope would disprove the hypothesis. The statistical significance of the estimated coefficient, the positive correlation, and the fact that the linear regression produced yields a positive slope all support the idea that not only does a positive relationship exist between the two variables, but that an increase in government corruption may cause a decrease in the drug trafficking crime rate by police recorded offenses. Applying the variables to each operationalized definitions, it can be

observed that an increase in government corruption may cause a decrease in a state's eradication of drug cartels. Graph 1 illustrates this relationship through the plotted points, as well as with the trend line that the linear regression produces. CPI, which represents government corruption, is plotted as the X value since it is the independent variable. Drug trafficking crime rate by police recorded offenses, which represents eradication of drug cartels, is plotted as the Y value since it is the dependent variable.

Drug Trafficking Crime Rate versus CPI, 2006



Graph 1.


Most points are clustered around the inserted trend line and show a positive linear regression. This graph, along with the positive slope of the points and trend line, simply visualize how the data support the hypothesis that less government corruption leads to higher levels of police-recorded drug trafficking crime arrests, or a higher effort towards eradication of drug cartels within a state. Mexico, a country notorious in international media and politics for its powerful drug cartels, has a CPI of 3.3 and a police recorded drug trafficking crime rate of 39.715 per 100,000 population. This country fits into the relationship fairly well since it has a low CPI and a relatively low level of police recorded offenses for drug trafficking. Two countries that fall onto the trend line and successfully demonstrate the hypothesized causal path are Panama and Canada. Canada, a country with low levels of corruption and a high CPI score of 8.5, shows a high rate of 71.12 police recorded drug trafficking offenses per 100,000 population, and thus a high level of the state's eradication of drug cartels. Panama, a country with high levels of corruption and a low CPI score of 3.1, shows a low rate of 26.01 police recorded drug trafficking offenses per 100,000 population, a thus a decrease in a state's eradication of drug cartels with an increase in corruption.

It is important to note four outliers that exist: Russia, Thailand, Scotland and Norway. Russia

and Thailand show relatively high levels of corruption, scoring at low values of 2.5 and 3.6 on the CPI, respectively. However, they also show high levels of police recorded drug trafficking crimes, levels above even countries that were scoring close to 10 on the CPI. Possible explanations include that these countries have simply a larger cartel problem to begin with, or perhaps that government corruption is prevalent in their countries in ways other than police corruption.


Similarly, Scotland and Norway agreed with the prediction in that high levels of government “cleanliness” yield high numbers of drug trafficking crimes as reported by police. However, the number of police-reported trafficking crimes was much higher than any of the other countries that fell at that CPI level. Scotland, at a CPI of 8.6, yielded a drug trafficking crime rate of 213 per 100,000 people. Norway scored especially high with a CPI of 8.8, but a drug trafficking crime rate of 421 per 100,000 people. Perhaps these countries are especially diligent about police reporting drug trafficking, or in the past have passed more severe laws in terms of what is considered drug trafficking. These four outliers could be studied in the future as individual country case studies to explore why their rankings fall so far above the general cluster of plotted points. This future research could even shed new light on why some states are so successful in eradication of drug cartels even if, as in the case of Thailand and Russia, they suffer from government corruption, or what laws are effective in eradicating cartels, as Scotland and Norway’s numbers are so high.

2006 Drug Trafficking Crime Rate per 100,000 People, Police Recorded Offense



Graph 2a.

2006 Corruption Perception Index



Graph 2b.

Graph 2a Graph 2b highlight the complex relationship between government corruption and eradication of drug cartels. Both graphs are set in terms of the rankings of country by their police reported drug trafficking rate. When arranged according to the rankings of countries by the drug trafficking arrest rate, the CPI graph has much variation by country rather than a similar curve. Overall, the distribution does follow roughly the same curve, yet many cases with low drug trafficking arrest rates reach unexpectedly high levels on the CPI graph. This simply visualizes the main points drawn from the analysis results. While overall the data suggest that government corruption causes low eradication of drug cartels, many other factors play into this relationship. The variance in the graphs shows this complexity.

Alternative Ways to Analyze Corruption and Eradication of Cartels

Originally, and in preliminary analyses conducted, the study used the number of drug laboratory seizures per country in 2006 to operationalize the eradication or drug cartels in each country. Lower number of drug laboratory seizures would account for lower eradication of drug cartels per country. Countries with low seizures, and therefore low eradication, would be expected to also have high levels of government corruption as their corresponding independent variable. This variable provides a more direct operationalization of eradication. However, problems arose with countries that

do not have a large drug problem to begin with. There were many countries like France, which has a low CPI and low number of laboratory seizures simply because there was not a huge drug problem to begin with. Countries like this made the data have almost no correlation, and no statistical significance. It is also possible to try to normalize the laboratory seizures by dividing it with another variable that would account for the level of drug cartels within each country, such as an indicator for the overall drug trafficking problem within each problem. If the laboratory seizures were normalized this way or possibly as a covariate in a regression with multiple independent variables, then perhaps the data would yield different results. The laboratory seizures also include any lab apprehended, no matter the size or group that ran it. This inclusion means that small time laboratories that had little to no affiliation with large scale drug trafficking organizations or drug cartels were included in the data.

Perhaps the biggest weakness in the operationalization of eradication of drug cartels used in this analysis is the level to which catching the traffickers affects the cartels themselves. Catching the traffickers does hurt the cartels, since their product is not being sold and delivered, but the extent to which catching small time traffickers hurts the big time cartels is questionable. At the very least, low levels of government corruption do to some extent help to eradicate certain processes of the cartels.

This study also originally considered focusing on only Latin American countries since Latin America is a continent notorious for large scale drug cartels, and specifying a particular continent might account for some regional bias. It is also hard to measure eradication of drug cartels when some countries simply have bigger cartel problems than others. Focusing on Latin America, in which cartels exist in many of the countries, might account for these differences. However, there were not sufficient data to use only Latin American countries to run a statistical analysis. Since this is such a complex issue, further research could focus in on an area to see if certain regional causes may exist.

Further research could also explore the other causes that affect a state's eradication of drug cartels. Using the theories listed at the beginning of this paper, poverty, negative international interference and insurgency group theory are all extremely viable theories that can be explored. The variation in the bar graphs, the moderate correlation, and the low r-squared show that many other causes likely contribute to states' unsuccessful eradication of drug cartels. Substantial data sets exist that depict the poverty level in each country, and one of these data sets could perhaps act as another independent or explanatory variable. The literature review shows that international efforts to help states who struggle with cartels often have a negative effect. A measure of international interference could be used in addition to government corruption since so many individual countries, as well as international organizations, work to prevent drug trafficking and drug cartels in other states.

When looking at observational data, it is important to control for as many factors as possible. Poverty was presented as another important factor in the literature review, and poverty could be an important control when studying not only a state's eradication of drug cartels, but furthermore the root cause of corruption itself. This study ran a preliminary analysis controlling for GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) as an operationalized variable for poverty. Using data from the International Monetary Fund, GDP per capita (PPP) was used to define poverty as it not only controls for GDP based on population, but by factoring in PPP, it also controls for different monetary values and inflation (IMF World Database 2006). The effect of the corruption rate considerably diminished by using GDP per capita (PPP) as a control, and eliminated statistical significance as well. However, if this study were

to be continued, it would be important to control for all factors, not just poverty. A myriad of other factors affect a state's eradication of drug cartels, as was shown by the data in the bivariate analysis. The point of this study was to look at simply the bivariate relationship between government corruption and eradication of drug cartels.

Importance of Corruption as an Answer to Low Levels of Cartel Eradication

The most important thing to remember is that the eradication of drug cartels is an extremely complex problem that does not have an easy answer. Although the data in this study suggest that higher levels of government corruption negatively affect a state's eradication of drug cartels, data also show that this is only a small piece of the puzzle in accounting for why states struggle to eradicate cartels. Nevertheless, it is an important question to ask considering the low quality of life and high levels of violence in many states with large scale drug cartels, as well as the fact that it becomes a U.S security issue when so many of the nation's drugs are coming in from overseas.

As more and more drugs are coming into the U.S from foreign cartels and countries, the U.S is becoming increasingly concerned with the power that cartels are beginning to exert on their respective countries and the difficulty each country is having in checking this power and eradicating cartels. Having a greater knowledge of why the cartels are so powerful can help action-based researchers understand the effectiveness of policies to stop them. Understanding the cause and effect behind drug cartels is important not only for the wellbeing and prosperity of the individual countries, but also in terms of the United States and U.S. foreign policy. A huge percentage of drugs in the United States come from out of the country, and U.S officials are constantly struggling in terms of how to stop this immense inflow of drugs. Not only are the drugs coming in, the gangs and cartels that control these drugs are also establishing themselves in the U.S. MS-13, one of the most notorious gangs in the U.S, has members throughout the U.S, along with established gangs in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico (Buckley 2007). This issue, and knowledge of what policies to enact in order to combat the foreign influx of drugs, is a constant problem for the United States government. Understanding why states are unable to control drug cartels provides pertinent information for future action or policy based research in order to provide solutions to combat the drug cartels that exist around the world.

North America currently consumes forty percent of the world's entire cocaine production (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2010). However, the majority of the world's illicit drug production is coming from large scale drug producing organizations, or cartels, in Latin American, Asian and Middle Eastern countries (UNODC 2010). The U.S feels threatened by the influx of "cocaine, synthetic amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), marijuana and heroin" (INCRS 2007, 16). In 2006, President George W. Bush declared twenty countries that were thought of as "major illicit drug producing or drug transiting" countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela (INCRS 2007, 4). The countries were put on this list because large scale drug production and trafficking continued despite copious efforts by the state to eradicate production and cartels. The U.S is currently using a policy that specifically targets the production of drugs, not the cartels themselves. They are trying to diminish drug production by "targeting the first three links

of the grower-to-user chain: cultivation, processing, and transit” (INCRS 2007, 15) While this is the most direct effort to target drug production, the data above suggest that perhaps the U.S can start looking to help government corruption as another possible way to fight drug cartels and their large scale production.

Conclusion

States’ inability to eradicate drug cartels is a problem that has plagued policy makers and analysts. There are many reasons why this inability exists, and the data analysis confirms the complicity of the cartel problem. However, government corruption provides one possible answer. The corruption perception index (CPI) score successfully operationalizes government corruption, and the rate of police reported drug trafficking offenses successfully operationalizes a state’s eradication of drug cartels, as police are often seen as agents of the state. By examining a state’s CPI score and the police recorded offenses of drug trafficking, a statistical analysis of a simple linear regression can explore the relationship. Statistical significance and analysis of the data does suggest that there is an association between higher levels of government corruption leading to a state’s low eradication of drug cartels. Although further analysis should continue to explore this complex relationship, these results help provide new insight on a problem that greatly affects both international and domestic politics. ✕

Works Cited

- Bartilow, Horace A., and Kihong Eom. 2009. "Free Traders and Drug Smugglers: The Effect of Trade Openness on State's Ability to Combat Drug Trafficking." *Latin American Politics and Society* 51(2): 117-145.
- Block, Alan A. 2001. "The International Traffic in Narcotics: A Critique of Certain Propositions." *Crime, Law and Social Change* 36: 1-2.
- Buckley, Cara. 2007. "A Fearsome Gang and Its Wannabes." *The New York Times*. Date of access: Sept. 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/weekinreview/19buckley.html>
- Chouvy, Pierre-Arnaud. 2011. "Finding an Alternative to Illicit Opium Production in Afghanistan, And Elsewhere." *International Journal of Environmental Studies* 68(3): 373-379.
- Friesendorf, Cornelius. 2005. "Squeezing the Balloon? United States Air Interdiction and the Restructuring of the South American Drug Industry in the 1990s." *Crime, Law & Social Change* 44(1): 35-78.
- Garlow, Stephanie. 2011. "The world's worst drug-trafficking offenders." *The Global Post*. Date of access: Feb. 7, 2013.
<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/que-pasa/major-drug-producing-countries-obama>
- Grillo, Ioan. 2011. *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
- International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/index.aspx>
- Klein, Axel. 1999. "Nigeria and the Drugs War." *Review of African Political Economy* 26(79): 51-73.
- Knoester, Mark. 1998. "War in Colombia." *Social Justice* 25(2): 85-109.
- Latinobarómetro. Online Data Analysis
<http://www.latinobarometro.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/latino/LATAnalyzeIndex.jsp>
- Robins, Philip. 2008. "Back from the Brink: Turkey's Ambivalent Approaches to the Hard Drugs Issue" *The Middle East Journal* 62, no. 4: 630-650. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/218512504/fulltextPDF/1398F1689687F42EE87/1?accountid=8285>

Smith, Peter H. 1992. *Drug Policy in the Americas*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc.

Transparency International “Corruption Perception Index 2006.”

http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006

Ulloa, Fernando Cepeda. 1998. “Introduction.” *Latin America and the Multinational Drug Trade*. Edited by Elizabeth Joyce and Carlos Malamud. Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd., 3-18.

United States Department of State. 2007. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control.” <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81446.pdf>.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2008). “Drug Related Crimes: Drug Trafficking at the national level, number of police-recorded offences.”

<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html>.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2010. “Drug Trafficking”

<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/index.html>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2010. *World Drug Report 2010*. Vienna

<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2010.html>

TROUBLE IN PARADISE: FIJI'S PROCLIVITY TO COUPS

Tanya Vitusagavulu

Abstract

Widely known as a tropical tourist destination, the Fiji Islands have been gripped by political turmoil and have had four coups in a span of 20 years. Various factors such as tradition versus modernity, military-civilian relations, failure of constitutionality, nationalism and power struggle are identified in this paper as factors of Fiji's political instability. This paper examines how socio-economic and cultural differences between the country's two major races, Fijians and Indians, have been the underlying cause of Fiji's proclivity to coups from 1987-2006. Along with other factors, the socio-economic and cultural differences between Fijians and Indians have crippled Fiji's political progress and development and have significantly interfered with the country's democratic process.

Introduction

Nestled in the South Pacific and known for its lush, swaying palm trees, heavenly white sandy beaches and tranquil, crystal-clear waters, Fiji is widely acclaimed as a hidden paradise. The warmth, genuine friendliness, and hospitality of its people has stamped Fiji's mark as an acclaimed tourist destination. Fiji has also come to be known as an exotic melting pot of the Pacific as its culture encompasses a vibrant and eclectic mixture of the indigenous Fijian, Indian, Chinese, European, and other South Pacific Island influences, which is reflected in its cuisine, language, architecture and religion and creates a truly, unique national identity. In this diverse island nation, the indigenous Fijians and Indians are the two major races and they have peacefully coexisted since the 19th century when the first Indians arrived in Fiji. For many years the country had the popular tourist slogan "Fiji, the way the world should be". However, its turbulent political climate suggests otherwise. The tropical paradise's scenic beauty has been gripped in political strife as it has experienced four coups in the span of twenty years.

Fiji experienced its first two coups in 1987. On May 14, 1987, Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka staged a military coup and overthrew Prime Minister Dr. Timoci Bavadra and his Fiji Labor Party and National Federation Party coalition government. Shortly after, on September 28, 1987, Rabuka staged yet another coup in which he revoked Fiji's 1970 constitution and declared Fiji a republic, thus making it no longer part of the Commonwealth. On May 19, 2000, a civilian coup led by George Speight transpired, which deposed Fiji's first ever elected Indian Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry and his Fiji Labour

Party dominated cabinet. The last coup was yet again a military coup spearheaded by Fiji military commander Commodore Frank Bainimarama who overthrew the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and placed the country under military rule and dictatorship. Being from Fiji, the author has always wrestled as to why her island country, which is relatively peaceful, despite the political instability, has been marred with political conflict. The last two coups occurred during the author's lifetime as she can vividly remember the coup of 2000 as a ten-year old primary school student in the national capital of Suva. Despite being away from home and living in Washington DC when the last coup of 2006 occurred, the author has seen first handedly the significant impact political instability has had on my country as she can ascertain the socio-economic deteriorating state of the country under military dictatorship compared to democratic rule, especially since the author last visited my country back in 2010. The author is thus compelled as a Fijian citizen to understand the array of issues that manifests itself in Fiji's unstable political climate and its proclivity to having coups.

Understanding the nature and underlying causes of coups as well as its aftermath is critical in assessing a country's political progress and development and maintaining order and stability in the country and its region. The last major military coup occurred in Mali in March 2012 with rebel soldiers overthrowing the country's President, Amadou Toure. The escalation of violence in Mali with the French military intervention in January 2013 shows the extent of instability that can take place in a country that has experienced political turmoil in the aftermath of a coup. Many coups are successfully undertaken and vary in their outcomes whilst other coup attempts fail, as was the case in the failed coup attempt in Eritrea in January 2013 when renegade soldiers seeking to remove its authoritarian government were crushed by government forces. In international relations, it is critical to examine the underlying causes and effects of coups not only because they disrupt a country's political stability, but they may also affect regional security and stability and have ramifications that extend outside their borders. With despotic regimes falling in the Middle East and others struggling to maintain their rule, execution of coups and their effects are a matter of importance. Coups may be carried out to remove despotic regimes, only to be replaced with another or it can benefit a country by allowing for progress and development. In this research a review of literature on coups and Fiji's political instability is completed, followed by my hypotheses, methodology, and analysis of data collected. A discussion of my findings and recommendations conclude this paper.

Literature Review

Coups are a commonplace occurrence in the international arena and its causes have been widely debated as it varies from one country to another with none being alike. In the case of Fiji, the country has experienced not only military coups, but a civilian coup as well, each coup different from the others in terms of its nature and alleged intentions by the various coup plotters. It is therefore critical to recognize under what circumstances a country at risk of having a coup. Scholars have acknowledged that political instability as a result of military-civilian relationships and ethnic differences between two major ethnic groups play a significant role in coups. In my review of the literature, I examine scholars perspectives and their findings on coup risk and on military coups from around the world, as well as studies on the ethnically driven political tension in Fiji. This will establish a clear and defined notion not only on determining under what conditions is a coup likely to occur, but most importantly how to channel their findings to Fiji's coup culture.

Gauging coup risk is an important way to establish a country's proclivity to coups thereby determining what major factors fuel coup risk. According to Belkin and Schofer (2003), coup risk may be conceptualized as a structural function of government, society, political-culture, and state-society relations, where the precipitation of a coup is usually triggered by short-term crises (Belkin and Schofer). The strength of civil society, regime legitimacy and the past history of coups were identified by Belkin and Schofer (2003) as being the main factors that reflected underlying structural coup risk. They stated the importance of differentiating between coup risk, which is based on structural attributes in government, society, political-culture, and state-society relations, and triggers of coups, which are short-term crises, as triggers alone cannot lead to a coup without the presence of structural causes. In distinguishing between structural and triggering causes they recognized that structural causes of coups tend to change slowly whilst triggering causes can be quite fickle. Also, compared to triggering causes, structural causes tend to be more deeply set in the political system, and triggering causes do not lead to coups with the absence of structural causes. Structural causes of coups determined a country's vulnerability to coups, as they were present in high coup risk countries as opposed to low coup risk countries, in which structural causes of coups were absent making them invulnerable. Effective coup-proofing strategies needed to be implemented by leaders in vulnerable regimes with the presence of structural causes in order to protect themselves and prevent the possibility of a coup from occurring. It is no surprise that developing countries find themselves at higher risk of having a coup, since structural causes tend to be more prevalent in these countries where democratic ideals are less plausible and in which authoritarian governments take precedence.

Despite many developing countries the fact that many developing countries have weak structural attributes, some of these countries hardly experience the occurrence of a coup despite these structural defects because they have solidified coup-proofing strategies. Quinlivan analyzed how regimes in the Middle-East had been able to effectively make themselves coup proof, focusing specifically on the policies of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria. Coup-proofing policies adopted by these countries included the regime's reliance on groups with special loyalties to the regime and the creation of parallel military organizations and multiple internal security agencies (Quinlivan). Because the leaderships of these states divert much of their resources to protect their regimes, the heavily politicized militaries are incapable of realizing their potential of carrying out a coup, and the militarized politics apparent in these states remain stringently resilient when faced with defeat. Structural political-military arrangements that are present in these states had enabled them to remain in power despite external threats, military defeats and internal tensions. Quinlivan identified five factors; the exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties, the creation of parallel militaries that offset the regular military, the establishment of security agencies that carries out surveillance on everyone including other security agencies, the strong emphasis on military expertise in the regular military and funding, as the structural elements that were shared by the regimes in these three states and made them less prone to coups. Thus, these structural elements were able to offset the prevalent and major structural failures such as ethnic tension and religious animosity that would have made these countries have a high coup risk.

In their assessment of military coups from around the globe, through their analysis of political and economic data between 1950 and 1982, Londegarn and Poole cited poverty as a common denominator (Londegarn and Poole). In their research they found that coups were almost non-existent in developed countries, with coups being 21 times more likely to occur in poor countries rather than in

wealthy countries. Interestingly, they found that the aftereffects of a coup includes a legacy of political instability in the form of an increased likelihood of having more coups in the future when low levels of economic well-being and coups are accounted for in a country. When it comes to military-civilian relations there is a distinction between motives and opportunities for launching a coup, as Finer found when distinguishing between the two. He argued three factors that result in the launching of a coup are civilian dependence on the military, domestic crises, and military popularity (Finer). In a similar light, when it comes to motives and opportunities for coups Zimmerman also identifies the difference between the factors that motivate military forces to launch coups and the factors that provide the conditions for a possibility of a coup to occur (Zimmerman). According to Belkin and Schofer coup risk and opportunities for launching a coup are not necessarily equivalent (Belkin and Schofer). They state that opportunities for launching a coup are based on a conflation of the level of structural coup risk, which is reflected in the robustness of civilian institutions, the rule of law, the freedom of the press and other related factors, and the effectiveness of coup-proofing measures that leaders have implemented in subordinating armed forces.

The legacy of military coups as pointed out by Londegren et al., and the motives and opportunities of military coups cited by Finer, Zimmerman, and Belkin et. al is evident in Fiji as the military has been at the forefront of the political instability. Concerns have been raised that their functionality to remain out of politics is essential in eliminating the coup cycle, as they have only intensified ethnic division between the two major races in Fiji for their own institutional self-interest which has caused political discord (Scorbell, 1994; McCarthy 2011) which continues to run rife today as Fiji has yet to return to democracy and is currently under the dictatorship of military commander, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, who also is Fiji's current Prime Minister. According to McCarthy, democracy has been significantly affected by a power struggle between socio-economic institutions and elites cultivated by traditional forces. This conflict usually plays out in whether elites interests align with or are threatened by major traditional power institutions in Fiji. In Fiji the interests of the military has been a prevailing determinant in the quality of democracy, and thus they need to remain independent and apolitical for a stable democracy to ensue and put an end to the coup cycle.

Fiji's coup cycle has had great socio-economic implications on such a small country with a population of under a million people that is struggling to maintain political stability given its unique racial composition that has led to much political disparity (Davies 2005). Scholars have attributed Fiji's political turmoil as an extension of its colonial past under British rule, which was responsible for bringing to Fiji indentured laborers who first arrived from India in 1879 (Davies, McCarthy, Emde ; Lal). According to Davies (2005) since gaining independence in 1970, the political power struggle between the Fijians and Indians began to brew and quickly hardened and erupted as attested to the coups of 1987 and 2000, in which the main motives of coup frontmen Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka and George Speight was discontentment with a political party in power that was predominantly Indian (Trnka, Davies, McCarthy Finn, Wesley-Smith White Lal). Upon gaining its independence in 1970, there was much deliberation on how to best cater to the interests of Fiji's diverse population in its Constitution, which led many to believe that a balance would be found in Fijians maintaining supremacy through control of land and power and Indians continuing to enjoy the economic advantages they had over the natives (Finn, Wesley-Smith). According to Finn and Wesley Smith the structure of communal and cross-voting that was put in place under the 1970 constitution allowed Indians to participate in

politics, but the chances of an Indo-Fijian led government was highly unlikely.

Despite major cultural and religious differences between Fijians and Indo-Fijians, they have managed to lead a peaceful co-existence in terms of low-level violence or death compared to other similar countries (Davies), which is a reflection of the non-confrontational cultural stance of Fijians, and seemingly similar outlook on the part of Indians. Since their arrival as indentured laborers, Indians in Fiji have been able to progress at a faster rate than the native population due to their work ethic, which has greatly contributed to the country's economic development. In analyzing the Indian interpretation of conflict and history, Davies states that "victimization" was a major theme, and that Indians perceived their own status as second-class citizens in a country that rightfully belonged to the Fijians, but had also become their own home which they have had to toil hard for as well (Lal). This victim status was solidified with the 1987 and 2000 coups and its blatant message that the indigenous did not want any Indo-Fijian dominance in their country and this would not be tolerated. Indians have been further victimized by racial discrimination in the form of affirmative action, which has been displayed through various measures of preferential treatment towards Fijians at the expense of Indians (Davies, Lal). Davies states that Fijians have had to struggle in integrating their cultural and traditional norms to accommodate to Indians, especially when it comes to land and their cultural sense of belonging to a certain geographical location. The notion of having to share their ancestral land with the uninvited immigrant groups who also seek to maintain their equality of rights as second to none has become a triggering factor for native cultural sensitivities. Davies emphasizes how Fijians pride themselves on having their own country, playing out their own nationalism, and cultural pride in shaping their own national identity. However, these have been crippled by the British colonial rule and the Indo-Fijian political dominance that threatens what Fijians feel is an erosion of their own culture at the hands of foreigners in their land (Davies). Thus, according to Davies, the affirmative action that Indians are fighting against is trivial in comparison to the greater injustice Fijians fear of their own country and cultural traditions being transformed by outsiders.

In her analysis of the status of the two major races in Fiji, White assesses that racial subjectivity exists between Fijians and Indians, with Fijians being considered "backward" and Indians "advanced". This racial subjectivity can be traced back to the first arrival of Indians in Fiji in which they considered themselves superior to the savage-like ways of the native Fijians they first encountered, and that has led to many stereotypes between the two races. The Fijian communal way of life, which emphasizes sharing and caring for the extended family and community, varies in comparison to the individualistic way of life espoused by Indians. Indians would place much emphasis on education and hard work, considering themselves disciplined, as opposed to Fijians who place more emphasis on community and sharing whatever little they have with family and giving to the church. These different outlooks have led to the stereotypes between the two races of Fijians being "lazy", "naive", and "carefree" and Indians being "cunning", "greedy", "stingy" and not to be trusted by Fijians (White). In her observation of Fijian culture, White observes that Fijians tend to base their stereotypical and prejudicial views of non-Fijians on Fijian standards of behavior culturally prescribed, which were condescending and ethno-centric. Thus, Fijians usually draw the comparison between themselves and non-Fijians when it comes to how much time and money they devote to family and church commitments and ceremonial events and honoring communal obligations, distinguishing that other groups, especially the individualistic Indians, do not place much emphasis on such matters and must therefore have no manners or customs.

These internalized prejudicial and stereotypical sentiments may not be easily picked up and evident, but much of the animosity on the political level can be traced to these very notions, and once triggered can prove volatile and erupt as is evident in the politicized racial tension that is prevalent today in Fiji.

The concept of democracy is not an easy concept to be accepted by native Fijians who place a lot of reverence on the chiefly structure that serves as the epitome of Fijian leadership. To express disdain and disrespect towards a chief is highly deplorable and offensive amongst Fijians as they hold sovereign supremacy in the traditional structure of Fijian culture. To dishonor the chiefs would ignite the fury of natives, and this has been a firm belief as to why there is much political tension. Indians have been perceived to have taken this for granted, placing more emphasis on allowing the democratic process to take precedence, whereas Fijians rely heavily on the leadership and backing of chiefs and is why institutions like the Great Council of Chiefs have the final say on issues such as land and custom (Finn, Wesley-Smith). According to McCarthy the extent of the progression of democracy in Fiji is highly influenced by ethnic divisions and indigenous sources power and influence in society. Therefore, given Fiji's political history, a more stable democracy in Fiji can exist if inclusive deliberation of all the races takes place and does not necessarily insist on what is best for all, but instead balances delicate cultural, religious, military and ethnic interests.

Hypothesis

To understand Fiji's proclivity to coups, structural causes that heightens its coup risk have to be identified. Despite an array of structural attributes that contributes to Fiji's political instability with military-civilian relations being a major factor, racial tension caused by socio-economic and cultural differences between Fijians and Indians has been the underlying cause for the coup culture that has gripped Fiji. This coup culture has had many turning points and overtures, which has been exacerbated by power struggle between elites and institutions. The four coups all vary in nature, with racial division as a primary factor. However, what is addressed and measured in this research is how much emphasis and to what extent were racial differences played out from the coups that occurred between 1987 and 2006. The last coup had an interesting twist to it because it has since seen indigenous institutions and national identity being threatened by a military whose commander is Fijian but is claimed to be a puppet for Indian individuals and their interests. This is in contrast to the three coups before it, which was championed by nationalist inclinations and sought to represent indigenous ideals. The dynamics and power play of the racial tensions in Fiji politics have definitely changed from 1987 to the 2006 coup aftermath, which needs to be examined in order to put an end to Fiji's proclivity to use racial division as a coup trump card. My hypothesis is that socio-economic and cultural differences between Fijians and Indians have been the underlying cause for Fiji's proclivity to coups.

Methodology

The political instability in Fiji has been attributed to factors such as an extension of Fiji's colonial history, elite power struggle, and military self-interest. It is true that various factors are played out in Fiji's political history, however socio-economic and cultural differences between Indians and Fijians fuels the political instability in Fiji and results in its proclivity to have coups. In this research an assessment of how racial differences between Fijians and Indians contributed to the coup cycle in Fiji from between 1987 to 2006 is made. History plays a critical role in establishing these differences, which

is why it is essential to include historical aspects from years before 1987 as well.

In determining the correlation between socio-economic and cultural differences and Fiji's proclivity to coups, political instability as a result of the coup cycle that has presided over Fiji between 1987 and 2006 is used as the dependent variable and socio-economic and cultural differences between Fijians and Indians is the independent variable. The research is based on both quantitative and qualitative data in order to gauge just how much of an impact differences between the races have had over the years that would solidify the hypothesis that socio-economic and cultural differences between Fijians and Indians have been the underlying cause for Fiji's proclivity to coups.

In the collection of quantitative data, socio economic progression and development of the two races was analyzed. An analysis of the growth of the Indian population since their first arrival in Fiji and how it compares with the growth of the Fijian population within the same time frame is carried out, as this is a pivotal factor that indicates how Fijians would feel threatened by having another major ethnic group steadily gaining leverage with them in terms of political influence and population. Another important factor that differentiates between the two is religious affiliation, which greatly shapes and strengthens an ethnic identity. In further solidifying the socio-economic and cultural differences between the two races, comparing education and economic levels is of considerable importance to gauge how one ethnic group's access and successful pursuit of education and their professional and economic advantages would merit friction between Fijians and Indians. Most of this information was obtained through the statistics provided by the Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics.

In terms of gathering qualitative data, an analysis was carried out on the constitutional processes of the three different Constitutions from 1970, 1990 and 1997 that Fiji has had, as well as the different measures that have been implemented in order to create Constitution that would accommodate and consolidate the unique ethnic makeup of the Fiji population and take into consideration traditional aspects of the Fijian hierarchy which is most sacred and paramount to the Fijian people. Political party affiliation between the two races is critical because it revealed the sort of ideology their interests were aligned with and particularly shows the direction in which the two races based on their party affiliation wanted the country to move towards pertaining to political party principles and representation. Much of the findings on the three Constitutions were based on a case study by Cottrell and Ghai, as well as other reports on the constitutional processes and ethnic tension in Fiji.

Analysis

Population

The emergence of the Fiji Indian identity began upon Indians' first arrival in Fiji as indentured laborers by the British colonial power between 1879 and 1916 and later complemented with the arrival of Gujurat and Punjabi immigrants who came as free settlers in the early 1990s (Grieco). The census statistics from the Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics comprised of the ethnic population of Fiji from 1881 to 2007 and is categorized by the five major ethnic groups in Fiji which is indigenous Fijian, Indian, European, Part European, Chinese and a section called "All Others" in reference to other ethnicities (Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics) and Fijians and Indians have remained the two major races in Fiji ever since. In 1881, the Fijian population was 114,748 acres compared to the mere 588, which made up the Indian population, thus Fijians accounted for 90 percent of the entire population,

whilst Indians accounted for less than one percent. However, over the years the Indian population steadily increased from 1891 till 1986, with the 1966 census indicating for the first time that they made up 50.5 percent of the population whilst Fijians accounted for 42.4 percent of the population. In the 1976 and 1986 censuses there were slightly more Indians than Fijians, as in 1976 they made up 49.8 percent and in 1986 they were 48.7 percent of the population compared to the Fijian population which was 44.2 percent in 1976 and 46 percent in 1986. The last census carried out in 2007 indicated that the population of Fiji is 837,271, with Fijians accounting for 56.8 percent of the population and Indians accounting for 37.5 percent of the population. Ever since 1986 the Indian population has decreased and according to Fiji's Bureau of Statistics a continuing very high rate of emigration of Indians since 1987 has been by far the most important factor (Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics).

Religion

According to the 2007 Census, Christianity and Hinduism are the biggest religions in Fiji, followed by Islam and then Sikhism. Christianity accounted for 539,553 of the population and Hinduism has 233,414 believers which has been surpassed by the Methodist church being the largest religious denomination with 289,990 adherents (Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics). In the 1996 census they actually had population by race and religion in which the majority of Fijians were Methodists with 261, 972 out of a population of 393,575 whilst the majority of Indians were Hindu and part of the Sanatan religious sect with 193,061 out of 338,818 (Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics). It is clear from the statistics that there is a clear difference between the two races when it comes to religion. Fijians tend to be predominantly Christian and Methodist at that, whilst Indians are largely Hindu.

Employment

The Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics conducted a 1996 census by employed population aged 15 years and over, by ethnicity and gender focused solely on Fijians and Indians. It revealed that Indian males had an edge over both male and female Fijians in the occupations of legislators, senior managers, professionals, technicians, associate professionals, service workers, craft and related traders, plant and machinery operators, and elementary occupations except for the occupation of clerks in which Fijian females dominated and the occupation of skilled agriculture and fishery workers in which Fijian males dominated. Indian males and females held the most occupations for legislators, senior office managers as Indian males accounted for 51 percent and Indian females accounted for 7.6 percent compared to 15.9 percent for Fijian males and 5.1 percent for Fijian females. When it came to elementary occupations Indian males made up 46.6 percent, Fijian males 31.7 percent, Fijian females 13.8 percent and Indian females 5.8 percent.

Education

In the analysis of the education levels of the two races, the 1986 and 1996 education census of population aged 5-20 years old by school attendance and ethnic origin was used (Fiji Island Bureau of Statistics). In 1986, 64 percent of the Indian population was attending school, whilst for Fijians it was 63.2 percent, and the statistics show that the school attendance for Indians was 82,565, whilst for Fijians it was 76,066. However, in 1996 76.6 percent of the Fijian population was in school, whilst for Indians it was 76.2 percent. There was a significant rise in numbers for Fijians attending school as it

was 109, 215 and for Indians it was 92,226. Statistics on education based on the ethnic categories of Fijians, Indians, and Others was also analyzed and was broken down into the three different levels of primary, secondary and post-secondary education for the years 1986 and 1996 (Fiji Island Bureau of Statistics). In 1986, we see that Indians make up 50.7 percent of the students attending secondary school compared to Fijians who made up 44.1 percent of the student population. In 1986, the gap between Fijians and Indians pursuing post-secondary education is even wider with Indians 54 percent whilst Fijians are 32.2 percent. In 1996, 58 percent of Indians are pursuing post-secondary education whilst only 34 percent of Fijians are doing the same.

According to a case study by Jill Cottrell and Yash Ghai, Indians tend to be more business oriented than Fijians and as a process more well off (Cottrell and Ghai). In 1993, \$10.7 million worth of tax revenue in Fijian currency was derived from Indians individuals as opposed \$1.2 million from Fijians in business. In their case study they also highlight that in 1970 44.4 percent of Fijian students passed the secondary school entrance exams compared to the 69.7 percent of Indians who did better and 22.3 percent of Fijian candidates passed the New Zealand university entrance exam, as opposed to 33.3 percent of Indians who also took the exam. Other notable quantitative data provided from the case study include how the discrepancy in education achievement presumably explains the imbalance in the public service by the time the first coup occurred in 1987, as Indians comprised 54.62 percent of the public sector when they made up 51.43 percent of the population. Also, there were greater differences between the two races when it came to highly qualified jobs, which were predominantly held by Indians.

Failure of Constitutionality

Fiji has had three Constitutions and according to Cottrell and Ghai each have all had a pivotal role in creating racial contempt and dissatisfaction between the Indians and Fijians. Under the 1970 Constitution, racial segregation was encouraged by the electorate system in which seats were allocated based on race. Due to the Constitution's favorable position towards Fijians, Fijians under the main Fijian based Alliance Party, along with their alliances with Europeans and Part Europeans, were able to enjoy majority rule in the House until 1987. The provisions of the 1970 Constitution assured a majority by Fijians in the Senate as well as allowing any nominee of the Great Council of Chiefs (Fijian traditional body) to veto any amendments made to any law that safe-guarded Fijian traditional interests such as land, development assistance, and the traditional governing role of the Great Council of Chiefs (Cottrell and Ghai). Fijians, under the Alliance Party dominated cabinet whilst the main Indian based party, the National Federation Party made up the opposition. This racially compartmentalized form of politics was contrary to parliamentary democracy and exacerbated racial animosities. This fake notion of "multi-culturalism" in Fiji politics was downplayed by elections that were openly fought along racial lines between the two political parties, which both invoked blatant emotive appeals that appealed to racial interests which created fear and suspicion of the other race and helped maintain their racial constituencies (Sharma).

Indians began to develop a lot of frustration and discontent with the political structure of the system and what they saw was the monopolization of political power by the Alliance Party, which was heavily influenced by the traditional system as policies were designed to advance Fijian interests. Also, there was discontent among educated, commoner Fijians who felt that their political aspirations were thwarted by the elites who enjoyed political power and were mostly Fijian chiefs. The Fiji Labour Party

emerged in the mid 1980's and was led by Dr. Timoci Bavadra who was Fijian and whose members were mainly Indians, defectors from the National Federation Party, as well as other Fijians. The Fiji Labor Party was not based on ethnicity but more on class lines, but was predominantly Indian. This party and Dr. Bavadra were viewed negatively within the Fijian community as Bavadra and the FLP was seen to be abandoning the more traditional stance of backing the role of chiefs in politics as opposed to the modern thought of chieftaincy being separate from politics. Thus, tradition versus modernity had become the crux of not only relations between Fijians and Indians in politics, but also friction amongst Fijians themselves.

The Fiji Labour Party and National Federation Party coalition were able to narrowly defeat the Alliance Party in the elections of April 1987, only to be overthrown a month later by Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka. The major aim for the coup was that the 1970 Constitution was to be changed in order to avoid an election of an "Indian-dominated parliament" (Sharma). Rabuka justified the coup that he carried out against newly elected Prime Minister Bavadra in order to protect the rights and interests of the Fijian people, especially land ownership and political power, even to the extent of making Fiji a Christian state (Bush). Following the first coup, there was a power struggle between Rabuka and Governor-General Penaia Ganilau, in which Rabuka felt that if the objectives of his first coup were not realized, he would take full control (Nanda). This is exactly what Rabuka did on September 26, 1987 after the Governor General had proposed for a multiracial parliamentary democracy. Firm in his traditional beliefs and obligation to his people, Rabuka abrogated the 1970 Constitution in order for the creation for of a new constitution that would benefit the Fijian cause. The 1990 Constitution rejected racial diversity and heavily favored Fijians, as it made sure there were not any loopholes that would impose on Fijian supremacy and encouraged racial segregation and Indian subordination and focused on the dominance of Fijian institutions over the state (Cottrell and Ghai). When it came to the electoral system, all votes were communal as there was no provision for cross-voting, also 37 seats were reserved for Fijians in the House of Representatives, which meant that Fijians did not need to make any alliances with any other ethnicity to form a government (Cottrell and Ghai). The entrenchment for legislation of Fijian land was enhanced by this Constitution and it guaranteed that only a Fijian could be Prime Minister. It strengthened the role of traditional institutions and gave special status to customary law which further segregated Fijians from other communities (Cottrell and Ghai). It also made the traditional body of the Great Council of Chiefs above the law and not held accountable to any institution or process (Cottrell and Ghai). However with the 1990 Constitution, there were negative ramifications for the Fijians as it led to internal conflict, especially with Indians out of the picture, which resulted in a political power struggle between Fijian commoners and chiefs which resulted in the creation of many Fijian parties which elicited that no one party could form a government without the support of an Indian party (Cottrell and Ghai). Perhaps acknowledging how his constitutional initiative had somewhat backfired, Rabuka agreed to the revision of the 1990 Constitution after seven years as there was a provision in the Constitution for that.

The 1997 Constitution sought to promote racial harmony and unity and with the insistence of Indians, was constructed by a constitutional review commission, which was headed by Sir Paul Reeves, who was a New Zealander, Tomasi Vakatora, a Fijian, and Brij Lal, an Indian (Cottrell and Ghai). This had never been done before as the country desperately sought a better solution for its constitutional woes after the failure of the 1970 and 1997 constitutions. The commission made recommendations

that would ease ethnic tension and ensure multi-racialism in the political spectrum and emphasize national identity. The 1997 Constitution introduced the alternative-voting system, which provided for moderation and cooperation across ethnic lines, in which each party had the incentive of collaborating with another party and encouraging supporters to vote for the party in agreement as second choice in their ballots and in the process facilitate national unity and achieve a broader national agenda (Cottrell and Ghai). However this sort of system leads to greater polarization as is evident in the 1999 election in which the predominantly and radically Indian Fiji Labor Party won, as well as in the 2001 election in which the United Party of Fiji under Laisenia Qarase won with a conservative Fijian party alliance.

With the Fiji Labour Party win in the 1999 election which saw Fiji's first ever elected Indian Prime Minister, traditionalist Fijians once again felt threatened as they felt that the push towards multi-racial political power as too liberal and modern for their traditional inclinations. The May 19, 2000 overthrow of Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry saw the call for the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution. According to coup front man, George Speight, the 1997 Constitution was not in the interest of the Fijian people, as it had been rejected by Fijian provinces and not properly explained to the people, but was instead brashly implemented (Lal). Also, George Speight felt that Prime Minister Chaudhry was favoring Indians by appointing them in the public sector in senior positions and accused Chaudhry of entrenching the interests of Indians, as well as being confrontational and insensitive towards Fijian interests and concerns. Thus, Speight felt compelled to overthrow the government because along with the Constitution, it did not serve the best interests of the Fijian people and needed to be removed by force (Lal). Fijians were surprised at Speight's brazenness, however for many he was viewed as a hero for championing what they were all quietly talking and thinking about. However, Speight was unsuccessful in having the Constitution removed, as this task was successfully undertaken by military commander Frank Bainimarama. After overthrowing the government of Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, Bainimarama successfully maneuvered the abrogation of the constitution in 2008 through his influence on the President Ratu Josefa Iloilo. Bainimarama justified his coup because he claimed Qarase adopted racist policies that explicitly favored Fijians over other races. Thus, the 2006 coup was the first coup in Fiji's history that has been ostensibly justified not for the Fijians, but out of the concern of the interests of the other ethnic groups in the country (Castellino and Keane). However, Bainimarama and his coup has been regarded as an Indian plot by the indigenous population and resentment runs deep as his coup has led to unsustainable debt and poverty (Lal and Hunter). Frank Bainimarama has since launched an election campaign for 2014 and has set up the construction of yet another constitution for Fiji (Lal and Hunter). Given the heavy animosity Fijians have against him, since he has total disregard for the Great Council of Chiefs and the Methodist Church, the potential for racial mayhem is inevitable and is a ticking bomb waiting to explode (Lal and Hunter). Fiji is in current disarray and has been elusive to political instability, shaken by ethnic tensions and the failure of constitutionality, there is no way of telling what the future holds as it looks grim.

Discussion

As the Indian population steadily grew in the early 1900s, surpassing the Fijian population for the first time in 1966, it is no wonder the Fijian leadership were not as excited as Indians were about the idea of independence. With the history of indentured labor behind them and inspired by Indian nationalism from their old country, their growing numbers and bright future prospects in their

new home would ignite a passionate drive for independence amongst Indians. Fijians on the other hand were faring comfortably under their British colonial power, which seemed to cater to every sensitive Fijian whim, recognizing and establishing policies and institutions that safeguarded the Fijian interests, especially their control of the land, which the British never sought to take away from them. In the eyes of the Fijians, if anything, independence not only signified uncertainty, but more than anything it threatened their own identity amongst foreigners who had only arrived not long ago, and who were trying to take. Indians were not only able to become the majority, but were also able to fare well in socio-economic terms, further widening the gap between themselves and the Fijians, who stringently sought dominion over them through the political sphere. However when that failed, all hell broke loose and has since seen the country crippled by a system that fails to successfully reconcile tradition and modernity to counterbalance the racial differences between the two major races.

Since, the 1987 coup, there has been a high level of anxiety amongst the Indian community in Fiji, as thousands left the country. They have been driven to the leave due to anxieties that revolve around security, human rights, fair political representation, and land rights. Fijians control 83 percent of the land which is leased on a long term basis which ensures the Fijians continued control and economic benefit, however other reports suggest that this figure is much higher as the Citizens Constitutional Forum believes that it is actually more than 90 percent (Castellinoa and Keane), thus expiration and non-renewal of these leases to Indians in the country leaves them in a difficult situation as it threatens their livelihood. According to report on the lands woes of Indians from lease expirations, the human costs are immense as it leads to the break-up of families and communities, social and cultural poverty, stress and emotional anguish, and economic hardship (Barr). Indians feel a grave injustice as they are overwhelmed with a sense of powerlessness and a loss of faith in the political and legal system, developing resentment against the establishment and an increasing all-round impoverishment (Barr).

Historically, social and economic inequalities have presided between Fijians and Indians in which Fijians perform poorly compared to Indians in terms of education and certain economic sectors. With the politicized racial prodding of parties, these notions are deeply ingrained in the mindsets of these two communities, which leads to the undermining of peaceful and fair racial relations. Once Fijians allow Indians access to equal political rights they see themselves as dispossessed in their own country. High levels of violence against Indians by Fijians had been unleashed by the coups which included systematic looting and burning of Indian homes, temples, and businesses with little intervention from security forces (Prasad, Dakuvula and Snell). Fijians are very religious and the Methodist Church, which has the largest Fijian adherents, carries a lot of influence in Fijian society and espousing tradition and Fijian nationalism. There is a deep separation between the two races when it comes to religion, and freedom of religion has been threatened with Fiji's political upheavals. After the 1987 coup, sabbatarianism was enforced by Rabuka, a devout Methodist, in a decree in which it stated that whether or not one was a Christian, Sunday would be observed as a sacred day (Castellinoa and Keane). In light of this decree, the Economist described Methodists as the ayatollahs of Pacific Christianity as the Methodist Sunday enforced after the coups meant no public transportation and the closure of businesses (The Economist) and was seen as an attack on Fiji's non-Christians who are mainly Indians as there have been incidents of arson and other attacks on Hindu temples before and after the coup of 1987 (Nanda). Hindu temples have been the main target of attacks and compared to churches and mosques have been targeted disproportionately with the destruction of religious texts and

statues (Radio New Zealand). Indians have been unequivocally suppressed by the traditional Fijian mandate as they have been deprived of their basic rights and had their equality threatened.

The fact that each time an Indian dominated parliament is elected into power, it ignites Fijian fury and leads to it being overthrown shows that Fijians will not tolerate Indian political dominance and reflects Fijian distrust towards Indians. Fijians are just not ready for Indian political dominance, which also shows their total disregard for the principles of democracy. As policies have been directed towards lessening the socio-economic gap between Indians and Fijians, it has only made matters worse for the country, as these policies have been considered to be racist against Indians. The question of the Fijian cause stems from the dilemma of tradition versus modernity, as Fiji's political history encapsulates that democracy is a concept that Fijians have undeniably had a hard time grappling with. Fijians contend that they have a right to self-determination as the indigenous people of Fiji even at the expense of Indians. It places Indians in a very unfortunate position as they fail to be accepted in their own country which they have all grown up in and helped contribute to its development and progress. They have reason to be frustrated, as their unfair predicament has driven them overseas in search of a better life. However, the ugly coup cycle that mars Fiji is not going to go away unless the two races recognize and embrace each other's grievances for the benefit of the entire country. Due to Fiji's unique ethnic make-up, effective race-based policies should be based on areas where a particular race lags, such as gauging socio-economic levels and making suitable provisions that do not leave one ethnicity disadvantaged completely disadvantaged as a result.

Conclusion

Fiji's proclivity to coups is deeply rooted in the socio-economic and cultural differences that exist between Fijians and Indians. Other factors such as civil-military relations, failure of Fiji's constitutions, Fiji's colonial legacy, elitism and power struggle both between Indians and Fijians and within the Fijian community itself, have all played a part in Fiji's political deterioration. However, all these factors are all centered on the sensitive racial intricacies between how best to accommodate the two major races in Fiji. Dialogue and education are necessary to bridge the racial divide and bring about a better platform for political resurrection. A deeper appreciation for the country's social fabric is critical in bringing about peace and conflict resolution. Democratic progress and constitutionality adherence will not be achieved unless the people work out ways to accommodate the unique racial composition of the country.

Since this research focused mainly on socio-economic and cultural differences between Indians and Fijians, it limits the scope of research, which could have been extended to other critical factors, with the role of the military being the main one. In many other countries socio-economic and cultural differences between races do exist, but they do not necessarily lead to the actualization of a military coup. The Fiji military was highly involved and instrumental in each coup, which is why it is essential to deeply analyze its role and function in Fiji's history since independence till the last coup in 2006, which has since seen a military dictatorship rule Fiji. It seems that unlike other countries whose militaries remain apolitical and subservient towards the government in the country, leaving politics to politicians, the Fiji military seems to use its position to foster its own interests, especially those of its leadership in politics. On reflection of Fiji's coups, the military has seen the need to act in the interests of the people instead of allowing the democratic process to take its course. Thus, future research

could perhaps focus on the Fiji military and its leadership and how it contributes to Fiji's proclivity to coups. This research shows the many complexities involved in Fiji's unstable political history when it comes to dealing with socio-economic and cultural differences between two major races and proves overwhelming for the nation to move forward and past racial lines for a more stable and secure future. However, coups should not be the answer, but unless people realize that, this coup mentality will continue to mar the country's political progress. x

Works Cited

- K.J. Barr, 'Squatters in Fiji—The Need for an Attitudinal Change' Squatters in Fiji— The Need for an Attitudinal Change" CCF Housing and Social Exclusion Policy (2007)
- Belkin, Aaron and Schofer, Evan. "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5(2003)
- Bush, Joseph E. "Defining Group Rights and Delineating Sovereignty: A Case from the Republic of Fiji" *American University Law Review* 14, no 3 (1999)
- Castellino, Joshua, Keane, David. *Minority Rights in the Pacific Region: A Comparative Legal Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
- Cottrell, Jill, Ghai, Yash. "A Tale of Three Constitutions: Ethnicity and Politics in Fiji" *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 5, no.4 (2007)
- Cottrell, Jill and Ghai, Yash "The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization" *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance*
- Davies, John. "Ethnic Competition and the Forging of the Nation-State of Fiji." *The Round Table* 94,no.1(2005)
- Emde, Sina. "Feared Rumors and Rumors of Fears: The Politicization of Ethnicity during the Fiji Coup in 2000", *Oceania* 75, no. 4 (2005)
- Finer, S. *The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988
- Finn, Gerard A., Wesley-Smith, Terrence. "Coups, Conflicts and Crises: The New Pacific Way?" *Race and Class* 42,no.4(2001)
- Grieco, Elizabeth M. "The Effects of Migration on the Establishment of Networks: Caste Disintegration and Reformation among the Indians of Fiji", *International Migration Review* 32, no. 3 (1998)
- Lal, Brij "Making History, Becoming History: Reflections on the Alleged Failure of the Fiji Constitution," *Contemporary Pacific* 14, no. 1 (2002)
- Lal, Victor. *Fiji: Coups in Paradise*. London, Zed Books Ltd., 1990
- Lal, Victor, Hunter, Russel "Frank Bainimarama's Tiger and Fiji Elections Prospects in 2014" *The Round Table* 101, no.5 (2012)
- Londregan , John B., and Poole, Keith T. "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power " ,*World Politics* 42, no. 2 (1990)

- McCarthy, Stephen. "Soldier, Chiefs and Church: Unstable Democracy in Fiji." *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 5 (2011): 563-78.
- Nanda, Ved. P.. "Ethnic Conflict in Fiji and Human Rights Law" *Cornell International Law Journal* 25, no 3 (1992)
- Prasad, S., Dakuvula, J., and Snell, D., *Economic Development, Democracy and Ethnic Conflict in the Fiji Islands* (London: Minority Rights Group, 2001)
- Quinlivan, James T. *Coup-proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East*. *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999)
- Scobell, Andrew. "Politics, Professionalism, and Peacekeeping: An Analysis of the 1987 Military Coup in Fiji" *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 2 (1994):187-201
- Sharma, Shalendra *Politics of Race in Fiji* *Economic and Political Weekly* 22, no. 49 (1987)
- Trnka, Susanna. "Land, Life and Labour: Indo-Fijian Claims to Citizenship in a Changing Fiji." *Oceania* 75, no. 4, (2005): 354-367.
- White, Carmen M. "Minority Status as a Contested Terrain: Denying the Parameters of Subordinate Status in Post-Independent Fiji Discourse" *Social Identities* 8, no. 1 (2002): 9-14
- Zimmerman, E. *Political violence, crises and revolutions: Theories and research*. (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1983)

ABOUT THE JOURNAL

Clocks and Clouds is an American University undergraduate research journal that publishes articles on the cutting edge of political science, international studies, and public policy. The journal is meant to add a voice to the intellectual dialogue both within the American University community and in broader academia. Our name comes from the work of philosopher Karl Popper, where clouds are a metaphor for the disorderly and irregular in social science while clocks represent the predictable and rational. By providing a venue for top undergraduate research, Clocks and Clouds aims to find the clocks amidst the clouds.

The journal is organized as an independent student-run joint venture between the School of Public Affairs, the School of International Service, the School of Public Affairs Undergraduate Council, and the School of International Service Undergraduate Council. American University undergraduates of any major may submit work for publication and will have their work assessed through a blind peer review and revision process. Clocks and Clouds publishes one issue per semester in print and electronic formats and appoints staff and editorial reviewers for one-year terms.

For more information, or to learn about participating in the journal as an author, staff member, or editorial reviewer, contact the editor at clocksandclouds@american.edu or visit www.american.edu/clocksandclouds.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Clocks and Clouds is a highly collaborative project among dozens of vital participants, and the journal owes a great debt to everyone involved. Among these collaborators, several deserve particular recognition for their active role in supporting and guiding the journal. Professor Kimberly Cowell-Meyers and Professor Dylan Craig deserve singular recognition for their continued role in advising the student staff and acting as advocates in the faculty. We are incredibly thankful to both Associate Dean Meg Weekes and Associate Dean Patrick Jackson for their support, as the collaboration between SPA and SIS would not be possible without them. The SPA and SIS Undergraduate Councils have also done remarkable work to build support among the student body.

We also owe particular gratitude to members of the American University community who have provided valuable advice and support as the journal has grown. Dr. Lyn Stallings in the Office of Undergraduate Studies has provided us with incredible opportunities to expand our name and audience across campus. We have also been excited to connect with the Honors Office through Dr. Michael Manson and R.J. Peterson, who have been instrumental in helping us reach out to talented authors. Sara Ghebremichael, James Helms, Jacqueline Corbett, Matt Bourdon, and Clement Ho have provided equally crucial advice on managing and marketing the journal.

Finally, the thirty-five students who submitted work to *Clocks and Clouds* deserve recognition, as well as the nearly thirty student staff and review board members who worked tirelessly to see this issue published. The articles we are able to publish represent only a small portion of the excellent research conducted by American University undergraduates, and the tremendous response the journal has received continues to validate our mission and push us forward.

ALL CLOUDS
ARE CLOCKS-
EVEN THE
MOST CLOUDY
OF CLOUDS.

KARL POPPER
